Real Spaces

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World Art History and the Rise of Western modernism

You know that poiesis is more than a single thing. For of anything whatever that passes from not being into being the whole cause is composing or poetry; so that the productions of all arts are kinds of poetry, and their craftsmen are all poets … But … they are not called poets: they have other names, while a single section disparted from the whole of poetry – merely the business of music and metres – is entitled with the name of the whole.
Plato, Symposium, 205B–C

1. POST-FORMALIST ART HISTORY

However the discipline of the history of art may have changed over the last few decades of theoretical and critical examination, it has continued to be an archival field, concerned with setting its objects in spatial and temporal order, and with relating them to appropriate documents and archaeological evidence. Much of this work has been accomplished; there are more or less firmly established bodies of works in most fields, and it is to be expected that professional attention might turn elsewhere. To be sure, connoisseurship and documentation have continued to authenticate artifacts in order to establish their market value, that is, for more than simply historical purposes; but the same archival and archaeological work also remains fundamental to the discipline of art history as a kind of history, and the 'provenances' of artifacts for sale *do* in fact place them in groups and series. If that is so, what implications are to be drawn from the fact that artifacts lend themselves to such spatiotemporal arrangement? What is the significance of the certainty with which a vessel from Teotihuacan found in a Maya burial may be at once identified as an import rather than the independent invention of some eccentric Maya potter? When human artifacts were assumed to be essentially form, the answer to this question was fairly simple. Artifacts belonged to styles, continuities characteristic of the imaginations of individuals and groups, from the expressions of which certain conclusions might be drawn about individuals and groups themselves. With the decline of formalism in art history, professional interest in such issues has passed from theoretical to practical in the sense that, while artifacts continue to be sorted, grouped and seriated, the interpretative dimensions of these basic activities have been set aside in favour of methodologies from other fields. Art has long been prone to reduction to problems in the psychology of visual perception, which is an obvious extension of the Western assumption that art taken altogether is *about* visual perception. The theories underlying more recent approaches to the interpretation of art, as I shall discuss presently, derive in one way or another from structural linguistics, and their emphasis is synchronic to the exclusion of the diachronic. The chapters of this book, however, proceed from a different starting point. What if historians of

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Images

1 THE ORIGINS OF IMAGES

If by 'original' we mean 'first', then the first images must have been made independently in many places, and can never be found, or could not be identified as first if they did happen to be found. The simplest substitutive images would have become indistinguishable from other objects once their fragile and fugitive contexts were lost, and resemblant images – images that are clearly *of* something – although associated with dates as early as 30,000 BC in Africa, Europe and Australia, are very difficult to date with any precision, and it is impossible to establish chronologies for traditions of activity that might have lasted for millennia, but have come down to us only in a few randomly preserved fragments. Images, in short, may have 'originated' and then originated again in the same place, as well as 'originating' in many places and times. Or they might never have originated at all in other places and times, where, however, they were (and are) always a possibility, always an available next step from conditions at hand, just as it has always been possible to stop making images, or to change the way they are made, and the purposes for which they are made.

Perhaps because images have become so ubiquitous and available for so many purposes – and this ubiquity and availability are basic features distinguishing the modern world – we are inclined to think of making images as simply natural. We persist in this belief even though, as we shall consider at length in Chapter 7, the conditions of presentation of modern images are obviously highly culturally specific, and unlike anything else before the twentieth century. We should also be warned against the assumption of the naturalness of images by at least two considerations. It may be only because fugitive and temporary marks have not survived, but images appear late in the hominid-human record; and images assume so many social spatial forms that they can hardly be assumed to arise directly from universal biology or psychology.

If our distant ancestors had the physiological capacity for speech several hundred thousand years ago, long before the earliest surviving images were made, it is most crucial for my purposes that any explanation of the origin of both language and images must acknowledge that both occurred within given real spatial conditions. Language and images might have had intimately entangled histories, as in fact they continue to have. Australian aboriginal sand-drawing, for example, which accompanies narrative, instruction and direction, involves a kind of continual spatiotemporal modelling, together with 'poking' or drawing or pointing, fusing something like ostensive indication with the use of pictographic symbols at various levels of specificity or abstraction. If spoken language *is* older than the earliest images, we have also seen that the aeonic chronology of tools and places reaches back much farther still, in turn suggesting that tools and places long preceded language, and that certain characteristic elements and relations of social space and action were already there to be articulated a second time by both words and images.

Whether or not they are older, images are deeper than language in the sense

that they are immediately rooted in real spatial conditions. The constitutive real spatial conditionality of images has the important consequence that their 'first' making must be explained by more than correspondence to appearance. Palaeolithic animals, for example, are descriptive, often remarkably so, and are often explained simply in relation to immediate visual perception. This cannot further explain, however, why animals continued to be painted in the same way and in certain places for so long. The painting and engraving of Palaeolithic Europe is as un-mistakable as any style in the history of art, and was maintained over many millennia, in fact, over a period about as long as human history since the last of these images was made. Rather than supposing that painters continued to recall very similar visual memories of the same things (animals) and nothing else, it is more likely that painting was taught by one painter (or group among whom some painted) to another, and that the requisite skills were either passed on as a ritual activity, or closely imitated. Images were often superimposed or recontoured in Palaeolithic art, which suggests that the act of making, or remaking in the same place, was as important as the images themselves, and that the formula of drawing in a certain way persisted not because an originative perception kept being recorded, but because the formula was part of broader patterns of behaviour (which need not always have been the same). If the 'painters' were, for example, shamans, then continuity of the 'style' must have meanings very different from those that come to hand if we suppose that what is often presented as the beginning of the history of art is no more than the immediate experience of nature, always uncluttered by intervening and interfering representations.

If by seeking 'origins' we wish to raise the question, not of when or where the earliest images were made, but rather of why they might have been made, what needs or purposes they might have served, then I will argue that, in the broadest conditional terms, images are fashioned in order to make present in social spaces what for some reason is not present. Images do not simply represent, rather they inevitably make present in determinate ways, situating, continuing and preserving. Moreover, if images place or re-place the absent, their uses are always defined by present purposes. Images, in short, are put in social spaces, in determinate sizes, in order in some way to complete the social spatial definitions and differentiations treated in the two previous chapters.

4.2 REALITIES OF IMAGES

Modern Americans routinely use images as means of information, advertising, entertainment, or as some combination (or confusion) of these. Images 'tell' us things (or persuade us about things), about other places and times (news, documen-taries, travelogues), or they show us available products, coupled with other images that engage our fantasies, thus inducing us to buy products, as if to realize our 'self-image' by acting upon the fantasies associated with those products. Or fantasies not directly connected to products might induce us to consume fantasies themselves for purposes of diversion or recreation. Modern images are in fact overwhelmingly shaped to these activities and expectations, which are hardly secondary to our lives. We cannot, however, understand all images and their uses from the standpoint of these assumptions and habits.

As we have seen, the modern Western aesthetic-formalist view of 'fine' art grew

up together with the gathering of works of self-referential quality into collections, ultimately into the institutional spaces of museums (and more broadly, into the spaces reserved for those of means and educated taste). At the same time, these changes in the institutional purposes of art made resemblant and narrative 'subject-matter' secondary to 'form', effectively relegating images to more popular and technological 'media'. The purest art of 'form' itself, 'abstract' art, is in fact often called 'non-representational', 'non-objective', or 'non-figural'. The aesthetic-formalist view of art underlying abstraction is, however, broader than abstraction, and is in itself iconoclastic in the straightforward sense of ignoring images even when they are present; aesthetic appreciation requires that we *always* look through and around whatever images we find in the art of any tradition to their more essential 'forms' and their relations. While all this has been going on in the newly specialized modern realm of 'art', however, we have also come to be inundated with images in unprecedented profusion, and the images *we* make and use without thinking of them as 'art' both continue to have real spatial meanings and to generate new real spatial meanings, new social spaces and institutions. One of my purposes in writing this chapter is not simply to explain continuities among the uses of images in various traditions, but to try to provide a basis for the understanding of the vast culture of images in the present. Television, 'seeing at a distance', to take a most pervasive contemporary example, has its own place in the long human history of images, making the whole world in principle contemporaneous, but also presenting the past as 'live'. Stimulation and manipulation of fantasy and 'self-image' are constant and again pervasive in modern life, and huge industries of advertising and 'public relations', from which political and economic institutions are hardly separable, are devoted solely to the creation, transformation and dissemination of 'images', which have as much to do with political change and institutional formation in the modern world as the realities to which we are inclined to believe they unproblematically refer. In short, we cannot begin to understand our own art history, and the ways images have come to bear on our lives, without raising questions about the conditions of presentation of the images we use, and about the relation of those conditions to our own spatiotemporality.

Egyptian tomb images were fed and ministered to regularly by priests. Images of deities were treated like great lords and ladies, awakened, bathed, anointed and fed each day. They were carried on litters on feast days and taken to visit other gods in their temples. The mass of people addressed their supplications to the gods on the occasions when their images were brought out of their darkened and exclusive sanctuaries. Votive images of the élite, as mediators to the gods, might also become objects of popular veneration. Life in Christian Rome turned for centuries around icons of Christ and the Virgin Mary, objects of devotion and pilgrimage, carried on appropriate occasions in procession, sometimes to visit one another in their 'houses', much as Horus might have been taken to the temple of Hathor or Isis.

The history of the ancient Mediterranean is bound together at a deep level by an image called the Palladium. Ilus, the founder of Troy, was said to be descended from Zeus and Electra. In response to his prayer at the founding of the city, an image of Pallas fell from the skies. (Pallas was a feminine deity of unknown

origin; the Greeks identified her with Athena, the Romans with Minerva.) Perhaps this 'image' was an unworked stone, a meteorite, like that of the mother goddess Cybele. However that may be, Troy was supposed to be impregnable as long as it possessed the Palladium. This was stolen, Troy fell, and the powerful image began its legendary peregrinations through the classical world. It was said to have been enshrined in the Temple of Vesta in Rome, where the sacred fire of the state was tended, close to the central, originary shrines and monuments of the city. Rome in its turn fell, the Palladium having passed to Constantinople. It had innumerable later echoes in the Christian Middle Ages. An icon of Christ saved the city of Edessa, and the Byzantine emperor Heraclius attributed his rule to the agency of an icon of the Virgin Mary; Constantinople itself was said to have been saved from invaders by an icon, perhaps of the Virgin and Child together, although the Virgin is especially praised as the all-powerful mother of God. As this suggests, icons, and especially icons of the Virgin Mary, demanded the very highest devotion and the most determined defence; they made present a spiritual imperial power from which the emperor himself took the strength and authority of rule. Much later, and in other political circumstances, in Italian cities like Florence and Siena, icons were the focuses of civic unity, invoked in times of collective danger and thanked for deliverance. The Virgin of Guadalupe has attained a similar status in Mexico. What links all of these examples is behaviour as if the images involved were effective, or potentially effective, as agents of powers, powers closely related to the central values discussed in the last chapter. To us, Egyptian votive sculptures and Byzantine icons are to be seen in museums, where they have quite different values, demanding altogether different behaviour. (Even at that, we might believe that their forms express the 'spirits' of ancient Egypt and Byzantium, as if they were still in some way animated in the institutional spaces of the modern world, if not, however, animated by what they represent.) These examples may serve to call into question the self-evidence of images of all kinds, thus to introduce the issues and distinctions pertinent to the consideration of images in the modern world.

4.3 IMAGES AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCE

The Spanish soldiers who conquered the Inca, and the priests who followed in their train, may well have believed that their paintings on panel and canvas, which showed the sacred narratives and personages of their faith as optical, spatiotemporal events, would appeal to everyone as being comparable to what we all see; but the Inca seeing these same images could quite reasonably conclude that the Christian God was nothing more than a piece of painted cloth that could not speak. The Spanish in this example, as Europeans of the Renaissance, assumed images to be resemblant optical surfaces in virtual spaces. To be sure, images in Christian art respected the hierarchical planar decorum I shall discuss in Chapter 5, and were appropriately shaped and decorated for the rituals they faced, but these matters bore very differently upon them as images. As we have seen, the Inca were accustomed to religious art more primarily grounded in substitutive, real spatial values, art that, instead of making the past present, was meant to articulate the undisputably present. The Inca must also have associated cloth appropriate to divinity, and even images of divinities themselves, with

fine textiles, not with 'painted cloth'. Few Europeans would have denied that a religious painting really *is* in a certain sense a piece of painted cloth, but the paint and cloth would have been regarded as the durable and portable but more or less indifferent vehicle for the reality made evident through the image, a position worked out in centuries of debate and conflict in the Byzantine and Western worlds concerning the nature of images and the representation of Christian divinity. The importance of this difference in attitude toward images, rooted in the certainty of ancient usages in both cultures, must be recognized in order to understand part of the mutual incomprehension of the Inca and the Spanish. And the fundamental depth of such convictions must also be recognized in order to understand the ferocity with which the debate about images was being rejoined in Renaissance Europe with the onset of the great schism of the Protestant Reformation just as European colonization was well under way.

In general, the language available for writing about images has been thoroughly shaped by the long Western controversy over images. The simple Western opposition between 'word' and 'image' is in itself portentous and culturally loaded. Terms like 'idol' and 'fetish' can hardly be used neutrally in Western critical discourse. The first is from *eidolon,* the generic Greek word for an image, real, apparent or mental; the second is related to our 'factitious', a word like 'artificial' or 'conventional', referring to something with no real basis, something simply made by art (it is obviously related to 'facture'), as dreams are made by the imagination. The early Christians distinguished themselves from pagans in rejecting 'idols', and the word 'fetish', whatever meanings might have been given to it by modern writers, was from the beginning heavily laden with the most elemental Judaeo-Christian and Platonic opprobrium. Modern scientific and scholarly prose itself arose in the midst of the iconoclasm contemporary with the beginnings of modern natural science, rejecting persuasion by the 'colours' of rhetoric in favour of factual inference. The word 'species' served for centuries to refer to appearances, and is related to *specto, spectare* (or *specio, specere*) and to the Greek *skopein,* all of which mean to look, look at or behold. It belongs to a rich but ambivalent cluster of words – 'special', 'expect', 'respect' and 'spectator', but also 'specious', 'spectacle', 'specular', 'spectre' (and 'speculate'), much as *skopein* has given us words like microscope, but also 'scepticism'. In modern usage, 'species' has become so identified with scientific taxonomy as to have lost all its earlier resonance. Words like 'impression', 'conceptual image', 'idealization' and 'fantasy' presuppose a psychologistic reduction, which, however familiar and deeply habitual, is also historically and culturally specific.

4.4 TRACES, IMAGES OF TRACES, SIGHT AND ABSTRACTION

Before beginning the consideration of substitutive images, I wish to introduce some fundamental questions about images through the general category of what I shall call *traces*. Like the semiotic *index* discussed in the Introduction, a trace is contiguous with its cause, but it does not have to resemble its cause. A trace may be defined as an index insofar as it functions as an image rather than as a sign. As a kind of index, traces belong to the category including the facture from which inferences of human agency and purpose may be drawn. In the Introduction I illustrated the index with the example of footprints, from which a skilled tracker

might infer a vivid and accurate picture of the person who made them and the circumstances in which they were made. Complete and likely as these inferences may be, however, the trace cannot yield the equivalent of a resemblant image. Most of us have little experience in making such inferences; but we are altogether familiar with the metaphor of visual 'impressions', and we are accustomed to completing the marks that stand for them *as images*. The putative visual 'impression' may be regarded as a kind of retinal trace, and the mark, a brushstroke that stands for this impression, is both a trace in its own right and an image of the retinal trace. From such traces and images of traces we are altogether accustomed to inferring that, for example, those marks on that canvas show people bustling along a Parisian boulevard.

Women of the Walbiri of Central Australia draw and tell 'sand stories'. The story begins with the smoothing of a small area of sand, a model precinct for what is to follow. In this area marks are made, rubbed out and redrawn as narrative advances. Some of these marks are highly schematized resemblances, which might represent a number of different things that can be similarly schematized. In other marks resemblance is not an issue at all; these are *images of traces*, which have a very different basis and authority. A kangaroo is not shown by its shape, even a very schematic shape, but by a series of marks on either side of a line. This shows the tracks of the kangaroo on either side of the mark left on the ground by its tail. A snake is shown by a 'serpentine' line, which is not just a schematization of the form of a snake but the mark of the snake's path. One of the most important images of this kind is that of a person. Persons (unless sleeping) are not shown as 'stick figures', or even as sticks, both of which might be abstractions of the appearance of a person, rather they are shown as U-shapes turned in various directions in various narrative situations, accompanied by one or another appropriate attribute. The U-shape is the mark left on the earth by someone sitting cross-legged on the ground. For those accustomed to noting the slightest changes in flora and fauna, to whom an animal's track may indicate its more or less recent presence as certainly as an actual sighting, the impressions left by people seated on the ground are a vivid indication of distinctly human presence and activity, with associations of stopping-place and centre, and therefore of group identity. But again, it is most important that the U-shape refers not to human appearance but to the distinctive trace on the ground of primary human social activity.

The U-shaped images of traces take their definition from the results of actual contact – the marks left by people sitting on the ground – but they are also images of that actual contact. Moreover, in becoming images they are simplified and schematized, and, more importantly, they are abstracted from size, made smaller in order to be put to some use, in this case to be manipulated in a model of social space and time. It is this abstraction that makes the reference to actual contact manipulable in the narrative.

I shall return to traces, and to their values of contiguity (closely related to central values) through the rest of this book. But images of traces also again raise the more general issue treated in Section 15 of Chapter 1, on models. The image of a trace, in abstracting from size, shifts apprehension from tactile to visual (at the same time that the final authority of the marks is tactile). But we may only

touch things at the size they are, and contiguity, like touch, implies an exact, concave–convex fit between cause and trace. We may, however, *see* the same thing *as* the same thing over a wide range of actual sizes, just as we are able to recognize someone close at hand or at a distance. To put the matter in the most general terms, *all images are sight-like in being abstracted from actual size,* and this abstraction, this 'drawing from', is always the movement as an image into one or another space of human use. And, as we shall see, the abstraction of images provides the basis for the characterization of sight itself, as well as imagination and thought, as 'places' for images.

4.5 REAL METAPHOR

Our word 'metaphor' is from the Greek *metapherein*, to transfer, to carry over or across. When we use language metaphorically we put one word 'in place of another' on the basis of some similarity between the things the words signify. Metaphors are not simply equivalent to what they replace, however, and the basis for comparison must be established by some embracing context. If I refer to 'the lion Alexander', or say 'Alexander is a lion', I might be taken to mean that there is a lion named 'Alexander'. If I say 'Alexander of Macedon is a lion', then it becomes clear that I am comparing a person, a ruler, to something he is not, namely a lion. Since Alexander is *not* a lion, I must mean that he is like a lion in some way; but then I might mean that Alexander is brave and strong like a lion, or that he is lazy or rapacious, or that he has any number of other qualities that lions might be observed to have. If I say 'Alexander of Macedon is a lion in battle', then it becomes clearer that I mean he is brave and strong. Contexts are not simply verbal, of course. If I had lived in the ancient Near East, I might know that the lion is a royal animal, that rulers had always compared themselves to lions, and that to call Alexander a lion was to call him kingly and to place him in the company of kings.

In language, metaphor usually consists of the interchange of two subtantives, which makes metaphor rich to the point of paradox and beyond; it provides the basis for any number of comparisons not specified by context at the same time that these comparisons are implicit in the metaphor itself. There is an inherent inequality between the possible characteristics of things and the characteristics specified by context, and some poetry is distinguished by the high degree of elaboration and resonance among the characteristics of metaphors.

In this section, I will focus on what might be called the metaphor underlying metaphor, corresponding to the first exchange of substantives. When substantives – person, lion – are exchanged in speech, it is as if, before we are aware of the limits imposed by context, we actually put a lion in the place of a person. When we make what I shall call a *real metaphor* we actually *do* put something at hand in place of something else, something else which is absent, or not actually or practically present, that is, not present in a way that allows it to be treated or addressed. Real metaphor thus makes the absent present by the transfer of what is already at hand. A stone, to take a simple hypothetical example, 'takes the place', or is 'put in the place', of a dead chieftain. *Real metaphor is the most basic means by which substitution is effected*, issuing directly from the most basic conditions of human spatiality, both presence and absence. The same people or

things may be present or absent, and 'in the absence' of some person or thing, other persons and things are present, and may serve to make the absent *as if* present. This is an irreducible basis for the construction of significance within the extralinguistic spatial relations and possibilities acknowledged and indicated by language itself.

The word 'substitute' is closely related to what I mean by real metaphor. 'Substitute' is related to 'stand', to 'status' or 'stature', and to 'statue', which last might be taken to mean something standing in the place of someone who for some reason or another is absent. In general, a real metaphor is something that is able to take the place of something else, to make the absent in some sense actually present; it is something already present that has lent itself to being made to stand for something else.

Like verbal metaphors, real metaphors are defined by context, but the context is a real spatial one. The transfer of something in order to be something else is a primary real spatial and social spatial act, and so is the consequent construction of spaces and times that specifies and sustains this identity. A stick becomes a hobby horse in the context of the game, that is, both within the space and time of the actual playing out of the game and within the premises and rules that shape and control this actual playing out. A stone becomes the presence of the dead chieftain *in a place or precinct*, a correlative space at once preserving identity and specifically shaping behaviour. In these elemental conditional terms, either stick or stone might be suitable for any number of uses in other contexts.

Given its suitability to purpose, the identity of a real metaphor is thus radically dependent upon its real spatial context. As we shall see, degrees of separability of a substitute from context, in the sense of its having the same meaning outside its context, are achieved by facture (which makes it evident that a stone was shaped to some purpose), and more specifically by the addition of resemblant elements. Such 'meaning', however, can only be general and provisional. If recognizable eyes have been inscribed on a worked stone, we may see that it is anthropomorphic, and this recognition might be made by anyone unaware of its original definition by context. (By the same token, the more an image is articulated, the more culturally and historically specific it becomes, so that it becomes more distant even as it becomes more referential.)

Real metaphor, placement in social spatial context, asserts identity, and it also inevitably specifies *how* the two things are the same. In the case of a simple real metaphor, a stone, many possibilities are raised by the initial statement of identity. At the deepest level, 'this is that' also means 'this may be treated as if it were that'. What permits this to be so in the simplest case is mere presence, which allows something to be faced and addressed. Actual presence, however, has its own conditions and co-ordinates. A stone takes up space, is of a certain size, 'stands', is permanent, and these features of the substitute may also be compared to what has been made present (or has made itself present). A stone may be said to 'face', but it may also be made explicitly to face by location relative to an observer in a precinct, or by the addition of features.

Unless its precinct happens to have survived, or unless it has been distinguished or specified in some way by facture and figuration, a real metaphor simply rejoins the natural forms from which it was separated by human purpose.

In elemental instances, things do not have to be transformed in order to serve as real metaphors. Stones may simply be erected or piled, anointed or painted, or they may be set off by bounding; they may be significant by virtue of origin, which might be earthly or heavenly. (Meteorites, stones from heaven, have often been objects of reverence.) Whatever their intrinsic value is thought to be, however, this value must be articulated. These articulations may be minimal and temporary, so that countless shrines – and formative centres – must have slipped into oblivion. A stone regarded as a sacred presence might become just a stone, and pieces of wood might decay. Sometimes, however, real metaphors, like the places that sustain them, may become objects of monumental elaboration, and their identification is preserved by continual use.

4.6 REAL METAPHOR AND RECOGNITION

A real metaphor may effectively be what it stands for simply as a result of placement in its proper context of use. It does not as a whole resemble what it stands for, but it may be specified or empowered by the addition of powerful, resemblant or significant elements, in which case it becomes what I shall call an *icon*. Actual materials might be added that are thought to have intrinsic qualities, eagle feathers or leopard skins, for example, and if these added materials are represented – painted or incised, for example – they must be recognizable.

Something may be recognized by someone as referring by convention rather than resemblance, as words do, and a non-resemblant mark placed anywhere on a simple real metaphor might be meant to have the value of an eye or hand, but if there are examples of such significant marking, they are in principle unreclaimable in the absence of translators, and even translators might give a number of meanings. For present purposes, recognizability is achieved through *resemblance* and *relation*. At base, *resemblance* is a real spatial (and real temporal) relation; that thing, or kind of thing, that appeared there or then now appears here. It is thus related to real metaphor, but stresses appearance, or reappearance, rather than substitution. 'To resemble' means 'to be like', from the Latin *similis*, 'like', and *similare*, 'to make like'. When we say something resembles something else, we make an at least implicit comparison.

Non-resemblant marks may be recognizable because of *relation*, which is relation *on a surface* (in this case, the surface of a real metaphor). 'Eyes', for example, may be added to a real metaphor with simple marks, gouges or incisions, but these must be comparable to actual eyes in being side by side in the upper part of the form to which they are added. It is this most general anthropomorphic scheme, this minimal set of relations – of one to another, of part to whole – that makes the marks recognizable. This scheme, or order, which may vary considerably in itself, also allows a characteristic kind of development, since things that are not eyes can become metaphors for eyes as long as the scheme is maintained. Simple incisions might be filled with seashells or precious stones not so much to imitate the appearance of eyes as to state their properties or value, that they are, for example, bright or precious. The eyes of the presence stated by the real metaphor are *like* precious shells or stones. Although such metaphors may change, or even be interchangeable, the schema itself is irreducible, and if it is too greatly altered recognition becomes problematical.

Since resemblance is also evident in corresponding relations on surfaces, schemata and resemblance are continuous. This has the simple but important consequence that those who make faces (for example) in one way may recognize those made by others in other ways; and it also has the important consequence that, as long as images continue to resemble sufficiently within this broad range, they may be subject to arbitrary invention and elaboration, both in their first utterance and in any successive utterance.

Things are made to resemble principally by *shape,* which adds another fundamentally important dimension to relation. Shape, like resemblance, is always at least implicitly *of.* Moreover, the outlines by which shapes are usually effected tend to have the value of *comprehending* what they enclose. (*Comprehendere* meant to 'grasp', 'unite', 'seize', 'include' or 'arrest'.) That is why both recognizable parts and potent materials may be added to specify a real metaphor. Both in different ways make essences and powers present.

4.7 COMPREHENSION AND CONTOUR

The word 'shape' is related to the German *schöpfen,* 'to draw up', as water is drawn, but also 'to conceive' (as suspicions) and 'to create' in all the grandest senses of that word. In English, the word is ambiguous, in that 'to shape' may mean to form something three-dimensional, but 'shapes' are generally two-dimensional, and the recognizability I have been discussing presupposes relations on a surface. (I will discuss the problem of images on surfaces at the end of this chapter.) Shapes are definite in that they have outlines or edges, but they may also be 'free', when, although they are definite, they do not define ánything, that is, do not make anything recognizable. When they *do* define something, they are said to be *of* that thing, the shape *of* a horse or tree, even *of* a triangle. *Contour* is a special case of shape that defines; the word means something like 'turning with', following and respecting the limits or bounds of a given form. To draw a contour is to abstract (from *abstrahere,* 'to draw' or 'pull from'), but it is also to draw *upon* a surface. Contours are not only *of* things, they are also *from* them, and *after* them. To draw a contour is to 'take a shape' or to draw the contour of a thing as if passing one's hand over a surface in response to variations in the farthest visible surfaces of forms, but it is also to do so at any practicable size. The question of size, and of abstraction from size, is again crucial. In becoming of and from something, the image also enters a place of human use in being identified with a surface, and is abstracted from actual size in the very act of being put to one or another purpose. I have already argued, in Section 3, for the analogy to vision in such abstraction.

As we have just seen, the words 'draw' and 'abstract' are both related to the Latin *traho, trahere*, 'to pull' or 'to draw'. 'Trace' (as well as 'track') and 'portrait' have a similar ancestry. 'To portray' means something like 'to drag or draw forth', literally to 'take' a likeness. These metaphors all suggest actual grasping, as in fact both 'perception' and 'conception' are emphatic variants of *capio, capere*, 'to take hold of', 'grasp' or 'seize', and only secondarily refer to the activities of sense and mind. A *perceptio* may be a harvest, and if 'conception' is the mind's active grasp of form, it is clear why it also refers to biological conception. In all cases, representation is a transfer of some essence; it is more properly

110 Machu Picchu, Peru, sacred
stone, c.1450–1500 AD

a reproduction, not in the contemporary sense of the endless exact replication
of an 'original', but in a more natural biological sense. (One must say 'natural
biological' because the artificial biology of cloning raises the prospect of the
endless exact replication of individuals.)

The term 'comprehension' itself refers to seizing or taking up, and we may
still use it interchangeably with 'grasp'. In general, contour has the value of
circumscribing, comprising or containing what in some way or another is under-
stood to be essential to what a shape resembles; it is thus *what* is contained, this
implicit essence, whatever it is thought to be, that is comprehended and brought
into the space of human use by contour. (In a long Western philosophical tradition,
'form' is 'abstracted' from sensation, and form is always the more 'substantial'
principle of life, growth and definition. The modern language of 'abstraction'
continues this tradition; because they are *not* images, abstract forms are higher,
and therefore more spiritual.)

The Sacred Rock at Machu Picchu (Figure 110) provides a straightforward
example of what I mean by the *comprehension* of contour. To understand this
example we must recall the discussion of the Nasca lines (Figures 57 and 58). I
argued that these lines were made and kept as straight as possible in order to
provide a ritual path always most nearly contiguous to its destination or sighting.
A ritual path is best when it is most like the line of sight connecting observant
and distant sacred centre. To return to Figure 110, the Sacred Rock at Machu
Picchu, by repeating the contour of the mountains, actually brings the power of
the mountain *in the image of the mountain* into ritual space. The Sacred Stone
stands at the northernmost edge of Machu Picchu, its outer side facing the
mountain. Its inner side, toward the ritual centre, faces a sunken courtyard with
flanking buildings. The *image* of the mountain is thus an explicit quasi-contact,
or a fixing of visual contact, between sacred landscape and the space of ritual.
More than just facing, the Sacred Rock brings the sacred form along the line of
sight to ritual address close at hand, and the replication of contour, the tracing   261

111 Namerredje Guymata,
*Ngalyo the Rainbow Serpent
and Kangaroo*, c.1970. Natural
pigments on eucalyptus bark,
77.5 × 58.5 cm (31 × 23⅜ in).
Kluge-Ruhe Collection of
Australian Aboriginal Art,
Charlottesville, Virginia

of contour as a votive act, is made part of the distinction and animation of the
shrine itself. From this example I wish again to draw the general rule that contours,
'turning with' what they describe, comprehend or contain ('hold within themselves')
the vital force of the forms they bring into human use. Innumerable other examples
might be given. The 'X-ray' animals of Australian aboriginal painting (Figure
111) might be taken to show us, precisely in what is contained in contours, what
is vital and substantial about these animals; but over and above any single example,
this relation between contour and content is conditional, and the implicit substance
of what has a contour may assume any number of less explicit cultural forms
(just as X-ray drawing may occur elsewhere than in Australian aboriginal painting).

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If it is believed – as most people have believed – that living things possess life principles, and that these life principles may be separated from the body, then images might be considered traps, containers, or 'homes' for them. I will discuss this more fully in a later section of this chapter on masks.

Drawing, in the sense I am using it here, is active, but its 'activity' involves much more than an action or the consequences of an action. Drawing something makes resemblance, but drawing is also used as if capturing, replacing or restoring presence. This presence, however, can only occur under the conditions of presentation of drawing itself, on a surface, in a social space, and – at least potentially – for an observer. This conditional surplus is significant over and above resemblance as virtual substance. I shall discuss this issue at the end of the chapter, when I consider what I shall call the *completion* of images on surfaces. In general, and at the scale of social space, the relation between contour and content, of outline to what is outlined, is analogous to that between boundary and precinct as discussed in Chapter 2. In fact, the two are sometimes explicitly identified, as we may again see in the images among the Nazca lines (Figure 58).

4.8 LEPINSKI VIR

Lepinski Vir, on the Danube River, was a literal necropolis, a city of the dead, used from the middle of the seventh to the middle of the sixth millennium BC. The dead were not segregated in the earlier Neolithic period and such arrangements mark a fundamental development in the differentiation of social spaces. Lepinski Vir is named for the large whirlpool it faces. It is made up of similar and similarly aligned sanctuaries constructed on a truncated triangular plan with lime-plastered floors and rectangular stone altars. Rites of the dead included excarnation, the removal of flesh from bones, perhaps by exposure to birds. The bones were gathered and buried beneath the rectangular stone altars, at the head of which one or two images were placed.

These images (Figure 112) were made from river boulders, worked by grinding, polishing and reaming with stone tools. Perhaps the boulders were selected because of their ovular shape, which must have been identified with their place of origin; that is, they might have been selected as something like 'river eggs'. If so, they brought a presence with powers already specified to the cult and to the habitation of the dead. The presence was made sensate by the addition of eyes, becoming addressable (and perhaps also apotropaic) at the same time that its facing and gaze became part of the axial arrangement of altar and sanctuary.

Figure 112 is an *icon*, an image concentrating a number of powers in a way that could not occur naturally; it has the mouth of a fish (a creature of the river, origin and source of nourishment), bird claw hands (perhaps acknowledging the role of birds in death and regeneration, like the egg shape), breasts and vulva (sustenance and birth itself). The whole was painted with red earth, associated in many places with the dead as blood and therefore life. This is thus not so much an image of a deity as it is an assemblage of powers articulating an initial substitution, a real metaphor, perhaps made more significant by its origin, but also irreducibly significant in its own right; this presence is heightened and distinguished by facture, and by specifications of presence through figuration, the addition of resemblant elements.

112 Carved sandstone boulder, c.6000 BC, Lepinski Vir, Yugoslavia. Height 38 cm (15⅜ in). National Museum, Belgrade

113 *Linga* in shrine of Shiva
cave temple, Elephanta, India,
mid-6th century

114 'Master of animals'
in yogic posture with tiger
stripes and mask, and horns
of a buffalo. Steatite seal from
Mohenjo-Daro, 2300–1750 BC,
1.4 × 1.4 cm (1⅜ × 1⅜ in).
National Museum, New Delhi

4.9 SHIVA

At some Hindu shrines the deity Shiva may be addressed in the form of painted stones. The stones, simply in being painted, are already at a remove from simple real metaphor. Stones may be deliberately placed to mark shrines, and the most sacred stones spontaneously manifest presence, for example, through the attention of animals. However chosen, they are set off by inclusion within the precinct of the shrine at the same time that the precinct itself may be articulated by painting and striping with sacred vermilion. This striping effects distinction before it is associated as a symbol with the cult of Shiva, in which similar stripes might, for example, mark the foreheads of devotees. By the same token, painted circles articulate the sacredness of stone and shrine before they refer to the *yoni,* which may complete the presence of Shiva as his feminine principle. At a most basic level, as we have discussed in Chapter 1, this distinction by painting has the same significance as any greater degree of facture and is sufficient to articulate by elaboration the effective presence of the deity. Most basic to this articulation, however, are the stones themselves, whose presence has been made another presence for ritual address. All of these variants no doubt represent ancient practices, which have persisted to the present, forming a core around which millennia of factural development, iconographic elaboration and religious speculation have gathered.

The cult of Shiva centres around the *linga* (Figure 113), and the innermost sanctuary of every Shiva temple enshrines a *linga,* usually, as in Figure 113, a short, worked cylinder of stone with a rounded top, which may, however, reach

columnar size and proportions. The word *linga* means 'sign', perhaps a manifestation of the past and present power of the deity. A *linga* need not be shaped and, as I have just said, Shiva may be addressed in all kinds of stones, upright or not, and in comparable forms made from all kinds of materials. The honorific refinement of such real metaphors may take the explicit form of a phallus, which is, however, a specification of more general 'central' meanings, and the rounded upright stone became canonical. Still, the *linga* is never distant from the originary forms to which it is related.

If in general the word *linga* means 'sign', it also means sign of sex; that is, the stone is both the presence of the god and the more specific presence of the divine potency of the god. The cult of a deity like Shiva is very old. There are *linga* shapes of clay from the Indus River Valley cities, and a seal from Mohenjo-Daro (2300–1750 BC) shows a large central figure, frontal and enthroned, seated in a yogic posture, his face a mask, surmounted by great buffalo horns marking him as divine (Figure 114). He is shown as 'master of animals', with confronted antelopes standing beneath his throne (as deer would in much later images of the Buddha). Vegetation sprouts from the top of his crown, and similar shapes, repeated and inverted, serve as legs of his throne. The figure's erect phallus is central, perhaps indicating, not simply generation, but a ritual meditative state in which the power of generation is at once fully aroused and contained.

At a certain point the *linga* was coupled with a female counterpart, the *yoni*, a channelled ring at the base of the *linga*. The *yoni* has a spout from which libations poured over the *linga* may run. This is a further articulation of the *linga* as a male sign, by implication uniting it with a female generative principle of the same degree of primordiality.

When the earliest anthropomorphic images of Shiva were made, in the second or first centuries BC, some 1,500 to 2,000 years after the Mohenjo-Daro seal, the *linga* was presented as a phallus-column of large proportions. Much as the Egyptian Osiris might face outward from a *djed* pillar, thus to be identified with the most ancient signs of stability and generation, a full-figure frontal Shiva, standing on the shoulders of a kneeling monster, faced outward from the columnar *linga*. In this additive process figuration articulates and specifies more elemental meanings which are, however, not abandoned.

Simply centring a *linga* on a square plinth, and cardinally righting this base, at once establishes relation to the cosmos and establishes the centre from which the rightness of the cosmos itself had its origin. If we project such meanings back to the deity from Mohenjo-Daro, the yogic containment of seed may be understood as a form of spiritual ascent, identified at once with the generative power and vertical dimension of the centre. In later forms, Shiva may be shown in a flamed *mandorla*, the cosmic *linga,* a pillar of light, an absolute centre of energy. As a further development of its central and directional values, the *linga* is often given a face (Figure 115), four faces (one for each of the cardinal directions), or five (an additional face for the centre). As we have seen, the addition of facial features allows the presence established by a real metaphor explicitly to face and be faced and thus specifies ritual observance, but here it does much more than that. The identification of the gaze of Shiva with the notional lines defining the four directions from the centre defined by the *linga* places the observer and the whole world as

115 Face-*linga*, early 6th century, Shiva temple, Bhumara, India

a cosmos under Shiva's central gaze. These faces multiply a central unity and this multiplication states the multivalence of the single centre.

Perhaps the greatest exposition of the central values of Shiva is the rock cut temple on the island sanctuary of Elephanta. In this temple, which, like all Hindu temples, is cardinally oriented, the *linga* (Figure 113), elevated on its square base in the inner sanctuary, stands as a culmination of the major east–west axis. This *linga* has no faces; instead, its directionality is articulated by doorways, with colossal guardian figures, open to the four directions. These doorways yield to the radiating power of the central presence as surely as they permit access to this presence. (Originally this inner sanctuary cannot have been as easily accessible as it is now. Ascent to the level of the *linga* and passage through the supernaturally guarded doorways would have been ritually complicated, and the *linga* itself would have been concealed and covered, to be revealed only on certain occasions.)

At the culmination of the north-south axis, facing north, is the colossal Shiva Mahadeva, the Great God, the ascetic Shiva, central and frontal (Figure 116). The crowned image rises to a height of some 5.5 metres (nearly 18 feet), its 'greatness' intensively stated by its size. Shiva Mahadeva raises his right hand (badly damaged) and holds a citron in his left. A crowned head in profile emerges from each of his broad smooth shoulders. These flanking faces are shown in a kind of realized profile, as if not to halve their actual presence. All three heads are shown in meditation, concentrating, that is, withdrawn each into its own centre. The image is in effect a great face-*linga*, and the withdrawal of concentration means withdrawal to the primordial central unity of the *linga*, itself concealed, but visible in its powers and aspects. To Mahadeva's right (our left), holding a serpent, is Aghora-Bhairava, the deity in his wrathful aspect; and to the left, holding a lotus, is Vamadeva, his feminine, active and worldly aspect. Reliefs to the sides of this colossal trinity show, to the proper right, Shiva as self-sufficient androgyne, his right half male, his left half female, the beginning of human generation. To the trinity's left is the descent of the River Ganges, once again a scene of primeval generative union. We shall encounter such significant real spatial polarities again in Chapter 5.

The Shiva Mahadeva is a complex and sophisticated icon in which the mysteries of divinity are set forth in terms of size, refinement, royal and religious symbolism, anthropomorphic metaphor and profoundly imagined inwardness. All of these aspects, however, arise from a unity, and, powerfully realized as they are, all might be taken away. Even phallic resemblance might be taken away, leaving only the aniconic real metaphorical presence; and this, of course, might be elaborated, or re-elaborated, in the simultaneously real spatial and theological terms of which I have tried to give some indication.

4.10 UPRIGHT STONES AND ANICONIC IMAGES

Menhirs (from a word meaning 'long stones'), monoliths ('single stones'), and stelae are found in separate traditions in many parts of the world. I have mentioned the *massebot* of the ancient Near East in the section of Chapter 2 on Jerusalem. Stelae are part of early Egyptian royal burials, and, in another form, stood atop Celtic *tumuli* as commemorative or apotropaic figures (or both). They are found

116 Trinity with Shiva
Mahadeva (centre), Aghora-
Bhairava to his right, Vamadeva
(or Uma) to his left. Shiva cave
temple, Elephanta, India,
mid-6th century

in Central Asia (especially Bronze Age Mongolia) and ancient China. In utterly
unrelated traditions, stelae were integral to the early first-millennium megalithic
tomb architecture of San Agustín in Colombia, and there are memorial and ritual
upright stones at Tiahuanaco in Bolivia. Many more examples might be given.

The word most often used for a standing stone, *stele*, is the Greek word for
an upright stone or post, from a verb meaning 'to set up'. Greek uses of stelae,
as gravemarkers and for public proclamations (we might also recall the stelae of
Hammurabi, Sargon and Urnammu (Figures 84, 93 and 94)), are specific variants
of the conditional form I will consider in this section as an extension of my
remarks on real metaphor.

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In the terms of the present argument, 'aniconic' images, literally 'imageless images', are objects treated as if embodying some presence without resemblant features; they may be divided into three kinds: unworked objects, that is, real metaphors; objects distinguished by origin – meteorites are an obvious example; and objects distinguished by facture, by smoothing and ornamentation, but not by figuration, like the *linga*.

The ancient Greeks, we are told by Pausanias, all worshipped 'unworked stones', and the cult of stones is very old in Aegean culture. Some were black meteorites, therefore 'heavenly' stones, but others were not. As we have seen, the Trojan Palladium was probably a meteorite. At the shrine of Apollo at Delphi there was a stone said to be the one swallowed by Kronos in the place of the newborn Zeus, and the *omphalos,* the navel of the world at Delphi, was a rounded stone rather like a *linga.* In all cases these stones must have been regarded as marking extraordinary manifestations, and, at least potentially, as marking or sanctioning centres. The Greek term for an aniconic stone, *baetyl*, has been traced to the Hebrew *beth-el*, house of god, the term used by Jacob for the stone erected to mark the place of his dream of a ladder reaching up to heaven. The Black Stone set in the wall of the Ka'ba at Mecca may have been, like the foundations of the Ka'ba itself, part of a pre-Islamic shrine, turned to the purposes of the new faith precisely because it was not an image. Given the range of possibilities opened up by real metaphor, from presence through distinction to figuration and description, Muhammad rejected all but the first, preserving ancient traditions of observance, while fixing and monotheistically universalizing a centre. The stone remained aniconic, and aniconicity assumed entirely new values.

To return to the Greek world, unworked stones served as objects of cult together with stones shaped as cones or pyramids, and the much more familiar anthropomorphic representations we associate with Greek classical art. Because of their persistence, aniconic images cannot simply be regarded as the 'primitive' beginnings of Greek art, rather they must be supposed to have had the authority of antiquity and deep foundations in immemorial piety and devotion, in contrast to which the sophistication of 'realism' might be seen as the conspicuous embellishment of sacred sites by patrons able to command such skills.

Many gods and demigods were honoured in aniconic form. Zeus and Herakles, Aphrodite, Eros and Apollo, were all worshipped in such forms. In the sanctuary of the Temple of Apollo next to the House of Augustus on the Palatine Hill in Rome reliefs show priestesses in neo-Attic costume tying fillets around an elevated and crowned *baetyl* (a stone erected to mark an epiphany) very much like that visible through the central portal of the *skenographia* from the House of Augustus in Figure 261. We are quick to identify such an image as 'phallic', but these *baetyls* were hung with the quiver of Diana as well as the lyre of Apollo, and their central, generative values should probably be assumed to precede any such simple illustrational identity unless there is reason to think otherwise.

Such practices were not unique to Augustus. In 204 BC the Romans sent an expedition to Asia Minor to claim a small meteoric stone identified with Cybele, the Great Mother, whom the Romans identified with Ops, the goddess of bountiful harvest; her cult, practised by the Roman king and his daughters, honoured the storage of grain. The stone became the 'face' of a statue of Cybele, placed in

117 'Staff of Oranmiyan',
Yoruba, Ife, Nigeria, late Archaic
period (c.800). Granite monolith
and iron

118 *Idena,* the 'Gatekeeper',
Yoruba, Ife, Nigeria, Pre-
pavement period (c.800–1000).
Granite and iron. Museum of Ife
Antiquities, Ife

a temple on the Palatine Hill. Thus the central spaces of Rome and their attendant rituals were complemented by the presence of this 'image'.

Substitution of the elemental kind I am describing is a possibility arising from the condition of the presence of objects. It is a possibility that may be taken up in many ways and, once taken up, may be articulated in many ways. At Ife upright stones were especially associated with Ogun, the pronouncedly masculine god of iron and kingship. In fact, a smith's anvil, a stone, is a shrine of Ogun around which many central, generative values are clustered. The so-called 'Staff of Oranmiyan' (Figure 117) is a shaft of granite nearly five metres (something over sixteen feet) high with spiral-headed iron nails set along its length to form a trident (often associated with Ogun), the prongs of which rise from a boss on the stone's surface. Oranmiyan was the hero son of Oduduwa, the founder of divine kingship, who is male in some accounts, female in others. If tradition has in fact preserved the meaning of this stone, and the trident refers to Ogun, then Oduduwa must be female in the myth that explains it. If the image is phallic, as it is said to be, it is perhaps once again more properly central, emphasizing collective generation. (The boss, for example, might also be a navel.) More importantly, this upright stone identifies generation specifically with royal origins and continuity.

The aniconic is always potentially iconic, which brings us again to the subject of *figuration.* A further degree of specification of a real metaphor beyond the meanings of presence, evident collective effort and distinction by facture such as polishing, colouring and addition of resemblant elements to the surface, may be seen in the 'Gatekeeper' from Ife (Figure 118). Here the stone itself is shaped three-dimensionally. Like Figure 117, the 'Gatekeeper' was made from a rounded stone with iron nails inserted, but the stone has been worked to entirely different effect and purpose. Rather than simply being elaborated on its surface, the shaft is deeply cut in order to describe the contours of head, neck and torso, 269

119 Monolith, 16th century
or older. Basaltic stone, Cross
River region, Nigeria

description consistent with the proportions of the figure as a whole. The continuity and integrity of the stone are respected throughout, and the figure's large sash and delicately folded hands rise from the surface and then rejoin it in a manner comparable to the boss on the Staff of Oranmiyan.

The monolith in Figure 119 from the Cross River region of southern Nigeria and Cameroon was probably made between 1600 and 1900, although some may be much older. About 300 of them were made, a number of which have found their way into museums and private collections. They are rounded shafts of basaltic stone varying in height from 30 centimetres to two metres (just over a foot to more than six feet). They are worked in several more local styles, although in all cases the shafts remain undisturbed, suggesting that substitutive placement of the upright stones themselves was of primary significance. They are ancestor

and status images, showing powerful men with individual attributes, markings and signs of wealth; but they also share certain features, large ornamented navels, for example, or beards and open mouths, perhaps as if speaking. The monoliths were usually set up in large circles, once again certainly by group labour, since the largest stones weigh upwards of half a ton. Accordingly, the circles they defined were used for group activities, trade, play and ritual. Occasionally the stones are alone, and when they are moved from old to new villages they are grouped together or associated with central trees.

The Cross River stones are distinguished by having been transported, smoothed and set up, and this distinction is a first condition of their apparent life. The priests, chieftains or warriors for whom they were made possessed powerful spirits, in need of appropriate abode. The shaft is such an abode, and they were also allotted a reserved place, a precinct, where substitution was appropriate, and where their individual powers were multiplied and available for ritual address. It is in the precinct that the stones explicitly 'face'. An upright shaft of stone may be said to 'face' in all directions, and the addition of features actualized one of these possibilites *in the precinct*, in relation to observers. Features also further articulate the anthropomorphic potential of the upright stone, which may not only be addressed like a person, but is sensate, with eyes to see and a mouth to speak.

Some of the resemblant elements – eyes, nose and mouth – are immediately recognizable, others are not, although they were no doubt significant to those who made them. The multiple brows and beard are perhaps signs of rank and identity, like the patterns of facial cicatrization. Group continuity is asserted by substitution and representation through that substitution, not by resemblance to individuals. The figures' outsized and distended navels, circled and crossed by beaded ornamentation, sometimes radiating large spiral forms, are elaborated to a degree indicating special significance. Perhaps the navels associate these erect male figures with their births, and so with their mothers, and thus with their divine lineages, bringing us back once again to the primordial values of centres.

4.11 MAYA STELAE: 18 RABBIT AT COPAN

Independently of traditions anywhere else in the world, stelae were an important part of the élite centre culture of ancient America from its beginnings in the second millennium BC. A buried offering of jade figurines from the Olmec site at La Venta (Figure 60) models a ceremony taking place among upright shafts of polished stone, and the earlier Olmecs seem to have established the pattern of commemorating dynastic rites of passage and achievements by the erection of stone monuments with relief carving. Maya stelae are part of complexes resulting from corporate labour in megalithic construction, demanding the continual effort of groups in the moving of earth, the quarrying and transportation of stone, and the preparation and application of vast quantities of lime, stucco and pigment. In these centres, the members of a hereditary élite led their ritual lives, directing the construction of the centres themselves as well as the religious, political and economic fortunes of their supporting agricultural populations.

Calendrical inscriptions are one of the hallmarks of classic Maya culture. The

Maya system was vigesimal, 20 x 20, rather than 10 x 10, our century, or 10 x 10 x 10, our millennium, and their calendar, interlaced with ritual and divination, developed together with pictographic and phonetic writing, so that dates and events could be recorded together. The Maya calendar began from an unknown but probably originary event in the late fourth millennium BC, and its purpose (like that of any other calendar) was not simply to record occurrences but to place them in a larger framework of meaning. Maya rulers lived in mythical time, in which they re-enacted and emulated the feats of gods and heroes; writing expanded this chronology, recording names, accessions, marriages, anniversaries, sacrifices and military victories. Stelae provided a principal format for these inscriptions.

The beginning of the dynasty of rulers who oversaw the expansion and eventual regional dominion of the city of Copan (in present-day Honduras) coincided with the beginning of the tenth *baktun* (the 400-year cycle in which the Maya counted their time), corresponding to the fifth century AD. Copan is a series of plazas and courtyards with temple platforms and subsidiary structures arranged on a north–south axis respected through all the phases of its construction. Like all Maya centres, Copan underwent continual building and rebuilding, in which temple platforms and images – including stelae – were rearranged, sometimes destroyed and incorporated into new structures, always within the same cosmically righted ritual order.

The thirteenth ruler in the dynasty that ruled the great Maya centre of Copan, Waxaklahun-Ubah-K'awil, called 18 Rabbit, became lord in 695 and ruled for some 43 years before being captured and beheaded on 3 May 738 by Cauac Sky, lord of the tributary city of Quirigua. According to inscriptions, Cauac Sky smashed and burned the images of the deities at Copan, thus stripping the place of its supernatural protection. Such dates and information give some idea of the precision with which Maya dynastic chronology was kept. The Maya called their stelae 'trees', a term rich with connotations of centrality, and earlier rulers of Copan had set up stones outside the ceremonial centre in relation to landmarks associated with ancestors or in relation to phases of the sun and consequently to the passage of the agricultural year. 18 Rabbit erected seven stelae, all in the northern Great Plaza. Central to the plaza was a radial platform with stairways facing the cardinal directions built by the dynasty's founder. 18 Rabbit rebuilt this platform at a larger scale, concentrating his stelae, standing over cardinally aligned cruciform underground vaults, on the eastern side of the plaza, all in sight of the rising or setting sun.

The sculptures of 18 Rabbit are surpassing virtuoso displays of stone drilling, cutting and knapping, altogether comparable to Maya eccentric flints (see again Figure 24), but at the greater degree of complexity of three dimensions. Some of the stelae of 18 Rabbit are characterized by especially deep undercutting; forms are set out in full relief, at the same time presenting strong, shifting contrasts of light and dark with changing sunlight. The images are thus doubly elaborated; they are carved with transforming brilliance, and what is shown by this carving is an individual transformed to the point of divinity by splendid and powerful regalia, all without departing from the traditionally significant format of the stele.

120 Drawing of west, east
and northern sides of a stele
from Copan, Honduras,
commemorating 5 December,
711, the end of the first *katun*
(20-year period) after 18
Rabbit's accession. Stone
with red paint, height
3.86 m (12 ft 6 in)

Early Maya stelae showed the ruler alone, in profile, with descriptive figural
proportions, and, however iconically complex their image became, Maya rulers
continued to be shown as historical individuals. Although he is shown in frontal
planar wholeness in the manner of the god-masks he wears, 18 Rabbit is shown
as active and, more specifically, as engaged in beneficial ritual. To mark the
completion of the first period of twenty years falling in his reign, 18 Rabbit
erected Stele C, carved with his image on both sides, facing east and west. Perhaps
he sees the whole circle of the world, or the old time and the new, or both. The
image facing east is perhaps younger, since that facing west, the setting sun, is
bearded (Figure 120). The western face is modelled and incised with the greatest
subtlety and precision, as if with an individual inwardness endlessly reflected
amidst the mysterious trappings of kingship.

18 Rabbit's regalia, more than ornament, are powers, which he possesses, or
in which he participates, to a superlative degree. In another image, Stele H, he
cradles the sky serpent bar of rule in his hands and wears a great feathered back-
rack, the cosmos itself. He wears the net skirt of the maize god. He is First Father,
ancestor of all humanity, who, like the kernel of maize, defeats death. For all his
static majesty, 18 Rabbit dances the dance of creation and regeneration. At his
sides twisted cords ending in serpents with white flowers rise to heaven. Another
stele bearing the same date records the ritual in which 18 Rabbit invokes and

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enlivens his ancestors. The 'tree' is thus the shamanic centre through which the king communicates with the world of the ancestors and spirits; in the right order, and beneath the right configuration of the stars, he communicates with the generative energies of the world, affirming dynastic continuity, but, most elementally, enacting the rebirth, and the eternity of the rebirth, of the maize that gives life to all. The stele not only commemorated this occasion, it left the image of the king and his power forever to be ritually observed, that is, approached, faced and addressed. Once again, however, the construction of social space within which these complex meanings could be realized presupposes the significance of real metaphor, and of quarried stones set upright.

4.12 MANIPULATION

So far I have discussed real metaphor in terms of fairly large monuments, often the results of group labour, and related to group spaces and uses. There are, however, more properly personal values of real metaphor rooted in what I shall call *manipulability*. Any real metaphor manifests a presence, which may be faced and addressed. This presence may also be anointed, bathed, painted, decorated, clothed, unclothed and reclothed, hidden and revealed, all as an extension of its reality in the space and time of ritual. Large or fixed images take a kind of basic meaning from their being unmovable by individuals, another side of the group labour necessary to make them in the first place. By the same token, other images are significant precisely by virtue of their being able to be handled, to be moved and treated at will. Manipulability again illustrates the principle that *the actual size of images is always determined by use.*

There are many examples of manipulation, some of them close at hand, like snapshots of friends and family members. But Palaeolithic 'Venuses', as we shall see in the next chapter, are fashioned in the shape of tools, as if to make an implement with special powers, thus changing the value of both tool and image. *Ushabtis*, or 'answerers', placed in Middle Kingdom Egyptian tombs, were meant to take the place in the afterlife of the tomb's owner, who might thus avoid labouring for the gods through eternity, as Egyptians laboured one quarter of the year for the pharaoh in life. *Ushabtis* were inscribed with the name of the deceased, and if this name was called these substitutive images were to go instead. They may also bear an inscribed request to go in the owner's place. It was perhaps sufficient that image and name together designate an individual and, once this designation had been made, the small size of the figures evidently did not matter; but it is also precisely because of this small size that they may be seen to 'fall to hand', to be able to be 'used' should the need arise.

Figure 121 is an *akua'ba* used by Asante women of West Africa to induce conception and beautiful children. It is wooden, and might have been embellished with beads and string. Like most other African wooden sculpture, examples of *akua'maa* (the plural) are not older than the nineteenth century, although similar objects may have been made much before that. The faces are round or ovoid discs, rather like the 'faces' of the kind of hand mirrors descending from ancient Egypt in many traditions. The head is about two-fifths the height of the figure, head and neck together accounting for well over half the height, usually around 30 cm (12 inches). These are something like infantile proportions but

121 *Akua'ba,* Asante, 19th century. Wood, height 34 cm (13½ in). British Museum, London

also indicate the relative importance of the face and head. The 'body' of these figures is formed by a handle, on which abbreviated arms are a kind of hilt, the 'foot' a stand (if the figure is set upright) or butt (if it is grasped). *Akua'maa* with arms and legs, because they are more 'realistic', are often said to have been made latèr, although there is no reason that such elaboration (as well as simplification) could not have taken place at any time. The handle-torso has a navel and breasts, the latter marking it as female. This is because the Asante are matrilineal, and the desire expressed for conception is the desire for a female child to continue the lineage.

Akua'maa may be kept or used in shrines or they may be worn. They may also be used as dolls by young girls. All of these illustrate what I mean by the values of manipulability. Precisely because a shrine might be regarded as the proper 'home' of the image, the association of the image with the shrine may be added to one's own person and activities. If the image itself is grasped and manipulated, still other real spatial values come into play.

The Asante have been reported to believe, as Europeans long have, that the sight of things is able to influence the developing foetus in a mother's womb. The *akua'ba* is not simply a substitute for a child; it is a highly articulated real metaphor, which makes it possible to attract the spirit of a beautiful child, for which it provides a correspondingly beautiful habitat, thus to share its powers with its possessor. The making (or the having made) of an *akua'ba* is a votive act. The 'beautiful child' is a girl with certain characteristics, each heightened and refined by facture, approaching the notional rather than the descriptive. The regular shape of the head becomes a circle or oval; shiny smoothness of skin becomes the polish of the whole surface; another sign of health and vigour, the neck ringed with fat, is refined to the level of rhythmic pattern.

If child and *akua'ba* are carried together, the force of the image might continue to guide the child's growth toward these positive qualities. If the *akua'ba* is used as a toy by an older child, this does not remove it from the patterns of real spatial meaning I wish to indicate. On the contrary, it reaches to the very foundations of culturally specific space and action, to second nature. If the *akua'ba* has now become a 'doll', the child does not simply return to nature in play but rather models and mimics culturally specific behaviour, learning roles, values and ideals as she invents games, just like children playing with dolls in any other culture.

The Yoruba of Nigeria have an unusual number of twins, and consider the birth of twins a portentous event. Twins are believed to share a single soul, and if one dies it must be persuaded not to take the other with it. A diviner may advise parents of a twin who has died to have an image carved called an *ere ibeji*. Figure 122 shows a pair of such images made for twin girls, perhaps by the well-known carver Akiode before 1936. At core, these are manipulable real metaphors, by means of which the spirits of the two children may be addressed, comforted and placated; and once again their identity depends not only upon resemblance but also upon the correlative spaces and times of which they are part. When such images are completed, the mother carries them home like children, dancing as she goes, accompanied by the songs of other women. If ritual is defined as the culturally specific acknowledgement of the extraordinary through extraordinary behaviour, the simple activites of motherhood are transformed into ritual. This

122 Attributed to the carver Akiode, *ere ibeji* (twin figures), Yoruba, before 1936. Wood, height 20 cm (8 in). University of Iowa Museum of Art, Iowa City

pattern continues. Once home, figures are placed in a shrine in the room where the mother sleeps. There they are washed, fed, handsomely dressed and ornamented, and rubbed with oil and colour. Thus the twins' spirits may be assuaged and even persuaded to bring the parents good fortune. Again as if to please the twins' spirits, and the spirits among whom they dwell, the images are smooth and beautiful, whole and radiantly healthy, heightened at every turn by refinement and ornamentation.

In general (early Japan is an exception), ceramics arose together with agriculture, which made sedentary life possible and made the storage of seed absolutely necessary for the maintenance of collective life. In such circumstances the meaning of earth itself must have changed. Fired earth, *terracotta* in some form, became the container and preserver of dry grain, kernels of which, placed in the original earth and watered, split to create new green life. Earth in both cases was the source and preserver of life. Pottery is thus primordially utilitarian, and it is tied to human use in two ways: it is usually shaped to purposes, and these purposes are usually scaled to the human hand and to domestic activities. Although there are large pottery containers, like the great reserve jars of Knossos in Crete, and displays of ceramic virtuosity distinguished by simple size, like Greek geometric amphorae, most pottery is small – bowls, cups and jugs. As important as pottery may have become in the life of agricultural peoples, however, clay seems

first to have been formed into images. In the successive levels of occupation at Jericho, unfired clay figurines appear before pottery, and so it is not possible to account for the origin of ceramics on simple practical grounds. It was evidently more important to squeeze and press clay into resemblant shapes than it was to turn the same techniques to the fashioning of bowls and jars. For some purposes, it was more important to manipulate images than to manipulate things.

In Palaeolithic Europe, long before agriculture, clay figurines were fired in kilns. Animals were modelled with the uncanny descriptive precision and concrete suggestiveness of surface and contour of cave painting and engraving. Female figures (Figure 123) repeated in fired clay the tool-like forms of stone figurines. Like the stone figurines, they are small – Figure 123 is just 11 cm (4½ inches) tall – and they are manipulable.

Clay figurines like Figure 123 are associated with hearths and fire, and this association continued. Both clay and dough are baked to yield substances with very different properties. In a temple at Sabatonivka in Moldavia from the first half of the fifth millennium BC – some 20,000 years after Figure 123 was made, and well into the European era of agriculture – a large group of female figurines, reduced to torso and broad thighs, lay on a dais near a bread oven surrounded by pots with burnt animal remains. This suggests that the simple but deeply mysterious processes of cooking and baking, the transformation by fire of animal and plant life for the sake of human life, were the subject of ritual, and that these rituals involved what were perhaps already millennially old ritual manipulations of female figurines.

Like any material, clay may be worked skilfully and brilliantly, thus to make distinctions among some uses and users and others; there are many examples of ceramics as refined in their facture as work in the most precious materials, which are supplied only to the highest social levels. But clay may also be worked by almost anyone. In parts of India, clay figurines have been made in much the same way since at least the third millennium BC. To be sure, figurines have changed in response to élite styles in other materials, but the old ways have also persisted, much as the *linga*, rather than being supplanted by sophisticated anthropomorphic representations of Shiva, has persisted as a core of religious observance which is only elaborated in its later forms and may always be repeated without change.

Terracotta figures continue to be made in India in great numbers for a variety of votive purposes. They are made in all sizes, from tiny to very large, and are given as gifts to the gods to mark personal, family and civic occasions. At the scale of personal devotion, the practices that surround these votive offerings are associated with simpler shrines – beneficent trees, stones and springs, for example – rather than with the great shrines, with their priestly mediations, that have grown up around larger centres.

The festival of the goddess Gauri observed in northwestern India may provide some clue to the understanding of the innumerable ceramic figurines, especially female figurines, that have been made in uncountable numbers by agricultural people in so many places, in the ancient Near East, in Old Europe and the Mediterranean, in Africa and America as well as India, even though the specific rituals are of course lost and irrecoverable. Just as we are inclined to see any

123 Woman from Dolní Věstonice, c.23,000 BC. Baked clay, height 11.5 cm (4½ in). Moravian Museum, Brno

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upright stone as 'phallic', so we are inclined to see any female figurine as a 'Venus' or 'fertility goddess'; in both cases, however, matters are much more complex, even if central values of generation are never far distant.

Gauri is petitioned to bring health to men and to bring happy marriages. Her festival coincides with spring planting. Having fasted, women go into the wet fields and fashion five tiny images of Gauri from the mud. These are put in a specially painted bowl and carried home in procession. Then they are placed before an altar set up for the occasion and painted with the images of the goddess and her consort. Offerings of flowers, food and sweet-smelling grasses are placed in the bowl with the images. More offerings are then made to large communal images of the two deities, after which the women take the bowls with images as offerings to a well, circumambulate the well three times in prayer, then drop the bowls and their contents into the source of water.

In general, Indian votive ceramics are broken and discarded after use. The important thing is the gift to the god, the change of state of the image, following which the clay may return whence it came. In this case, the fashioning of images itself is a homage and an observance, part of a gathering of salutary forces that is finally offered up to other life-giving forces. These images, scaled to and by the hand at the outset, are not simply representations of the goddess, rather the conditions of their making and holding involve them once again in the most basic meanings of use and ritual.

In Mesoamerica, agriculture was practised for about 5,000 years before pottery began to be made, between 2300 and 1500 BC. In the centuries after 1500 BC small clay figurines began to be made in great numbers throughout present Mexico and Central America, becoming a fundamental part of the village culture that preceded élite ritual centre culture in these areas. A great variety of ceramic traditions developed, like dialects of a common language, in the 3,000 years before the Spanish Conquest.

In this 'formative' period, villages grew up around the banks of Lake Texcoco in the Valley of Mexico, where the Aztecs were to found Tenochtitlan over two and a half millennia later. One of these villages, now called Tlatilco, judging from its size and well-stocked burials, emerged as richer and more important than its neighbours. Tlatilco may help us to understand the role of art and images in this pervasive founding culture.

The typical artifacts of Tlatilco are pottery and figurines. They are highly characteristic and are probably the work of specialized makers, perhaps shamans, although, as in the example we have just considered, makers might sometimes have been users. Most of these figurines, which are around 10 cm (4 inches) tall, are of women (Figure 124), although there are also male figures, sometimes in the identifiable costumes of shamans, warriors, musicians, acrobats or ball players, as well as masks and masked figurines. There is also a strong strain of interest in deformation, which may indicate a belief that physically unusual persons possess unusual powers, and that they and their images are therefore either especially appropriate participants in shamanistic ritual or especially powerful apotropaic images (or both).

The figures of women are generally frontal and upright. They were not made to stand on their own, unless perhaps when pressed into the ground. Their propor-

124 Female figurine from Tlatilco, Valley of Mexico, c.1200 BC. Clay, height 15.7 cm (7⅛ in). Museo Nacional de Antropologia, Mexico City

tions are non-descriptive, the head being about one-third of the body height. The women are young but sexually mature. Their breasts are small and often hidden by hair. Their thighs are exaggerated, often to bulbousness. Hands, lower legs and feet are reduced to nubs. The figurines are typically naked, but are often elaborately coiffed and ornamented, and may have been dressed in impermanent materials. Sometimes they wear short, fringed skirts. Their clay is usually slipped and painted in patterns perhaps reflecting those made with the ceramic body stamps also found at Tlatilco. Some are shown with infants. Although these women have no obvious supernatural attributes – other than the deformations I have noted; often they have two heads or fused faces – their condensed and emphatic thighs suggest fertility and birth. Perhaps these features are related; birth might be seen as doubling, fertility as the capacity to double.

At Tlatilco, these figurines were laid in burials, usually those of women, together with shells, bowls and jars, the latter two of which contained food and drink. Uses of the figurines, however, were not primarily funerary, and much the greater number of them were used in domestic contexts. Those placed in burials seem to be part of the equipment for the afterlife, as if that were a continuation of the present life, in which the same things were needed. The figures in burials are not broken, whereas those outside burials most often are, having been discarded with other debris. It might be supposed that the dead person in the course of her post-mortem journey might have been expected to break them. Why?

Perhaps in the face of life's transitions and crises, in situations of birth, sickness, initiation, marriage, another generation of birth, death and departure to the afterlife, these figures, appropriately outfitted for one or another occasion, represented a gift to the gods. Good for no other occasion, they were broken and discarded. In their innumerable replications and adaptations these figures may have become little more than good luck charms; but even if that is so, they marked the significant stages and events of life and people courted good luck by the making, possession and manipulation of images. Like countless other manipulable images and offerings, these have an earnest human dimension; they are not only images of fertility but offerings against illness and injury – against the dangers of childbirth – or offerings in gratitude for deliverance from illness and injury.

4.13 VOTIVE IMAGES

Many of the images discussed in the last section belong to the vast family of votive art. In this section I shall be concerned with the questions of why and how images play as important a role in votive art as they do.

The word *votum* is from the past participle of *voveo, vovere*, which may mean 'to vow', 'to promise solemnly', or, more simply, 'to wish for'. Votive offerings are fundamental to religious activities in many cultures, and the more general meaning – to wish for – will perhaps help us to understand why these practices are so common and so widespread. Votive practices span unrelated traditions, and they also span élite and popular art forms within traditions. They are firmly established at the broad, practical level of many religions. To wish for something is to desire what is not present, a state of affairs that does not exist, usually a future state of affairs. A vow is an attempt to enlist higher aid in order to determine

the future: if we win this battle, we will build a temple for Athena (who will have favoured us if we have won). Vows may also be individual: if I survive the plague, I will donate a new altarpiece to the family chapel; or, if I *have* survived, I owe a donation. Centres and shrines are the appropriate places for such offerings, since it is there that the offering may be near a power and come into the awareness of that power.

The word *sacer* means 'consecrated to a deity', but it also has a fundamental real spatial meaning and implies a precinct. The opposite of *sacer* is *profanum*, which means before or outside the *fanum*, or temple precinct. The *sacer* is therefore by implication what is *inside* the *fanum*. 'To sacrifice' is to make sacred, *sacer* plus *facere*, 'to make,' an act also by implication performed in the precinct. Perhaps because the act of making sacred, sacrifice, often involves the visible transformation of what is sacrificed, *sacer* was deeply ambivalent; it also meant doomed and forfeited (as sacrifices are) and, beyond that, accursed and detestable, as if the sacrifice deserved its fate. Profane 'goods', wealth and life itself, might be as nothing inside the precinct, thus to be consecrated to a higher purpose. These terms still survive with something of their old resonances in the modern, more secular world. 'Victim' is from the Latin *victima*, an animal for sacrifice, as if unexpected suffering and death finally made sense as a kind of consecration. The use of the term 'holocaust', a sacrifice wholly consumed by fire, has similar implications, but at the historical scale of the attempt to comprehend modern genocide.

The act of offering – from *ob-ferre*, 'to carry before or against' – involves approach, and its fundamental values are values of proximity. Just as centres entail precincts, shrines are real spaces reserved for presences, and the precinct's boundary implies a qualitative spatial change, which is essential to the sacrifice. Sacrificing, making sacred, or consecrating, putting with the sacred, bringing into the *fanum*, may be accomplished in two ways: by facture and by explicit denial of the ordinary. Sometimes there is little difference between the two. An artifact might be evidently reserved for some 'higher use' by brilliant display of skill, which in turn made it and its use extraordinary. The same goal might be achieved much more simply. Such practices as placing fine but broken pottery in burials might be explained by supposing that it was in this way made extraordinary, like the passage by death of the one it accompanied, and thus appropriate to its use in the other space and time of the afterlife, not only by facture but by breakage, by a double denial of its usual function. The issue quickly becomes much more complex, and sacrifice in the usual sense, of animals, for example, or of human beings, involves death in this world in order that the blood of life itself be offered to a higher world. In all cases, what is offered is something of value. Gold and silver are of value in the profane world, where they facilitate commerce and serve to define social rank. They may be as nothing in the sanctuary, but they are not literally nothing, and the ornamentation of a temple might make evident the relative status of the building in a city by a comparable use of gold and silver, which are, however, distinguished by facture and by manifest separation from usual function. Much of the world's art might be so described, and, by the same token, much of the world's art has been melted down or otherwise returned to ordinary purposes.

125 Votive statuettes from the square temple of the god Abu, Tell Asmar, Iraq, c.2900–2600 BC. Photo courtesy of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago

A votive image places a resemblant presence before a sacred presence, and in this relation of mutual facing, proximity is a primary value. Proximity short of contact (but with the implicit goal of contact) may be defined by lines of sight, as if 'facing' were literal and as if sight were a kind of touch. Offerings placed *before* the shrine are close to, but also in sight of. The importance of the value of proximity to a shrine is exemplified with diagrammatic clarity by customs of burial in medieval Christian churches. Although the Church resisted interment within church buildings themselves, patrons, especially royal and high ecclesiastical patrons, insisted upon this prerogative. In general, places near the high altar and relics were more prestigious, and the common run of people were buried in the churchyard. The early French kings were arranged under the crossing of St-Denis, and tombs of the monarchs of England ring the high altar and shrine of Edward the Confessor in Westminster Abbey. Cosimo de' Medici is buried under the crossing of San Lorenzo in Florence as *pater patriae,* flanked on either side by the dynastic burials in the sacristies of Brunelleschi and Michelangelo.

As examples of the values of facing and proximity in votive figures we may consider the images by which we best know the ancient Sumerians (Figure 125). These tubular standing figures are often carved of soft gypsum and painted, with inset stone eyes and brows. They are of generally descriptive proportions, standing in attitudes of prayer with feet together, hands clasping offerings to their chests, their large eyes staring straight ahead. Although all are fairly small, some figures are larger than others, size probably denoting relative rank. These are substitutive images of persons – men and women – of high status, worthy to present themselves dressed before the deity in the deity's own house (early Sumerian temples were like houses), where they were set on benches facing the altar. The

right to present themselves to the deity was perhaps granted by the priest-king for some service or donation to the temple. Such access to the god as these images indicate would thus have been limited and no doubt coveted, both as a privilege of rank and as means to divine favour. Images of select individuals were thus placed near the centre, in continual possible sight of the god. These images may see the god – hence the large envalued eyes – some Sumerian votive images are *only* eyes – and the god may see them, as forever observant and offering. They await the god's word, or gaze, or perhaps even the god's appearance, an epiphany.

All stone and metal had to be imported to Sumer, and clearly identifiable images of the gods, which might be expected to have been made of the finest materials, are as rare as gold, copper and hard stone were valuable. Gypsum such as that used in Figure 125 was highly prized and statues like this were reworked and repaired. Over time numbers of them must have accumulated, and there would have been pressure to replace them with images of new devotees. The group of ten statues to which Figure 125 belonged was buried next to the altar of their temple. Votive figures of the lesser material of clay might be broken to become part of the fabric of the temple as it was enlarged, so that the same relation stated by the hierarchy of materials was maintained as images were kept in the sacred precinct, but relatively closer to or farther from the sacred centre. In both cases the images became foundations of the growing temple.

The highest material of all was royal diorite, which came from Arabia. The pious Gudea of Lagash prided himself on the fact that his image was made of diorite. His pride may be used to illustrate an important duality in votive images. In the first place, use of the material displays unique status, as does Gudea's being shown seated before the god, as donor of the temple structure, the god's house itself. All of this states highest social rank, closest to the god, if still in an attitude of submission and offering. But the identification of the image with the prized and exotic material of diorite also raises another issue. It means, as the high finish and polish of the image also mean, that his image is uniquely worthy to stand before the god, thus the better to act as intermediary for his people. The figure is, like innumerable other royal votive offerings, at once an expression of piety, power and unique vicinity to higher or central power. Splendid offerings are pleasing in the eyes of the god and therefore elicit divine favour, but only one who possesses unique power may make such an offering. So the ruler, however just or unjust, may become a benefactor. This is another of the fundamental patterns of the appropriation of the centre.

The phrases 'splendid offerings' and 'pleasing in the eyes of the god' bring us back to the question of sight as a kind of contact. In the example we have just considered (assuming there was an image of a god, or even a place for the god, on the altar of Sumerian temples) there was mutual 'seeing' on the part of the images of god and observant. An offering that is not an image might be made pleasing *as if* for the gaze of the god by material or facture. Again, it might be desirable to offer an image of oneself, or part of oneself, to the gaze of the deity in the hope of recognition and favour. The offering of a wax arm, for example, like the wax limbs seen at many Roman Catholic shrines, places an image near, but also in the sight of, the image of the shrine. In such a case, it is essential that the image *be* an act of offering on someone's part *and* that it be recognizable.

Many votive images are made not so much in fulfilment of a vow as in gratitude; that is, they are made after some intercession *as if* in fulfilment of a vow. Lorenzo de' Medici, who was to become known as Lorenzo the Magnificent, one of the great patrons of the Italian Renaissance, did not easily establish his reputation as a great and enlightened ruler. On 26 April 1478, Lorenzo and his brother Giuliano were attacked in Florence Cathedral by conspirators and Giuliano was killed. Lorenzo escaped with minor wounds, and in the months that followed he ruthlessly punished the conspirators, publicly hanging them (when beheading was a proper aristocratic execution) and humiliating their memories.

Images played a crucial role in Lorenzo's public reaction to the conspiracy. Drawing upon an earlier Florentine tradition, he commissioned *pitture infamanti*, 'defaming paintings', of his enemies in the last indignity of their execution, images for which he composed derisive inscriptions. The artist who painted these *pitture infamanti* was Sandro Botticelli, who at about the same time must also have been painting the nymphs and graces of his *Primavera* for one of Lorenzo's cousins. The institution of *pitture infamanti* is itself an instructive example of the perennial substitutive value of images, doubly instructive because this episode took place in Florence alongside ethereal Neoplatonic allegory on the eve of the formation of the classic High Renaissance style. But even more interesting for our present purposes are the votive images Lorenzo had made of himself to give thanks for his deliverance. In this case the artist was Andrea del Verrocchio, among other distinctions the teacher of Leonardo da Vinci.

According to the biographer Giorgio Vasari, Verrocchio raised the crude and modest efforts of popular votive images to a new level of naturalism for this occasion. Wooden armatures were covered with wicker and cloth, and wax life masks, hands and feet were added and painted with oil colours; the figures were finished with clothing and even hair, so that, Vasari reports, the figures seemed natural and living.

Three of these figures were made and placed before miraculous images, a crucifix and two Madonnas. It was no doubt considered appropriate to elevate the artistic level of the votive offerings of Lorenzo de' Medici, in order to distinguish them from the simpler offerings of all and sundry, and Verrocchio was in a position to marshal all the accumulated skills of Florentine Renaissance naturalism in addressing the problem. But, however relatively sophisticated Lorenzo's images might have been, they were, like other votive art, variations on themes still connecting them with popular practice, and placing them among broad traditions.

After he had fled bleeding to the Medici palace, Lorenzo appeared bandaged to the people in the window to assure them he was still alive. It was an image of himself in this state, with a wound at his throat, that Lorenzo placed before the crucified Christ. Lorenzo's own appearance to the people recalled the display of the wounded and humiliated Christ, and Lorenzo meant to say that the suffering Christ, seeing Lorenzo's suffering, must have extended his mercy and grace. It was that image of distress that he offered in lasting gratitude to Christ's gaze. To the popular shrine in the church of the Santissima Annunziata, built by his father to house a miraculously completed painting of the *Annunciation*, Lorenzo presented an image of himself in the robes of a Florentine citizen, as if to continue

to live under the Virgin's sustaining grace. (This account of Renaissance Florentine attitudes toward images cannot be completed without noting that the Medici effigies in the Santissima Annunziata were vandalized when the Medici were expelled from Florence in 1494, two years after Lorenzo's death. The *pitture infamanti* of Medici family enemies were also erased.)

The word 'miracle' is from a word meaning 'to wonder or marvel', 'to look on with wonder'. Miracles, like prodigies and monsters, are first of all extraordinary *appearances*. Pliny in fact wrote of *miracula* in his *Natural History* as prodigies and monsters, as portentous appearances demanding interpretation, potentially either good or evil. Accordingly, extraordinary images may be beneficent and attractive or ugly and repellent, and in either case they may be *apotropaic*, 'turning away', preventing the approach of malevolent forces. Composite monsters may thus appropriately stand before a shrine, throne room or tomb, and, in the Mediterranean world, misshapen images might turn the 'evil eye' from a home, or a child's cradle. In Christianity, 'miracles' became more unambiguously good, signs that the divine is indeed benevolent, although the devil still deceives, tempts and seduces. In all cases, the association with appearance is essential.

Western votive images are often referred to as 'miracles' (*miracoli* in Italian, *milagros* in Spanish) and typically show us in some detail *what the deity saw* and testify to the fact that the deity did indeed see it and intervene. The making of a votive image is both an offering and a public witness and testimony, a statement of gratitude, which in turn encourages faith and hope in others. 'Martyr' is the Greek word for witness, and a martyr is one who bears witness to faith through self-sacrifice. The innumerable paintings of martyrs in Christian art not only commemorate such acts, but preserve their memories, literally keeping their exemplary deaths 'before the eyes' of observants. Similarly, votive images make more or less rich offerings, and, placed in the sight of the higher power, they testify to an intervention of that power in the narrative of an individual's life.

4.14 ICONS

In this and the following sections I will make a distinction between two fundamental kinds of images, *icons* and *effigies*. In general, *icons* are substitutive, but they are also additive, as we have already seen in a number of examples. To make an icon, a real metaphor is specified by powerful materials or by resemblant elements, or both. *Effigies* take their primary authority from causal or indexical relation to what they reproduce, or continue to make present. Effigies are related to traces (as discussed in Section 4). A life mask is an example of an effigy. Icons continue the process of transfer of materials to social space and use begun by substitution, adding specific powers to presence. Materials must also be brought to making an effigy, but not because of their intrinsic power. A life mask is made with clay or plaster. Instead, effigies take their value from actual spatial contiguity with their object, which implies temporal continuity, sequence, and literal reference of image to an actual prototype. In a life mask, a mould is made *from* the face, then material is poured into the mould to make the final image. Contact with what was in contact with the original is maintained throughout, and this is essential to the value of the image.

The word 'icon' (which I use reluctantly, and only with the following quali-

fications) is from the Greek *eikon*, meaning 'image', with strong connotations of likeness (and thus, as we shall see, with strong connections to the values of effigies as I have just defined them). But since, as I have discussed in the introduction to this chapter, neutral or positive terms for images are so rare, and since 'icon' has fairly good connotations (in another example of the survival of traditional religious terms in modern 'popular' culture, there are 'national icons' and 'pop icons') I have decided to adapt the word to a primary category of images.

In narrower historical terms, perhaps the most familiar use of the word *icon* is in relation to the Byzantine icon (which I shall discuss below), an image for devotion and veneration. For present purposes I will stress and generalize veneration or observance, making likeness secondary, in favour of actual presence, refinement and appropriate attributes and powers in relation to use. Understood in these broader categorical terms, an *icon* is a conditional possibility, with an open number of possible cultural variations, like real metaphor. The fundamental purpose of any icon in the sense I will use the word is to make powers present in a new unity. Although they may have resemblant elements, icons are not as a whole *of* anything, although they may *imply* that they are.

The *nkisi n'kondi* in Figure 126 was made collaboratively by a carver and a ritual expert, who used it once the carver had completed it. Many *minkondi* (the plural) were made up entirely of pouches of materials collected and assembled for their powers and virtues. (This one would certainly have been clothed and more or less elaborately accoutred in use.) If an *n'kondi* (which means 'hunter') is a human figure, as this one is, then the powers presented by means of it may be addressed, so that it may 'see' and in general act as the enforcing agent of the ancestors, from which its powers largely derive. Animating and empowering materials are sealed into the stomach (the 'soul' or 'life', here marked by a cowrie shell) and the head of these figures, which thus concentrate a greater or lesser number of spiritual powers. *Minkondi* are apotropaic, but they are also 'crossroads figures', ritually addressed at critical junctures in time. In such rituals blades and nails were driven into the figure to awaken the force of the *n'kondi*; and, since iron is always a powerful material, these additions should probably also be regarded as offerings, further adding to the figure's power. They are only disfigurements if we fail to see the *n'kondi* as an icon, that is, as an assembly of spiritual potencies, some of which are associated with human features and capability to act.

For an example at another scale of what I mean by an icon we may return to the Aztec *Coatlicue*, discussed in the Introduction (Figures 4 and 5) as an image primarily significant in terms of real spatial values. This is not how 'Serpent - Skirt' might be imagined to have appeared had she at some time actually lived, rather the image is meant to make her effectively present, fully realized in the precinct for which the image was made, into which the deity's terrible powers were to be brought for ritual address. The powers of agency and possibility of address and propitiation, colossally presented by the substitutive core, and specified in anthropomorphic (or gynaecomorphic) form, are complemented by the powers of eagle and serpent. Consistently with such an assembly of powers, the figure was repeated, so that what might seem narrative redundancy is the multiplication of presence.

126 *Nkisi n'kondi,* Zaire,
Yombe, 19th century. Wood,
metal, shells, height 116.8 cm
(46 in). Detroit Institute of Arts

Insofar as objects may be seen to stand and face, all real metaphors are minimally and schematically anthropomorphic. But, just as 'facing' involves values at once more complex and basic than mere spatial relation, being even minimally 'human shaped' may imply something like human awareness, motivations and capacities. A presence stated by real metaphor can be addressed, prayed or sung to, anointed, reasoned or pleaded with, deferred to, scolded or tricked, and its being given human form gives it the apparent capacity to 'look back at us', to respond. By the same token, limbs give the capacity to move, act, gesture and signal, to react, to dispense, as it were to intervene in human affairs.

Anthropomorphism, and the conditions that make it possible, may be developed to magnify the presence of a deity relative to us. Anthropomorphic presence may be magnified by sheer size, and the Shiva Mahadeva at Elephanta, to return to that example (Figure 116), is comparable to colossal images of deities in many other traditions. We may face this great deity, and the deity faces us (although his eyes are averted). But if the relation of an observant to this colossal image is symmetrical in this fundamental respect, Shiva is profoundly unlike the observant in his seeing in all directions. The multiplication of faces and gazes to the cardinal directions states transcendence by confronting us with what is impossible in the conditional terms of our own physical existences.

The parts of Shiva we see are descriptive in their proportions and surfaces. The same surfaces, however, are also refined and heightened, and thus made literally supernatural attributes of the deity. When surfaces (and proportions) are developed in themselves in this way, they may become iconic. In general, images of religious figures are often iconic in this sense, and also in the case of other naturalistic traditions of religious images, such as Buddhism and Christianity, the most sacred images may not be meant to reclaim the appearance of a historical individual so much as to make present characteristics of divinity, such as the 'greatness', measure, harmony, love or enlightenment of the Buddha. Christ might be shown with similar characteristics, but also as wrathful judge or Man of Sorrows. In these terms, the purpose of an intensely naturalistic crucifixion may not be to recover the appearance of a horrible and moving event but rather to present divinity with the attribute of susceptibility to human pain and suffering.

The sixth-century temple of Vishnu at Deogarh was built in the central square of a cardinally oriented *mandala* of nine squares. In the relief sheltered by the south portico of the temple (Figure 127), Vishnu the Preserver is shown in a deep sleep on the coils of the serpent Ananta, who floats on the endless sea of milk, and whose heads hood and protect him; the god is dreaming an age of cosmic creation into existence. The four-headed creator god Brahma, usually shown in a lotus issuing from Vishnu's navel, appears to arise from one of the serpent's coils. Brahma is flanked by Shiva and Indra.

Vishnu, with his consort and companions, is presented as a great crowned lord, his ornaments worked to the degree of finish of jewellery. He is much larger than any other figure. The proportions of his body are generally descriptive – he is something over eight faces tall, although his legs, perhaps reflecting some aristocratic ideal, are elegantly long in comparison to his torso. The contours

127 *Vishnu Dreaming the World,* Dashavatara temple, Deogarh, India, south side, 6th century AD. Red sandstone

and transitions of the volumes of his body are smooth and flowing. Lakshmi, Vishnu's consort, rubs his legs and feet.

The attribute of anthropomorphism makes the real metaphorical presence of the deity manifest and approachable, and a heightened anthropomorphism identifies the essence and therefore the power of the deity with proportion and measure like that also embodied in the place of his temple. At the same time, these features, which articulate the anthropomorphic potential of the real metaphor itself, are *higher* than any observant in the terms in which image and observant may be compared. Vishnu is larger in relation to his world, more harmonious and more lovely than we, and these qualities, in their very comparability to us, are transcendent.

This brings us to a final striking feature of Vishnu's image. He is shown with multiple limbs, in this case, with four arms. The serpent Ananta also has many heads (and is described as thousand-headed). Like Vishnu, the mother-goddess Durga was shown multi-armed from the beginnings of Hindu sculpture. This multiplicity is in all cases a statement of divine power. The god who may be faced and addressed, and who may act, may act 'with many hands', in ways we cannot. Actions and attributes may change, but the surpassing power shown in many-armedness endures.

4.16 EFFIGIES AND IMAGES WITH THE VALUE OF EFFIGIES
The word 'effigy' is derived from the prefix *ex-*, meaning 'out' or 'from', and *fingo, fingere,* which means most specifically 'to mould'. As I have mentioned, life and death masks are taken directly from the 'features' (a word, by the way, with much the same ancestry as 'facture', as if individual faces were already artifacts) and are, like touch and its object, necessarily of reciprocal size. *The*

first value of an effigy resides in its having been in immediate contact with its object. A life mask begins as an initial impression, which is negative and concave relative to the form from which it was taken. The positive presence of the face is re-presented when the mould is filled. At all stages immediate contact is essential. At all stages, too, the image is the same size as the original (at least in principle, since shrinking or warping may occur).

Effigies have definite contours only 'after the fact', only insofar as they are the result of contact between surfaces. Insofar as an area of contact has a limit – which all areas must – the limit is the actual end of contact. This has important consequences for the issue of comprehension; in an effigy, it is surface that contains or comprehends, not just contour. In this fundamental respect, all effigies – that is, traces that may be seen as images *of* something rather than mere signs, like footprints – are like masks as I shall discuss them in the later sections of this chapter. We may see an effigy as the outside of an inside.

As I remarked earlier, effigies belong to the more general category of *traces*, and traces, or images of traces, may be indicators of former presence without being images in the sense I have just defined. The Buddha could be shown by a pair of footprints before it was considered acceptable to make images of him. The Palaeolithic hands stencilled in caves were made from *someone's* hands, and when art historians sort out and characterize the 'hands' of individual artists evident in the 'styles' of works, those artists' hands must actually have fashioned the works if their attributions are right.

The primary value of effigies, rooted in contiguity, 'touching with', is obviously related to a primary value of centres. Effigies may also have values close to those of relics, which in fact often mark centres. Remains and relics are what is left as the physical aftermath of an extraordinary life. The ashes of the Buddha lay at the foundations of the stupas built by Asoka, and objects associated with the life of Christ – slivers of the true cross, the crown of thorns, his burial shroud – as well as the bodies and parts of the bodies of saints and martyrs and objects associated with their lives, sanctified the holy places of Europe. These were all witnesses to sacred narratives – and no doubt many of them were 'discovered' after the fact in order to supply the demand for such witness – but they were also objects of veneration in their own right, because of their immediacy to, and contiguity with, the once living sacred.

People may make either icons or effigies (or what I shall call *images with the value of effigies*) according to the purposes the images in question are to serve. Many examples might be given of their coexistence. At Ife, portrait terracottas and bronzes with the value of effigies (Figure 16) might have been made together with the 'Staff of Oranmiyan' (Figure 117). In Mesoamerica, the Olmec made very schematic images together with colossal heads which, if they are not huge likenesses of individual chieftains (Figure 27), have the apparent value of describing the details of facial features with fidelity. The art of the first-millennium Andean Moche culture runs the gamut from schematic iconic images to apparent portrait vessels of a high degree of individuality. The conclusion to be drawn is that the skills of portrait 'realism' – skills of making images *as if* they were effigies – are always an option in traditions in which facture is already highly developed, even if these 'realisms' have 'styles' and are strongly characteristic of the traditions

128 Roman patrician with
imagines of ancestors,
1st century AD. Marble, height
165 cm (65 in). Rome, Palazzo
dei Conservatori

129 Robert Campin, *Saint
Veronica with the Sudarium,*
c.1420. Tempera on wood,
151.5 × 61 cm (59½ × 24 in).
Staëdelsches Kunstinstitut,
Frankfurt-am-Main

of skill of their cultures. This implies the adaptability of factural skills, that makers of schematic and highly refined images may quickly make closely descriptive ones.

We say that a life mask, or a portrait for that matter, is made 'after' someone, meaning that it resembles the person; but it is also 'after' someone in a simpler sense, since it implies *prior* physical existence, and, as an image, implies the persistence of the person's appearance (if not presence) in the image when the person is absent. That images may be seen – and tend to be seen – as *succeeding* their prototypes means that prepositions like 'of', 'after', and 'from' should be taken very seriously when used with regard to them. These simple prepositions imply that a likeness in some way issues from its model, or issues from *a* model, and that the two stand in some vital and necessary relation. ('Issue' is from *exire,* 'to go out'.)

In European cultures over a long period (and perhaps in others as well) what might be called the implicit succession of images served as an important metaphor of biological succession and lineage. In Aristotle's theory of biological conception, which had the status of science until modern times, the semen-borne 'form'

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of the male struggled to realize itself in the resistant 'matter' of the female, nature always trying to realize a handsome male child, a norm from which females were a major deviation. The Etruscans made portraits which may have been taken from life (or death) masks, and Roman families after them made masks of ancestors that were honoured at public sacrifices and carried in funeral processions of prominent family members, in which they were worn by those who most resembled them in build. Figure 128 is a copy after a life-size Roman Republican portrait of a patrician carrying *imagines* of two male ancestors. I shall discuss such images again in a later section.

A life mask is a trace of individual features, absolutely fitted to the surfaces from which it was made; it is an effigy that has the authority of being immediately *from* what it represents, an authority rooted in values of contiguity and contact. Saint Veronica (Figure 129) is supposed to have been a pious woman who, moved by the suffering of Christ carrying his cross to Calvary, wiped his face with a cloth, which was imprinted with his features. The name 'Veronica' is often explained as an anagram of *vera icon*, 'true image', and the cloth, called the *Sudarium* (referring to the sweat of Christ) was installed as a major relic in St Peter's in Rome. In this case image and relic are united and the 'true face' of Christ was thought to have been preserved, guaranteed by actual contact.

The prototype for the Christian icon, which developed more or less concurrently in Rome and Byzantium around 600, was the memorial portrait, the best record of which is to be seen in the mummy bundle portraits from the Fayum in Egypt (Figure 131). In principle, the many images of the Virgin Mary and Christ were 'taken', like portraits, directly from their models, and thus had the authority of effigies. In the absence of models, or of models at the time they were painted, resemblance to a divine original was authenticated, first, by their capacity to perform miracles; and, second, by the claim that they were *acheiropoetikos*, 'not made by human hands', that they were completed by angels, by the holy personage, or, in the case of the Virgin Mary, by the evangelist Luke, who was said to have been a painter as well as a physician. In this case, authenticity is affirmed not only by the sanctity of the evangelist, but also by his hand's having been guided by what his eyes had before them, so that a kind of linked series of contacts is again essential. For their part, images made without human agency had a precedent in the heaven-sent aniconic stones scattered through the sanctuaries of the pre-Christian classical world.

Effigies derive from absolutely particular things and events. In principle, the first image in a series of effigies is immediate to its object, contiguous with the surfaces of its object, and has the special authority of having been authored in essential ways by its object. But the crucial contact was inevitably in the past, and so effigies immediately raise questions of actual relation to their putative origins. Because they are particular, effigies imply narrative, and create the demand for *true* narrative and provenance. Christianity is founded on sacred narratives, and such values figured often in the various histories of Christian icons. In modern secular culture, the premium placed upon the authenticity of 'original' works of art is related to these same impulses, which provide a basis for the authority of the past, for controversy with respect to that authority, and for resistance to it.

130 Prince Ankhhaf, from his
tomb at Giza, Egypt, c.2500 BC.
Limestone, painted light reddish-
brown, height 60 cm (23 in).
Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

131 Mummy bundle portrait
of a woman, from the Fayum,
Philadelphia, Egypt, c.160–90
AD. Encaustic on wood,
44 x 20 cm (17½ x 8 in).
British Museum, London

Early in the long Egyptian quest to preserve the habitation of the life force
after death, the body, and especially the features of the face, were bandaged,
coated with plaster and painted. The Old Kingdom mummy of the chief weaver
Watay – perhaps the earliest known to have survived – is a fragile shell of linen
and painted plaster. It maintains a delicate, slightly smiling air of life. The Egyp-
tians imagined the body as a container, a vessel shaped by the god Khnum when
the *ka* was also made, and this subtly corrected and enlivened death mask might
be seen as the preservation of just those surfaces of the volume the god had made.
The bust of Prince Ankhhaf (Figure 130), son-in-law of the pyramid builder
Cheops, preserves incidents of individual bone structure and the fall of aging
flesh with great fidelity, at the same time smoothing and generalizing hair, skull
and ears. Images of the dead with the real or apparent value of effigies, however,
did not generally prevail in Egyptian mortuary art, perhaps because most images
were pharaonic, and the image was primarily one of status and succession of
status. In these terms, images of the pharaoh were more properly iconic.

As I have just mentioned, the mummy portraits from the Fayum in the Nile
Valley of the Roman imperial period are images with the value of effigies (Figure
131). Most were painted on wood panels in heavily textured encaustic (pigment
mixed with wax and melted onto the surface) and placed over the face of the
deceased in the place of a mask. The surfaces of the features are followed with

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modulations of light and dark, describing textures of skin and hair according to the techniques of Greek painting. This is an effigy at one remove, mediated by the painter's hand, but faithful to persons as if like a mould. Because the form is virtual, these life-scaled images withdraw into their own niche of space, a niche strangely at odds with the mask of the traditional mummy form. In this blank space the eyes are opened and the glint of life, the tiny reflection of the light of the world, is restored, as the head is lighted from an unseen source. These images (and the bundles to which they were attached) were kept in the houses of their families for two generations or so, perhaps until the individuals were no longer remembered by anyone living. Then they were buried.

The Florentines of the Renaissance, as well as distinguished visitors to the city, made votive wax effigies that were placed by the hundreds in proximity to miracle-working images, especially those in the church of the Santissima Annunziata and in Orsanmichele. I have already considered the contributions of Lorenzo de' Medici and Verrocchio to this tradition. A fine instance both of an effigy and of the enhancement of the values of an effigy by artistic skill is provided by the death mask and marble portrait of Battista Sforza, Duchess of Urbino, by Francesco Laurana. Battista Sforza died in childbirth in 1472, and her death mask (Figure 132) shows her fallen, delicately boned features, her jaw slack in relaxation from mortal pain, her eyebrows sadly still, beyond any possible expression. In Laurana's

132 Anonymous, death mask of Battista Sforza, Duchess of Urbino, 1472. Terracotta. Louvre, Paris

133 Francesco Laurana, *Bust Portrait of Battista Sforza,* c.1475. Marble, 49 × 52 cm (19¼ × 20½ in). Museo Nazionale del Bargello, Florence

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bust (Figure 133) these features return to the poise of a kind of immobile life, and the effigy is restored as an image of courtly elegance and reserve. The refinement of form and edge elevates the image and at the same time reveals the style of the sculptor, the 'manner' (from *manus,* 'hand') or touch, that, as it was said in the Renaissance, breathed life and spirit into the work of art.

4.17 EFFIGIES AND SIZE

Size is the crucial difference between effigies and images with the value of effigies. Marble portraits, for example, may be smaller (or larger) than the same original, and the effective equivalence of the sculptures as portraits at whatever size raises issues of measurement, proportion and ratio. This effective equivalence is rooted in the interchangeability of surfaces as sets of relations, and means that images with the value of effigies are subject to the general rule that the size of images as a fundamental condition of their presentation is always determined by use.

Mirror images raise the issue of proportion and ratio because, however veridical mirrored reflections may seem in response to our own opposing presence and movement, they are never the same size we are. The image of ourselves in a plane mirror, which in a long tradition has been thought to give the truest reflection, is subject to the geometry of reflection and always much smaller than it appears. Again, surfaces are equivalent not as size but as relations; a mirror image is reversed, but preserves relations (raising those issues of symmetry, identity and difference I will discuss in the next chapter), just as it is always in relation to what surrounds our reflected image that its size looks right, and provides a reliable basis for our most exacting self-corrections.

Late medieval European pilgrims took tiny mirrors to shrines, not because the mirrors retained the image of the holy place, but because they were subject to visible contact with the shrine and had at some point truly contained its image. It must have been significant that the image had been there on a portable, possessable surface as an image, however tiny and fugitive. A modern tourist's snapshot serves a similar function, but actually retains the image. The snapshot, skewed, under- or overexposed as it might be, reproducible at many sizes, is a souvenir (from the Latin *subvenire*), perhaps something that has 'come under' the same influence as we have, and so may serve to aid or reinforce memory. The snapshot is evidence of our having 'laid eyes on' the 'original', of our having been proximate to it, and at least of our having established contact by the sight; the camera is the nearest mechanical equivalent to this contact, and the most effective supplement to memory. In general, the authority of a photographic image derives not so much from its resemblance as from its status as a trace or index, as the immediate and direct consequence of a physical state of affairs in relation to a light sensitive surface at a certain point in space and time. Whatever else it might be, and however it might be manipulated, insofar as the photographic image is the result of contact, it may always have the value of an effigy, regardless of the size at which it is reproduced.

4.18 ICONS AND ICONOCLASM

The Virgin of Vladimir (Figure 134) is the holiest icon of Russia, the palladium, first of the city of Vladimir, then of the city of Moscow. It was made in Constant-

134 *The Virgin of Vladimir,* c.1131. Tempera and gold on wood, painted area 104 × 69 cm (41½ × 27½ in). Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow

inople just before 1136, when it was taken to Russia. It has been damaged and restored many times over the centuries, but even though only the faces of Christ and the Virgin are original, it has remained a representative Byzantine icon, and the cumulative attempts to maintain its original appearance are significant in themselves.

Because this is a two-dimensional image, the observer (and observant) must imaginatively complete the corporeal presence of the Virgin and Child in their virtual space. This completion is guided by materials and facture. At the same time that we see the Virgin and Child in a space fronting on our own, we also see the substance of the image as ultramarine with the value of the heavenly, and as gold with the value of royalty (in the hems of the garments) and, beyond that, with the value of celestial space and light. The contours comprehending the unearthly substance of divine mother and child, like the surfaces these contours bound, have been refined again and again. As they were refined, they also became more and more evidently not 'from' or 'of' anything ordinarily visible, rather they join the precious materials at the level of supramundane reality. The making of the icon thus effects a double removal from the merely visible. Not only was it abstracted from the visible in being an image (which is the case for any image on a surface), but that abstraction was elaborated to achieve the appearance of an altogether different presence. The level gained through material and facture was powerfully exploited in the iconography of the image. The Virgin of Vladimir is an example of a type of Virgin called 'tender' or 'compassionate', and such images were said to embody a paradox analogous to the simultaneous physical and transcendental presence of God and his Mother through the image. The Virgin circumscribes, contains the body of Christ, as, it was said, a human woman contained the uncircumscribable Creator. This is a variation of the paradox of the Incarnation itself. As both human and divine, the Virgin gazes at us in the tragic knowledge (which the observant also had) of her child's human fate. In order for the image to have its effect, we must finish the story of Christ's life and sacrifice. Therefore, at the level of divine archetypes there is also human compassion and pity. Christ's head interrupts the contour of his mother to press his cheek to hers. They touch and embrace with delicate fingers. Her face, toward us, is dark and sombre; he faces away from us, into the light that casts his mother's face in shadow, as if raised to the level of celestial illumination, the level of the image itself, and thus to the level of his promise, above and beyond death.

The same conditions that make images able to be addressed, venerated and exalted also allow them to be insulted, humiliated and destroyed, and iconoclasm, the general term for the destruction of images (the word is from the Greek *eikon*, 'image', and a verb meaning 'to break') provides many negative demonstrations of the positive values of images I have discussed so far in this chapter. Iconoclasm, in fact, is the express inversion or denial of those positive values *in the same conditional terms*. Precisely because an image is considered able to house the spirit of what it represents, it may be destroyed by enemies as well as maintained by friends. Bad spirits may be contained by images as well as good ones, and images considered benevolent by some might be considered malevolent by others. Images made for one reason might have to be neutralized for others. In some Egyptian tombs, for example, unpropitious images belonging to hieroglyphic

inscriptions were trimmed away from the hieroglyphs to which they belonged, and it must have been more important that maleficent presences be avoided than that the text be complete. When we say that images – or even monuments in general – are 'defaced', we do not simply mean that they have been violently deprived of their features, we still mean that a fundamental real spatial value of theirs has been destroyed or compromised.

The destruction of images has as much to do with the social spaces to which they belong as with the identity and properties of images themselves. Images expressly implicated in the meanings of social and political spaces are the first to be hauled down when the social and political order enacted in those spaces is changed. But even in such cases, the surrogate presence of the image is also treated *as* a surrogate, as a substitute, so that the image is destroyed *as* an image, in its relation to its original. It is the effective presence of the original that is broken and humiliated, brought to the ground. The bronze royal head in Figure 15 may have a mutilated eye because it was 'punished' in the place of the king himself, and left as a monument, but now to his degradation. The king is one fittingly punished as a criminal. There are innumerable examples of such punishment *in absentia*. Burning in effigy is a familiar and still fairly common example, entirely comparable in principle to the *pitture infamanti* of the Florentines, to cite only one of the examples discussed above. And again, it is important to stress the importance of the substitutive values of the image in such behaviour. The life of miracle-causing statues of the Virgin in the cults of popular piety might be said to have been fully acknowledged during the English Reformation when these images were imprisoned, tried as heretics and demeaningly executed in public. Nor are such practices merely archaic. The public burning of religious icons after the Russian Revolution and the 'execution' of statues of Christ and the saints in the Spanish Civil War struck at more than the political order with which these images were more or less integral.

Images of course perish without violence in many significant ways. Sub-Saharan African wood sculptures, even if they are ancestor figures, must (unless they are 'collected' and preserved) normally only slightly outlast the reach of living human memory; they make the dead present among the living and provide precedent for the making and use of similar images, but they themselves gradually fall in the round of generational time. Sacred images, like sacred texts, that have worn out or been broken in use may be disposed of with more or less ritual. In India, images no longer in worship are placed in water, there to disintegrate and rejoin the great divine and nutritive cycles of the world. We are inclined to think in terms of destruction or survival and conservation, but perhaps the dislocation, breaking and grinding of the great stone images at Olmec and Maya sites should be taken to mean that some of these images had completed their lives, that they were ceremonially deactivated rather than destroyed by invaders or political rivals, much as buildings and even whole sites were rebuilt at significant intervals.

The Western tradition was shaped at its very foundations by a strict prohibition against the making of images, and this has certainly contributed to our expectation that any destruction of images must have been violent. The first of the biblical ten commandments (Exodus 20:3) states that 'thou shalt have no

other gods before me.' The second follows directly from this, and enlarges upon it. 'Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth: Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the LORD thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me; And shewing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my commandments.' More text is devoted to this commandment than to any except that to keep the sabbath, and the prohibition of images is uniquely underscored with threats of retribution. From this text a number of conclusions have been drawn: that images simply should not be made, or that likenesses of creatures should not be made, perhaps because to do so was to compete with God's creative power. In no case should any image be worshipped. To do so implied that God was the image, or that the image was God, which meant that God might be any other image, or that there are many Gods. In order to be one, God was unrepresentable, and any image that was worshipped was necessarily false.

Although there are accounts of art and artists in the Old Testament that were pointed to in justification of other practices through the centuries, the Jewish tradition itself mostly observed the second commandment (not always, however, as we may be again reminded by Figure 51, and by the other murals in the synagogue at Dura Europos). The history of Christianity has been much more complex. Early Christians sharply distinguished themselves from the pagans, whom they regarded with contempt as worshippers of idols; but they also modified and assimilated many pagan forms and observances. Many Christians were martyred for refusing to worship the image of the emperor, but the Church also progressively adapted the symbolism of empire to its sacred personages. As I have mentioned, there is a close relationship between relics and images, basic values of both of which are rooted in contiguity, and the Christian cult of martyrs and relics itself thus established a broad and popular base for the use of images. Although practices involving images became dominant, a strong strain of iconoclasm always persisted in Christianity.

Yahweh could not be made present (although he could make himself present, and such places might be marked), and any image is therefore either a false image of Yahweh or a false god altogether. In being both unpresentable and unrepresentable, Yahweh was without history, in our terms, without succession. At the same time, the creation of human beings was described in terms of succession: they were created in the divine likeness. In one text (Genesis 2:7) Yahweh works like a divine sculptor, forming man from the dust of the ground, then breathing life into his nostrils to make a living soul. An earlier account is more ambivalent, and ambivalent in ways that take us back to the themes with which this chapter began. Is an 'image' or likeness a similarity of appearance or something else? Is an image really 'of' its original? Does it in some way comprehend what it represents? However these questions were (and might be) decided, the image relation in these texts is emphatic and insistent. 'Let us make man in our own image, after our likeness' (Genesis 1:26); 'So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he him' (Genesis 1:27). What follows both verses suggests that man was like his creator in having

dominion over the rest of creation; the later Christian tradition was inclined to understand these words to mean that humans are in their essence like God in being free (even though this would also be the cause of sin and fallenness) and in having a rational soul capable of comprehending the order of creation. Because likeness was spiritual rather than physical, this tended to cast anthropomorphic representation at the level of allegory, just as the human body itself was the appropriate expression and agent of the free, rational, but immaterial soul. (The second verse might also suggest that God was in some sense both male and female; such a reading of the text, prompted by the 'ancient theologians', is given by Giuliano de' Medici in his defence of women in Baldassare Castiglione's *Book of the Courtier.*)

The Old Testament prohibition against images was both reinforced and deeply modified by Greek rationalism. The tendency of natural and metaphysical speculation toward a unity embracing all lower categories of thought, and the identification of this unity with eternity, together with the idea of the essential invisibility of the intelligible, coincided with the idea that the creator God was one and invisible. By the same token, images in general were associated in Greek thought with the sensory (if not the sensual), with the transitory, the illusory and the fantastic. Images also had problems of descent and succession in the vastly influential philosophy of Plato, for whom paradoxically invisible 'ideas' (*idea* in Greek more or less corresponds to *species* in Latin) exist in a timeless supercelestial place; things of this world are images of these perfect 'forms', and images of the appearances of things are consequently at a second remove from true reality. These ideas fused with the Mosaic prohibition of images, adding vanity and sensuality to the absolute dangers of 'idols'.

The issue of succession became critical in Christianity because of the doctrine of the Incarnation, according to which Christ is the only son of God. Questions of the nature of this relation, and of the relation of Father and Son to the third person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, have been the topic of long, bitter controversy. But for our present purposes it is sufficient to say that Christ was in any case a historical person, a real human being, whose life was a narrative, of whom there were records and traces, and of whom there might have been effigies. It would be altogether appropriate and understandable, then, if the Christian icon began in funerary portraits. And because of the central importance of the human life of Christ, narrative was a correspondingly important part of Christian art. The importance of narrative softened the general prohibition against images. An early Pope, Gregory I, justified images as a way of instructing those who could not read the sacred narratives (the vast majority of people). The image of the Crucifixion itself oscillated through the history of Christian iconography between a symbolic and eternal god on the Cross and the more or less graphic depiction of Christ's exemplary human suffering.

The third monotheistic religion, Islam, looked back to the example of earlier Judaism, and Abraham, father of Ishmael by Hagar before he was the father of Isaac by his wife Sarah, is counted as the first Muslim. According to the Koran, Abraham, after he had become a prophet of the one true God, confronted his father, asking him why he served a 'worthless idol, a thing that can neither hear nor see?' (Sura 19:39ff.). Muhammad's revelations took place in the early seventh

century, and his religion was formed in opposition to religions in which images were used in worship, from earlier Arabic traditions to Eastern and Western Christianity. Muhammad in his turn erased the paintings and removed the stone figures in the ancient shrine of the Ka'ba in Mecca, rebuilt on a foundation thought to be laid by Abraham himself. The Koran is unambiguous about idolaters: 'God will not forgive idolatry' (Sura 4:114ff.). Idolatry and making images are not necessarily the same, however, and attitudes toward images in Islamic traditions are more complex. Sculpture is extremely rare in Islamic art. (The Iconoclastic dispute aside, sculpture was generally suppressed in Byzantine art, and rare in Western Christian art between the end of Classical Antiquity and the late Middle Ages.) Painting is treated in terms of succession. The painter attempts to rival God in making things appear, but is finally condemned when asked to bring them to life, which only God can give. In the same terms, these arguments are entirely compatible with the rejection of the Christian Trinity: it is inconsistent with the dignity of God to be supposed to have had a son (Sura 4:171ff.; 18:1–5). Such texts are among the inscriptions in the Dome of the Rock (Figures 53–4). The question of images is thus raised to the level of fundamental theological choice, and, more specifically, places early Islam squarely in opposition to the iconophiles of Byzantine Christianity. Again with perfect consistency, the Virgin Mary occupies a place of honour in the Koran (Sura 19), but both worship of her image and the idea that she was Theotokos, 'the mother of God', were utterly rejected. Although practices of art varied with local circumstances and patronage in the intercontinental reach of Islam – the great painting of the Persian and Mughal courts, for example – the art of Islam is most typically represented by highly developed ornament and calligraphy, that is by art turned to the purposes of appropriately distinguishing place and text (Figures 186–9).

The word 'iconoclasm' now refers to unconventional behaviour and attitudes of all kinds and is generally positive in connotation. It has drifted far from its beginnings. The first Iconoclastic controversy broke out in 726 with the destruction of an image of Christ on the palace portal in Constantinople. The use of images in worship quickly became the centre of a complex struggle, a sustained civil war among shifting political factions of the Byzantine empire that lasted well into the ninth century. As we have just seen, by the eighth century Byzantium confronted the new religious and political reality of Islam. Since the Christians scorned the pagans as idolaters, there must have been sympathy with the Islamic position; at the same time, however, the Christians also believed they had transcended the old Jewish law, and the use of images in worship had deep, more generally Mediterranean roots. The Christian theological arguments that finally justified worship with images accommodated narrative; they also reached well beyond Byzantium to Western Christianity and have influenced the use of images in Christian worship to the present day.

The Iconoclasts argued that Christ could not be truly imitated by painters, but rather that he could only be truly imitated in virtue, and that the Cross and the Eucharist were sufficient and appropriate representations. At issue in these arguments was not simply the nature of images, however, but also the much broader and even more contentious question of the nature of Christ. God was unrepresentable, and so, if Christ simply *was* God, Christ also was unrepre-

sentable; on the other hand, however, God had become an actual person, and it was argued against the Iconoclasts that the incarnation of Christ had voided the Old Testament prohibition against images. If Christ was a historical person, then images might be true in the sense that they came down from actual contact with him. They might, in short, be effigies. To be sure, there were images for which such claims were made, but these images, obviously liable to doubt and even forgery, did not afford the basis for the arguments that prevailed. Instead of saying that images of Christ were 'of' him in a direct line of physical descent, it was argued that they were 'of' the transcendent idea, the eternal archetype, of the saviour of the world, equivalent to the Word of the Gospels themselves. To worship before an image of Christ, therefore, was not to worship the image itself, but rather the truth it instantiated. In fact, not to worship before an image was in effect to doubt, to question or to deny the eternal truth it embodied.

All of the arguments against images remained alive in the Christian medieval tradition, even though worship with images became the rule in both the Eastern and Western churches. The next great outbreak of iconoclasm occurred during the Protestant Reformation of the early sixteenth century, when the status of images became a major point of conflict between Roman Catholics and Protestants, the latter of whom typically removed images from their churches. The Reformation more or less coincided with European exploration and therefore also coincided with European contact with such image-making cultures as those of West Africa, India and ancient America. The images of these cultures, not excluding those few sent back to Europe as trophies, marvels and curiosities, were treated in their turn as false gods, fetishes, idols, demons and fantasms.

Iconoclasm continues in the modern world. The destruction of the colossal Buddhas at Bamiyan in Afghanistan was made possible by a combination of justifications of the kind I have reviewed in this section and modern weaponry. The literal smashing of images was part of the French Revolution, and of subsequent modern revolutions. There is, however, a deeper iconoclasm, more deeply revolutionary, at the base of Western modernism as I shall discuss it in Chapter 7. 'There is a great difference', Francis Bacon wrote in his *Novum Organum,* 'between the *Idols* of the human mind and the *Ideas* of the divine. That is to say, between certain empty dogmas, and the true signatures and marks set upon the works of creation as they are found in nature.' The smashing of Bacon's idols, of Tribe, Cave, Marketplace and Theatre, became the great project of the Enlightenment; their destruction meant the reformation of clouded human understanding, of individual prejudice and passion, of the 'truths' of social accommodation, and the dismissal of speculative dogma, all in the faith that the newly and clearly perceived reality of nature would lead humankind into a new age.

4.19 MASKS

A real metaphor becomes an explicit image when it is given features and attributes. When given eyes, a mouth, markings and navel, the monolith in Figure 119 came explicitly to 'stand' and 'face' in its precinct. Another simple but essential transformation also occurred. As the surface was articulated by features, the monolith itself became a *volume* bounded by a continuous surface; it in effect

became a container, a visible *outside* enclosing and concealing a positive *inside*
with a potential for many kinds of meaning. Outside and inside are opposites,
but they also imply one another, and, much as contour *of* entails comprehension, the inside may be seen as *of* the outside (and vice versa). If we suppose that
such monoliths were made as appropriate and accessible dwellings for the spirits
of chieftains or kings, then it might be supposed that the spirit may reside 'in'
this volume. The 'invisibility' of the enclosed and concealed inside may represent
the invisibility of spirit. The condition of simple presence may thus become
outside and inside, which might be understood as something like body and spirit,
or body and life or appearance and essence. This duality and reciprocity of inside
and outside is also fundamental to masking.

In general, masks make manifest what they show, which becomes faceable
and observable; they also enable what they show to act; and this in turn entails
some transformation of the wearer of the mask, the impersonator. Within these
fundamental conditions a great number of cultural variations – and variations
within cultures – are possible. The word 'mask' is from the Italian *maschera,*
from Arabic meaning 'to transform' or 'falsify', finally from an Egyptian root
referring to leather as a second skin. As this might suggest, the transformations
achieved by masking vary greatly in degree. The mask may simply be part of a
masquerade, but the shaman wearing a mask in ritual *is*, in a sense I will try to
define, the spirit of the mask, possessing extraordinary powers and abilities; and
the gold-faced, blue-haired mask of the Egyptian royal mummy effected the
transfiguration of its wearer into a god, prepared to face other gods in the afterlife.
In all cases, the 'reality' of the mask, like that of real metaphors, is dependent
upon circumstance and occasion, the social event of the masquerade, the ritual
invocation of spirits by the shaman, the prolonged and painstaking ritual preparation of the body of the Egyptian king for life in eternity.

As we have seen, real metaphors possess the values and meaning they do in
their spaces and times of use. The same principle applies to masks. In many cases
the mask wearer is said to be the mask, that is, to become the interior implied
by the mask. Such statements should be understood to mean that *in the space
and time of the proper, ritual use of the mask, the masker, who makes the mask
live, is its animating force.* It is possible to see a masker both as a familiar person
and as the living entity of the mask. This explains why masks themselves are
sometimes regarded as powerful, while others are treated with indifference.
Whether mask transforms wearer, or wearer animates mask, masks are complete
and alive only in prescribed space and time.

As characterizations of the distinction between inside and outside, masks
may articulate real spatial meaning at several levels. The masks on Shang dynasty
bronze ritual vessels (Figures 17 and 169), in addition to being representations,
might also distinguish and transform their contents; that is, what is inside – food
or wine – may have been heightened and consecrated by virtue of its outside.
Again, masks may define and specify boundaries in architecture. Large masks
were incorporated into Maya temple platforms from the very beginning of the
tradition, and by the end whole façades were made up of them. They are often
placed around doorways. Whatever their iconography may have been, these
masks ornament and distinguish buildings, at the same time identifying them

with the presence of a deity. These masks may be partly apotropaic, part of the great number of guardian images in the art of many traditions. But as elements of architecture, the masks powerfully emphasize the difference between the space within and without the walls of the structure. Behind the mask is an implicit interior reality, a reality with which those inside were to be associated. Passage through a masked doorway or façade must have been as if to pass into another world, and such passage was no doubt restricted, the mask once again serving the purpose of helping to define social spatial difference and hierarchy.

Masks were a major part of the ceremonial life of Mesoamerican cultures from the Olmecs through the Maya to the Aztecs. It must be supposed that masks were used for many purposes by so many people over a period of some three thousand years, but the Aztec uses of masks (and costumes) are well documented and constitute a characteristic variation on the themes we are considering. The fashioning of costumes out of impermanent materials was a major Aztec art form, of which we have only a few echoes in sculpture and painting. The Aztecs, like many others, also made unclothed images of permanent materials that were appropriately clothed – that is, invested with appropriate powers, like changeable icons – for ceremonial occasions.

The Aztecs in fact made no distinction between what I have called icons and masks, and both were called by the same name, *teixiptla*. Both served the purpose not so much of representation as of making powers present. As already mentioned, the *Coatlicue* (discussed in detail in the Introduction as an example of real space) is such an image, a dense concentration of the attributes of natural forces, powerful animals and mythical progenitors. In the case of such an icon, a permanent substitutive core made these powers always accessible in a sacred place; in the case of impersonators (as *teixiptla* is often translated – 'impersonator' contains *persona*, 'mask', as I shall discuss at length) the substitute was in effect the living wearer of mask and costume, who made the mask and costume able to participate in ritual, enactments of myth, and festival. The wearing of masks and costumes was a prerogative of high social rank among the Aztecs, and the wearer at once enacted the divine energy of natural forces and the mythic history of the people in doing so. At the same time, the wearer also displayed the divine authority and genealogy that justified rank. Unfortunately, perhaps because of the irreversibility of the transformation and consecration effected by having been the mask, it was required that the wearer of a sacred mask and costume be sacrificed after the ceremony in which they were worn, and so it was the custom of those privileged to wear them also to buy slaves who wore them in their place, enacted the rituals and were duly sacrificed. The costume, its transformative potency intact, was preserved to remain the most sacred property of the slave's buyer, a sign of ordained social status.

A full range of the meaning of masks may be seen in the many masking traditions of West Africa. The Yoruba, for example, believe that the spirits of the ancestors live on, present and powerful, and that it is necessary to communicate with them in order to enable them to continue to take part in collective life. (I have already discussed this issue in the case of Yoruba twin images, Figure 122.) Divination may reveal that an important ancestor must be honoured, in which case an elaborate costume is made, called an *egungun*, which means 'powers

135 *Egungun* mask, Yoruba,
Nigeria, Oyo/Ogbomoso region,
20th century. 160 × 109.2 cm
(63 × 43 in). Virginia Museum
of Fine Arts, Richmond. Gift
of Dr and Mrs Jeffrey Hammer

concealed'. It is made by fixing pieces of fine fabric to a frame that will rest on
a dancer's head (Figure 135). The costume is partly a display of the status and
prosperity of the lineage shared by ancestor and patron, and new layers of cloth
may be added each year. The face, the 'mask' proper, is a blank mesh, through
which the dancer cannot be seen, but which may, however, be elaborated. It may
be enlarged, for example, lined with valuable cowry shells, or a beaded pattern
may be applied in a symmetrical permutation of geometric shapes approximat-
ing the order of the features of the face. The minimal degree of resemblance
between this iconic mask and a face is a fairly precise indicator of the desired
degree of resemblance of the entire costume. Death is the final and most profound
transformation of the spirit and the costume reflects the utter strangeness of an
inhabitant of the world beyond. In the manner of icons as I have discussed them,
these images articulate the powers of the ancestor image, powers multiplied by   303

the addition of pouches of medicine. When complete, the costume is named by its owner and taken to the head of the Egungun society, who ritually enlivens it and appoints a dancer to perform the final ceremony. Singing women accompany it from the forest of the ancestors to town, and the whole entourage visits the compounds in which married daughters of the lineage live.

The *egungun* costume is a perfect example of masking, since it makes the invisible visible and therefore is a pure presentation of the reality and energy of spirit. As these last words suggest, the costume is not just a cluster of powers and attributes, it must also be danced. The male dancers are anonymous, but identification with the ancestral spirit must inevitably display itself in the skill with which the dancer actually performs the intricate and demanding steps of the dances. The display and appreciation of such skill suggests other meanings for masks, those of spectacle, theatre and simple entertainment. In the Yoruba Gelede society dances, performed in honour of living mothers, whose powers are seen to be ambivalent and in need of being turned by ceremony to the general good, the dancers are not so anonymous, the masks not so concealing, so that the transformation is not so complete. Gelede masks are also objects of endless wit and invention. Dancers are openly admired for their skill; sometimes they imitate animals and their movements, for example, and sometimes they are positively satiric. But however much a display of virtuosity the masked dance may become, it is always to some degree iconic and presentational, or, to look at the matter from the other side, however iconic and presentational it may be, the masked dance always demands the appropriately animating and embellishing display of skill.

We in the West are probably inclined to think of masks first of all as disguises, as ways of concealing, dissembling or falsifying, of making people seem to be what they are not. Although the histories of masks in the West are of course complex, it is significant that our word for an individual human being in general – 'person' – descends from *persona,* the Latin word used for a theatrical mask. The keeping and carrying of masks, or *personae* (as in Figure 128), was reserved for Roman patrician families according to a pattern that parallels the right of elite social groups to wear masks and costumes in ritual enactments in other societies. There is, however, one important difference; the masks in question assumed the value of effigies, thus becoming part of a very different notion of genealogy and succession. The designation of *persona* identified Roman citizens, and was denied to slaves. It was this political citizenship that was univeralized by Christianity, at which point personhood entered the discussion of self and soul of which it is still a fundamental part.

The idea of a person has never lost its theatrical associations. Theatre has provided a whole cluster of mostly negative categories for Western criticism, at the same time that it has also provided the metaphorical base for fundamental concepts we take altogether for granted, not only 'person' but also 'audience'. Always at issue has been the relation between appearance and reality, between seeming and a higher, true inwardness. 'Hypocrite', from *hypokrites,* the Greek word for 'player', is another such term; in the Sermon on the Mount Christ himself inveighs against the 'hypocrites' who give their alms ostentatiously. The actor, we feel, cannot really *be* the pretended character (even if the successful

actor makes us feel that this is so), and a 'true' or 'authentic' person cannot possibly be different from appearances.

In the first book of his *De officiis* (*On Duties*), the ever-influential Cicero propounded a general theory that turns theatrical metaphors to quite different purposes. Nature has given us all masks (*personae)* to enact: as human beings we must maintain the appearance of the reason from which all propriety and decorum arise; and, as individuals, we must enact the role nature has assigned us. On this view, the 'person' is the entity that continually and successfully realizes the appearances appropriate to an individual human life. We must be no less prudent and wise than actors (*scaenici*), who do not always choose to perform in the best plays, but rather choose the plays best fitting their own natural gifts.

Early Christian writers argued that, since God had created man in his own image, the modification of this image was necessarily a deviation, and, more specifically, a sin. Insofar as a man is not his true image, that is, the image of God, he must be fallen, alienated from God, so that masks necessarily embody man as sinful. By the same arguments, a person's appearances should not be different from the inwardness God has created. More generally, masks embody sin itself, and in the Middle Ages ancient theatrical masks became the patterns for devils or demons, associated with Hell. Such arguments (and the deep-seated assumptions to which they are related) are clearly variants on the themes stated above. The mask makes manifest a reality, which is not just an absolutely false self, but an evil one, dangerous because it is a possible transformation, rooted in human freedom and in original sin itself. By implication, the true image is the person's own visage, which might, however, be seen as the mask of a truer, higher, spiritual reality, regarded as both individual and divine. This view presumes the constancy of the inner, of our *selves,* which we feel cannot be changed, or should not be changed, by a change in outer appearance. We are, or should be, we believe, essentially the same person with a mask or without. Modern Western actors do not wear masks, although they may be 'character actors' or type-cast, just as ancient comic masks represented many 'characters'. The actor is successful when convincing identity is achieved with the role, although such skills continue to be regarded with ambivalence at the same time that the actor has become a more and more important example in modern life. It is not hard to see why portraiture (often from life masks) has been such an important genre in Western art; appearance is the unique mask of the self. But for present purposes it is sufficient to note that our own attitudes are culturally specific, that masks point toward some of our most fundamental questions regarding self-identity and authenticity, and such beliefs are themselves deeply involved in a cultural choices about the significance of masks and masking.

Masks (and costumes, which are in effect body masks) are important to the techniques of shamans, discussed in Chapter 2 in the section on centres and verticality. When mask and costume are donned, the spirit of the shaman, already an extraordinary one, prone to vision and possession – takes on the powers of the mask; that is, the shaman becomes a powerful spirit with access to other spirits, capable of the journeys to heaven or the underworld, or to the bottom of the sea, to the homes of the spirits of nature and the ancestors. The shaman may address, persuade, cajole or trick these spirits into turning their powers to

136 Inuit shaman's mask: convex outer side (left), and concave inner side with confronted profiles (right), 20th century. Whale vertebra, width 35 cm (14 in). Private collection

the needs of the group, or may determine what the group must do in order to placate them.

Figure 136 is an Inuit mask carved in the last century. It was made from a large whale vertebra, certainly a powerful starting point in itself. The mask was made by or for a shaman. On the outer, convex side it is shaped into the head of a polar bear with open mouth and small eyes of black beads. On the concave inside is another 'inner' image, with different, more human eyes and a spreading nose. The shaman, as one with access to the inner, who in fact journeys in the world of spirits, 'sees' the spirit owners of animals, and the more anthropomorphic face on the inside is the face of that spirit owner, which only the shaman can see, and under some circumstances display. This is, however, no ordinary face. Not only is its mouth open as if roaring, or as if to devour, but, in the manner of Asian and indigenous American images I shall discuss in the next chapter (Figures 169 and 170), it is supernatural, made up of the symmetrical images of two confronted killer whales, the ears of the outer bear transforming into its dorsal fins. The inner, concave face, contiguous with the outwardness of the convex bear's face, is addressed as anthropomorphic through the bear mask; the inner mask is also the unity of a great natural and mythical power that has been doubled and thus made great beyond anything possible in nature. The example shows the reciprocity and essential difference of inner and outer. It also shows the primary value of contiguity. Inside is contiguous with outside; and, were the mask to be worn and danced, the wearer, the shaman, would occupy the place of the spirit whose face is two killer whales, but would at the same time be the bear.

For the Kwakiutl of the Northwest American Pacific Coast, masks retain the values of shamanic transformation, which is also joined to the level of myth, genealogy and to the social order for which myth is fundamental. The right to wear masks (and to have new ones carved) belongs to members of families distinguished by the feats of some heroic ancestor. The crests of animals defeated, or of helper spirits in the struggle, state possession of both spiritual and social power, and these crests, which identified lineages, were added to important markers of wealth and status such as painted houses and totem poles.

The right to wear masks (which might also be gained by gift or marriage) also involved costumes and the transmission of chants and ceremonies, so that the mythic genealogy of lineages was an integral part of communal festival and spectacle. Figure 137 is a triple transformation mask danced to enact the story of the hero Siwiki, a founder with extraordinary shamanic powers, subject to transport and capable of assuming many forms, that is, capable of assuming the powers

of many spirits, thus to acquire wealth and status. After a long journey to the bottom of the sea, Siwiki returns, revealing himself to his brother as a fish, a dark green bullhead (a). The dancer works these masks with cords, and the fish mask opens vertically to reveal another form, the white-beaked Raven-of-the-Sea (b). The outer mask changes colour on the inside, but the features of the fish – especially the eyes – are repeated and elaborated. When the Raven-of-the-Sea mask splits (c), it reveals the face of Born-to-be-Head-of-the-World himself. Once again, the inside of the Raven mask changes colour but retains the outer image. As in Figure 136, every convexity has a related concavity, an inside in direct relation to the next outside. And when the whole mask is open, and the great chief is revealed, he displays all of his powers at once.

137 Kwakiutl transformation mask. (a) Bullhead; (b) Raven-of-the-Sea; (c) Born-to-be-Head-of-the-World; Hopetown, before 1902. Wood and rope, 89 x 54. 4 cm (35½ x 14¼ in). American Museum of Natural History, New York

4.20 GREEK DRAMA

Masks were one of the essential elements of the Dionysiac rituals from which Greek drama arose. From early times, dithyrambs, choral hymns to Dionysus, were performed in ring dances to the flute. The precinct in which this took place – an orchestra, from a verb meaning 'to dance' – was perhaps first a threshing floor. Areas have been designated as 'theatral' in Cretan palaces, and in his description of the shield of Achilles (*Iliad*, XVIII.591–601) Homer mentioned a dancing floor made by Daedalus at Knossos for Ariadne, where dancers circled 'like the wheel of a potter when he crouches and works it with his hands to see if it will run'. A 'ring dance' is a *choros* in Greek, and what would become the chorus was first of all a large circle of offertory dancers. 'Tragedy' (goat-song)

is from *tragos*, the word for goat, plus a form of a word meaning to sing, as in 'ode'. The goat in question was perhaps a prize, a sacrifice, or both.

According to Aristotle, tragedy was begun (by Thespis in 534 BC) with improvisatory introductions to songs by the leader of the chorus. Next came the *hypokrites,* the 'interpreter' or 'answerer', whose dialogue with the chorus expanded to include others in the spectacle. The *hypokrites* became an actor in exemplification and illustration, which came to require a cast, increasingly separated from the chorus, and increasingly demanding its own fictive space, narrative time, characters and specialized performers. Specialized tragic masks were also devised, according to tradition also introduced by Thespis. All the participants in a Greek tragedy, actors and chorus alike, were masked. Only the flautist was not.

When the theatre in Athens was moved from the *agora* to the precinct of Dionysus below the southeastern corner of the Acropolis (see Figure 42), the archaic real spatial core was maintained as the architectural form of the theatre grew up around it. The winning dramas to be performed were chosen by the king *archon*, responsible for judgements regarding religious matters. After the phallic procession opening the spring festival of the Great Dionysia, the theatre was purified and the image of Dionysus himself brought to the theatre in a torchlight procession. Tragedy showed not just myths, but stories of Bronze Age kings and heroes. In observing these narratives, Aristotle wrote in his *Poetics*, the members of the audience could experience *katharsis*, that is, could at once experience, and be purged of, feelings of pity and terror, through *ekstasis,* by seeing themselves in what they saw. Those who watched in common and at a distance knew the fates of those they were watching, and that knowledge became the inevitability of fate in the inevitability of the narrative. The watchers, seeing the implacable workings of fate, might also see themselves as subject to fate and the interventions of the gods.

Tragedies were performed in the *theatron* (from *theaomai, theasthai,* 'to see'), a place for seeing, but also for the spectators of the *theama*, the 'sight', 'spectacle', or 'show'. Whatever happens in the theatre happens *for* the seers. At the centre of the *orchestra* of the Theatre of Dionysus in Athens stood the altar of the god. A theatre was like other precincts in enclosing the presence of the deity, his *epiphania*, or 'shining out'. In other words, the theatre as a precinct specifically promises the presence, but more especially the *sight* of the extraordinary. The matter becomes more complex when the presence and appearance of the extraordinary are effected by human skill, so that the seers are 'taken in', made to see what they think they see, or what they desire to see.

Although the form of the *theatron* is immemorially old in the Greek tradition, monumental constructions under state patronage are fairly late. The Theatre of Dionysus in Athens was built in the fifth century, and modified to its present state in the late fourth, by which time theatres had been built throughout the Greek world. When the Roman architect Vitruvius wrote about theatres, he focused largely on sound. 'Seers' had become 'hearers', an 'audience', as we still say. Sound had its own physical geometry in Greek acoustics. Sound travels, Vitruvius argued, in percussive waves, like those from a stone dropped in water; accommodation to the geometry of sound shaped the round orchestra and the

concentric half-circle of seats of the Greek theatre. But the 'audience' in a Greek theatre were also still seers, and the orchestra and the *skene* behind it were also subject to the geometry of sight.

The *skene*, as I shall discuss at length in Chapter 6, was perhaps at first a tent behind the orchestra where actors could disappear and reappear, newly clothed and masked. It began to be painted with illusionistic paintings at the Theatre of Dionysus in Athens. Such *skenographia* began the definition of virtual space as an extension of theatral space (Figure 261), establishing patterns for representation in Western art and culture that have persisted and developed right up to modern times.

The self-taught painter Agatharcus of Samos, said by Vitruvius to be the inventor of *skenographia,* boasted of the speed with which he painted, and was criticized by the great painter Zeuxis for the superficiality of his work. Perhaps he had also devised an 'abbreviated' painting for other kinds of drama, the *skiagraphia,* or shadow painting, to which Plato pointed as an example of illusion, of empty appearance to which the true knowledge of philosophy was an antidote. If so, then Agatharcus occupies a foundational place not only in the history of Western naturalism and illusionism, but also in the tradition which intersects at so many points with this history, that of rejecting appearance in favour of a deeper (physical) or higher (metaphysical) 'true' reality. This suspicion of the evident as the illusory, like the idea of a person, has origins close to theatre, and would continue its metaphorical development in relation to theatre.

4.21 THEATRE AND POLITICS

The classical theatre, in addition to being a 'place for seeing', also gave institutional and social relations real spatial form. As a place, the theatre might be more or less exclusive, and, as a plan, it presented the opportunity for making hierarchical distinctions based on centrality and distance. So in the Roman theatre, the lowest seats of the auditorium (the *cavea prima*), with the best view of the stage, were reserved for the nobility; the *cavea summa* or *ultima*, farther away, was allotted to the lower classes. In early Roman theatres, senators sat nearest the stage; when *skenographia* was revived in the Renaissance, the prince might be seated at the point governing the construction. Vitruvius (V.vi.8) suggested the extension of a similar decorum to the stage itself when he described the central doorway of the *scaena* as 'ornamented in the manner of a royal palace'. He referred to tragic scenes, 'with columns, statues and other indications of royal things', in contrast to comic scenes, with private windowed buildings, and satyric scenes, which were rustic and pastoral. The 'royal' door was also 'central' in action on the stage. Players entering from the left came from the 'forum' – that is, from the city in which action was taking place – and those entering from the right were 'strangers'.

The Greek biographer Plutarch set out his life of the Macedonian Demetrius Poliorcetes as a contrast between tragic and comic drama to illustrate the mixed character and fortunes of his protagonist. Demetrius may have recognized some ambivalence in his own character, for he patterned himself after the god Dionysus, who was terrible in war, but also susceptible to the joys of peace (as Demetrius scandalously was). Playing out his life in the endless wars of the successors of

Alexander the Great, Demetrius delivered the Athenians from foreign domination, and they in turn flattered him and his father as kings and saviour-gods, inserting them in sacred ritual and calendar. At one point Demetrius was installed on the Acropolis, in the Parthenon (dedicated to his 'elder sister', Athena), where he pursued the Dionysian arts of peace to great excess. The Athenians renamed the festival of the Dionysia as the Demetria.

As Plutarch presents the matter, the flattering Athenians were also fickle to the point of treachery, and they betrayed Demetrius when the opportunity arose. He responded by cutting off their grain, laying siege to their city, and starving them into submission, whereupon he ordered them to assemble in the theatre. He surrounded stage and *skene* with armed soldiers, then descended from one of the side entrances, 'like a tragic actor', but also perhaps like a god, Dionysus in the Theatre of Dionysus. Contrary to the expectations created by this portentous appearance, he showed the pacific aspect of his divine exemplar, only mildly rebuking the Athenians before giving them grain.

Irony pervades Plutarch's life of Demetrius, and the Athenians, rather than merely debasing and prostituting their sacred civic traditions, seem more to have gained political advantage by exploiting religious customs in which they no longer believed. But irony itself is a kind of distance, a dissimulation, a pretence of ignorance (like that of Socrates) to draw out an adversary. It is as if Demetrius had said by his actions *in a theatre,* 'I do not know – and you do not know – that I am not a god.' For their part, the Athenians had previously resolved to greet Demetrius not only as if he were Dionysus, but as if he were his namesake, Demeter. Demetrius was thus identified with, and insisted upon his identification with, deities of the centre. He had both withheld and given grain, and his actions asserted rule by appropriating the ancient Athenian centre. But such an assertion is insufficient, and a far more important fusion has also taken place. If ritual became tragic drama in the rise of theatre, the 'central' rituals of rule also became theatrical, real in the spectacle of their performance.

Other rulers continued to enact the ancient central rites, stressing continuity with the past and collective welfare; but these rites could also be regarded as spectacles, designed not only to repeat ancient formulae but also to persuade the people through magnificence and splendour. Perhaps the dying words of Vitruvius's patron Augustus, set against the backdrop of his marble imperial Rome, provide the greatest example of ancient rule on this new model. According to Suetonius (*Augustus* XCIX), Augustus, having straightened his hair and closed his slack jaw, asked those gathered if he had seemed to play the mime of life well, adding in Greek that, if that were so, he should be sent from the stage with applause.

4.22 CHARACTER AND COMEDY

The word 'character' in Greek first meant cut or marked, like the impressions on coins and seals. Coins, made by striking measures of metal with engraved, punch-like dies, were new in ancient Greece; the first were made in Lydia in the late seventh century BC, and rapidly spread from the Ionian Greeks to the rest of the ancient world. Almost from the beginning, Greek coins were struck with images related to their places of origin, and eventually with images of rulers, which were among the first mass-produced identical images in Western art. Coin

portraiture began with images of Alexander the Great immediately after his death in 323 BC, and continued with later Hellenistic rulers, then with Eastern and Roman rulers. The standardization of currency, like that of weights and measures, was a 'central' prerogative; as much as currency enables commerce, it also asserts dominion, identified with an authentic image guaranteeing source and value. Coins continued to be made according to this pattern throughout the world, and images they bear have served as patterns for other images and as transmitters of political iconography. Perhaps the metaphor underlying the Greek word character was first rooted in the abbreviation of these images or in their replicability, or both. The Greek word for what we now call 'character', shown in the constant and more or less foreseeable reactions of individuals to events, was *ethos*. Character, in the sense in which I am concerned with it, perhaps most closely corresponds to 'type', as we might, for example, refer to someone as 'an academic type'. ('Type' hovers around the same metaphorical base as 'character'; *typos* is a blow, or the consequence of a blow, as when a coin is struck.)

When we call individuals 'academic types' we mean they appear and behave in ways that allow those to whom we speak to 'place' them, perhaps even to 'visualize' them. 'Character' in ancient Greek also meant the 'style' of a writer, the typical 'stamp' given to prose by a person's 'hand'. Because style is individual only to a degree, writers may also be sorted into groups – those, for example, who prefer plain to difficult diction, or prefer the 'classic' to the 'romantic'.

A genre of writing called 'characters', especially associated with Aristotle's student Theophrastus, descended from classical antiquity as part of the rhetorical tradition. As rhetorical exercises, characters resemble *ekphrasis*, the vivid description of works of art; and they bear a certain relation to the Aristotelian pseudo-science of physiognomy, the discernment of *ethos* partly on the basis of animal resemblance (leonine, aquiline, porcine, simian and so forth).

As a piece of writing, a 'character' represents a 'type' – the dissembler, the flatterer, the gossip – not so much by delineating permanent traits of appearance as by selecting and vividly describing features distinguishing one type from another. The boor's sandals are too large, and his voice is too loud; he sits with his cloak hitched up to display his private parts. Such characters were closely associated with comedy.

The *Characters* of Theophrastus enjoyed a great vogue in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, like physiognomy, paralleling the rise to modern prominence of the art of caricature, which I will discuss at length in Chapter 7. The notion of the 'character' (or type) allows us to describe people and classify them in relation to what might be called kind rather than ideal. Remarks attributed to Annibale Carracci, an originator and practitioner of Baroque classicism, but who is also often credited with the 'invention' of caricature, present caricature as the literal counterpart to classical idealization. Nature, Annibale seems to have thought, is mediocre, working to an unsatisfactory mean between the beautiful and the 'deformed', and so must be assisted in both directions by the artist. The painter who makes what he calls 'un ritrattino carico' (a little charged portrait) is just like Raphael (and the ancient painter Zeuxis), who, unsatisfied with any natural beauty, collected the beauty scattered in many examples (including sculpture) in order to make 'a work most perfect in every part'. This idealiza-

tion must fulfil the intention of nature, the perfect form she had failed to realize; because, Annibale continues, the caricaturist also understands nature's intention to make a 'beautiful deformity' when she made 'that huge nose or broad mouth'. But nature again stops short of this counter-ideal, and again the skilful artist must come to her assistance, representing such 'alterations more expressly', thus placing before the eyes of the viewer an image 'to the measure' of the 'perfect deformity'.

Annibale's purported words are an ironic inversion of some of the commonplaces of neoclassical theory and deserve much closer commentary. For present purposes, two points are especially important. First, the caricature is a 'little portrait', concerned first of all with the likeness of an individual. Second, the 'perfect deformity' is not a combination of things (like the ideal forms of Raphael and Zeuxis), in which case it would be a grotesque; rather it is the heightening of the features of an individual.

Both the idealizing artist and the caricaturist (and Annibale was both) realize truth in appearances, but one truth is higher, the other not so much lower as deeper. The distinction is close to that made by Aristotle in his *Poetics*: writers of tragedy are like painters who show people as better than they are, writers of comedies like painters who show them as worse than they are. Aristotle adds that comedy does not show us *bad* people, rather it shows us people insofar as they are laughable. With wonderful irony, Carracci can conclude that both ideal form and a good caricature are truer than life itself.

Annibale Carracci's joke at the expense of the idea of imitation leaves 'reality' poised between the ideal and the particular, both of which may be fully realized only by the artist. In caricature, the artist produces the opposite of idealization, but so to speak moves into reality itself, making the particular *more* so, exaggerating, and inevitably also moving into the realm of the comic. And what emerged with the newly concentrated particularity of caricature was not simply virtuoso shorthand drawings of individuals, but a world of characters, partly grouped by physiognomy, but also belonging to a broadening, open-ended category of human 'types'. Carracci was most prescient in stating that drawing and imitation could be separated, and that reality could be seen and represented in two absolutely valid ways. I shall discuss the issues raised by caricature at length in Chapter 7.

4.23 FOOLING THE GODS: ON THE BEGINNINGS OF METRIC NATURALISM

The most fundamental innovations, those repeated most often and most unproblematically once made, are the most difficult to understand historically. These innovations immediately assume the status of the natural, and seem to be installed at the same time at the basis of human nature and experience; and yet they were always done a first time – even if they were done first in several places and times – for reasons that cannot be assumed to be like our own reasons for doing what is comparable, or for doing what might in fact descend from an earlier form. In this section I will examine the conditions of *metric naturalism*, the making of resemblance according to measure and ratio.

There are many examples of artifacts meant to have a pleasing appearance to the spirits they serve. The bronze and refined facture of the images on a Benin royal altar flatter and attract the relevant spirits, much as bells get their attention,

or songs and incantations invoke them, or 'call them in'. I argued earlier that votive images are placed not just in the vicinity of the deity, but in sight of the deity. Of course it may be difficult to separate what pleases and fools the gods from what pleases and fools us. Still, it cannot be assumed that images were made in the first instance for something like our own seeing, and in this section I will argue that some kinds of refinement – those associated with metric naturalism – were meant both to please the gods and to fool them.

The long process of Egyptian embalming, the intricate preparation of the body of the deceased for burial, brought it back by artificial and magical means to the verge of life. Sense and speech were finally restored as the ritually reconstituted body began its new existence in the eternity of death and burial. The Egyptian *ka*, which we translate as 'soul', was a principle of life and generation, sometimes shown being fashioned on a potter's wheel by the ram-headed god Khnum, associated with the inundation of the Nile. This little image should perhaps be regarded as more than the personification of an invisible force; or perhaps it is better to say that it should be regarded as literally and precisely the personification of an invisible force. The apparent life of the image made by Khnum, whole, upright and facing, alert and moving, was the realization of the *ka*. The image made by art was in effect the replication by human art of the image made by Khnum, so that the *ka* might find itself in these images shown as if living, and thus in the unending activities of its own life. Zoser forever runs the race of his jubilee; Hesire (Figure 218) is forever Zoser's trusted official.

If the priest-embalmer re-enacted the rituals of Isis and Osiris, and through secret art rejoined the body to its life force, the painter presented the *ka* with the *ka's* own life. The *ka* lives in what is like itself, so that contour now comprehends the living *ka*. The *ka* itself completes its own image as living. Contour in Egyptian art is, however, dependent upon measure, which in turn presupposes surfaces, and true relations of living surface. This is the impulse to one of the first great styles of metric naturalism.

Measure, as I shall discuss at length in the next chapter, is near-indexical. Measures are contiguous in that a planar surface with a conventional unit must be applied to other surfaces in any act of measurement; but measures are also taken from these surfaces, so that specific measures are always of something. Because measure is near-indexical, a measured image might also be said to have the value of a near-effigy, to be authentic not because it is literally impressed from life, but because it is according to the measure of life. Like contour, measure is abstract, but in a double sense. It is drawn from, but this abstraction also permits a certain kind of notional metric modelling. We may make something exactly the size of an original by transferring measures, but, because measures are relations of units, we may also make images that are near-indexical with the value of near-effigies according to ratios of other units. Having determined that someone is six feet tall, I may make an accurate image six inches tall if all ratios in the miniature figure are in the same relations as the original measures. When images are defined by ratios, they are abstracted from size (as measure cannot be); they may thus be made at any size (as the Egyptians made them), and in being essentially the same at any size – that is, when turned to any purpose – they are analogous to the visual.

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
138 The Twins of Delphi,
Kleobis and Biton, c.575 BC.
Marble, height 218 and
216 cm (87¼ and 86½ in).
Delphi Museum

Pliny the Elder wrote in Book 35 of his *Natural History* that the Egyptians claimed to have invented the art of painting 6,000 years before the Greeks. Even if, as Pliny thought, the Egyptian chronology is exaggerated, there are still some two and a half millennia between the beginning of the Egyptian royal style and the beginning of Greek monumental sculpture and painting, millennia during which the traditions of Egyptian art were changed and adapted to new circumstances as they also diffused and interacted with local styles in the Mediterranean and the Near East. However direct or indirect the relation with Egypt may have

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been, the themes and techniques of the earliest Greek monumental art were fairly close to Egyptian models, even if they rapidly assumed their own character and diverged in their own directions. Nearly two thousand years after the series of standing, striding male figures was begun in the funerary art of Egypt, the Greek *kouros* took up this ancient formula, turning it to new purposes, making it a vehicle for the development of a kind of naturalism that assumed new cultural meanings, meanings that have continued to echo to the present day.

Deception was at least as important in the later Greek account of the origin of art in general as I am arguing it had long been in Egypt. Fire was taken away from humankind by Zeus and had to be stolen by Prometheus (whose name means 'foresight'), because Prometheus had outwitted Zeus, wrapping the bones of sacrificial animals in fat, and sweetening them with incense, making the inedible parts of the sacrifice seem the better, properly to be reserved for the gods. In this way, meat was cunningly reserved for humanity. Once the deception had taken place, Zeus could not go back on his word, as if a deal once struck could not be abrogated. Zeus countered, however, by taking the fire that made sacrifice to the gods possible, and Promethus countered once again by stealth, stealing the fire. The simple but important point, however, is that art fooled the gods, and that it did so by fashioning the appearance of the more desirable.

In this story, the gods first demanded burnt offerings, for which they must have provided fire, but then they insisted on the whole thing for themselves. Prometheus tricked them by a literal persuasion, making things sweet by art, so that the gods thought they were getting the better of the bargain. Presumably, the deal stood because the gods are as they are, and humanity is as it is. If that is so, the gods then further proved themselves to be vengeful, withdrawing fire, which had made sacrifice possible in the first place. When fire was finally stolen, however, the gods did not take it back, and humanity became in part godlike. The food of the gods – cooked meat – had become human food, and fire also made it possible to pursue the arts (an ambivalent but real power, as the myths of the ages of bronze and iron show), thus again to be godlike. All of this was achieved at the cost of alienation from the gods, who could, however, be sacrificed to as human occasion demanded, so that the gods might be pleased again and again.

According to this argument, substitution may be made positively *deceptive.* If a Greek *temenos* is the precinct of the god, and the temple building the house of the god, then the altar to which offerings were brought set the offering, not just in vicinity to the god, but again within the god's sight. The twins Kleobis and Biton (Figure 138), athletes in their prime of life, took the place of oxen to pull their mother to a festival of Hera at Delphi. Their proud mother asked the goddess for the best for these exemplars of strength, beauty and filial piety; after feasting and rejoicing, they went to sleep in the temple and did not awaken. Kleobis and Biton were counted among the most blessed of the Greeks, and their images placed them in the god's precinct forever in their fullness.

Kleobis and Biton are close to Egyptian prototypes, but it is not hard to see why refinement in the sculptor's art would move in the direction of the imitation of appearances. The progress of daedalic skill in Greek art from the late seventh century to the fourth, the skill that makes bronze or marble seem to live,

139 Kritios Boy, c.480 BC. Marble, height 82.5 cm (33 in). Acropolis Museum, Athens

thus to induce *thauma*, 'wonder', may fool us to think that art has made stone live (Figure 139); but it may also fool the gods not only to think that the image standing there is forever observant, but also like themselves, upright, beautiful, forever living.

4.24 ABSTRACTION, VISION AND DRAWING

From its beginnings, Western philosophy has been *epistemological* (from the Greek *episteme*, 'knowledge', 'understanding') in the straightforward sense that the question of how we know the world has been of primary concern. If this perennial project is closely related to the investigation of the natural world itself, it also entailed a distinct cluster of familiar problems. What is the relation between sensation and reality? If (as this question suggests) something is more real than sensation, how do we know these more real things? How do they get into our minds? How and why does the mind know them at all? The answers to these questions given by classical philosophy relied heavily on images, in ways that continue to shape discussion at a fundamental level to the present. As Aristotle wrote in his treatise on the soul (*Peri psyches* in Greek, *De anima* in Latin), the first treatise on what has come to be called psychology, 'the stone does not exist in the soul, but only the form (*eidos*) of the stone' (431b30–432a1). *Eidos* is related to a verb meaning 'to see', but also 'to know'. But what does this mean, and what is the relation of a stone in the mind to the real stone we see and touch? Or to all stones? Or to stone in general?

As I discussed briefly in the section on iconoclasm, Plato characterized perception and knowledge in terms of still familiar visual metaphors – 'ideas' and 'forms'. True ideas and forms exist in a place above, and the things we actually see in this world are mere *images* of them, which are always dim and distorted in comparison to their originals. Our soul, however, has an innate but hidden memory of these forms, which we may 'unforget' when jogged by what is truer or more beautiful here below. Plato's arguments have been vastly influential in Western art, art criticism and general culture. Aristotle devised a different scheme, describing operations of the mind that in effect internalized many of the conditions and operations involving images with which I have been concerned in this chapter. Comprehension by contour and the physically mediated contiguity of a trace or effigy to an original surface; abstraction from size (and thus from matter and touch toward vision); the distinction between measure and ratio, all are elements of this scheme, to which should be added the culturally more specific metric naturalism (discussed in the last section in relation to Egyptian art) and optical naturalism, a Greek contribution. The difference is that these are now characteristics of *mental images*. The use of these metaphors by no means ended with Aristotle himself; on the contrary, they became foundational for Western psychology.

In his *De anima* (424a17–22) Aristotle defined 'sensation', *aisthesis*, as the actualization of the potential to apprehend form without matter, a definition he illustrated with the example of a signet ring, which leaves an impression of its (small) image in sense, but leaves nothing of the gold or bronze of which it is made. (The 'sign' in this sense might also be a *typos*, a mark resulting from a blow, as in the striking of a coin.) In order for this transaction to occur, both

sense and its object must be actual quantities, that is, actual surfaces, and each sense has an organ, an instrument or tool.

Aristotle also referred to mental objects of experience as *phantasmata*, stating the general principle that there are no thoughts without *phantasmata*, that is, without image-traces of things that have appeared. *Phantasmata*, like *phantasia*, is, Aristotle tells us, from *phaos*, 'light'; by implication, a 'phantasm' is the trace of something that has acted on the mind in and through light, and that might be seen again in the light of the mind's eye, in activities based on imagination and memory. Mental images, however, are not just after-images of direct appearances. They are instead literal 'imaginations', acts of a faculty of image-making, in which syntheses of analogous elements from different senses are effected by the principle of the soul's unity, which Aristotle called the *koine aisthesis,* the 'common sense', which, he says, must 'see that we see', that is, must itself survey sensations, in order to perform its own operations. Since, he reasoned, sight embraces more qualities of things also apprehended by the other senses, the common sense is the highest sense, closest to thought. What is before the eyes is most like what is before the mind's eye.

In order for sight and hearing actually to occur, there must be a medium in a proper relation to the organ of sense. *Aisthesis* itself, Aristotle argued, is a mean (*mesotes*), which registers the absence of extremes in pleasure. We like things not too hot, not too cold, but just right. In the case of vision the medium is activated by light, and if the light is not too bright, sight realizes its potential to see, while things realize their potential to be seen. Taste and smell are related to touch (which Aristotle was tempted to think of as the fundamental sense); they are immediate, even if the sensations associated with them admit of degrees. Once again, however, we can only touch things at the size they are; by contrast, sight, as the paradigmatic example of the signet ring shows, apprehends the forms of things in terms of *ratio.* Once abstracted – that is, once the measurable has been apprehended as pure relation, as pure ratio, then it is admissable to mind, which Aristotle called 'the place of forms' (*De anima* 429a28), the potential to apprehend all that can be apprehended. In this way, all of our experience of the physical world gets into the mind (which would otherwise be crowded with material images) and may also be further abstracted. The importance of the abstraction from size involved, first in seeing, and then in thinking, cannot be overstressed. It means that things are known, and best known, apart from their corporeality, in terms of potentially notional ratio.

In the terms I have been using, Aristotle illustrated sensation with the example of a trace. For Aristotle, all traces – which he called 'signs' (*Prior Analytics* 70a8–10; his term for sign is *semeion*) – are not different in principle from the tracks of an animal, from which we might make very probable inferences about the animal and its activities. If we think of perception in these terms, it is obvious that we have no choice but to make countless such inferences all the time, and these inferences usually serve us adequately in the conduct of our lives.

Not all signs are of equal value; some may be blurred or partial, and the impression of Aristotle's signet ring itself must be imagined to be more than a trace. Assuming that it was engraved, its *eidos* would have been the impression of an image, that is, something already presented in such a way as to be recogniz-

able. All phantasms are also not of equal value, as we may consider in the example of Pliny's famous story of the invention of painting. Any shadow of her soon-to-depart beloved outlined by the Corinthian maiden on any wall would have been a trace, a record of presence of beloved, lamp and inscribing maiden, even a record of precisely real, particular relations. But only a shadow projected on a plane surface in a specific, perpendicular relation to lamp and profile would have been a telling image recognizably related to its original. *It is in the plane, and only in the plane, that the recognizable is both clear and true to ratio.*

To return to Aristotle's signet ring, its impression implies immediacy to source and cause, but it also implies a clear image, an artificially realized comprehension; and if sense does not always present us with such telling traces, it is the first business of thought (and of geometric optics, as we shall see in Chapter 6) to interject the conditions of planarity, comprehension (or telling shape) and ratio, thus to separate form from formless, true from false.

For Aristotle, 'form' was much more than shape or even relation. In fact, it was only secondarily shape or relation. Form was also both the principle of movement and the final cause or end, as, for example, the rational soul is the 'form' of the body, to whose nature and purposes the body is shaped. As images, or quasi-images, 'in' the mind, 'forms' were presumed to be in immediate relations to their originals, and to embrace their animating force, so that through their mental representation as images their essential principles could be considered and understood as such. The mind reasons about these *true* forms, each of which is part of a universal system of ends and final causes. Forms and their relations make the contents of the mind like the world that acts upon us, and a cosmos of these forms may be constructed by the rational mind.

It continued to be argued through the sixteenth century that small images – *species* – are in some way given off by objects or grasped in the activity of sight itself. The atomist poet Lucretius, although in general bad repute before the Renaissance, may be taken as representative in this respect. He wrote of *simulacra,* imperceptibly tiny images given off by things, by virtue of which we apprehend them, as having their *species*, as subtle shapes (*formae*) and effigies of them. *Species* were supposed to be small and very subtle, since they did not diminish the substance of their originals in being propagated, did not damage the eye in entering, and were thus once again abstracted from size and matter, and, more specifically, mindlike. We shall see in Chapter 7 that in the late Middle Ages, as the new optics of Alhazen and his Latin followers was assimilated, and its implications drawn, the idea of form began to undergo fundamental changes. *Species –* which once again is a basic visual metaphor, an appearance – explained vision, but less satisfactorily explained how sensation, exemplified by vision, transmitted the essence of things through sensation to mind. The Platonizing version held that essential *species* are already in the mind, memories to be awakened by the lesser *species* of sensation; the Aristotelian version held that mind simply is the capacity to abstract form from sensations. One way or another, the 'soul', the life principle and end of a thing, called 'form' in its own right, was somehow contained by its tiny image, and in these terms *species* were related to much more widespread attitudes toward images.

The pupils of our eyes are the light-sensitive apertures in the centre of the iris;

but they take their name from the reflection on the eye's surface, called in Latin *pupilla,* 'little doll'. The Greek equivalent was *kore,* 'maiden'. If, as some thought, these reflections were the act of vision, then it might have been further supposed that vision had 'grasped' more than incidental surfaces in the image. The Egyptians thought of the *ka*, the individual life force, as a double image of the body, but a form (or 'formula', a little form) placed in the heart. The Inuit believe that the soul, the life force, is a tiny replica in the bladder of the creature it animates. The relation between creature and soul is similarity of shape, not of size, and to make a small ivory image of an animal, as the Inuit do in great numbers, is to make the spirits of the animal possessable and manipulable. In some medieval European paintings of the *Annunciation* a small figure of Christ bearing the cross may descend with the light of the Holy Spirit as Jesus is conceived; or the soul may be shown as a small image ascending as someone dies.

In the terms I am describing, thinking at all levels is the manipulation of images. As we shall see in Chapter 7, this link of thought and image was broken by early modern optics, which provided a very different account of appearances. It must be said, however, that this change was not simply the correction of an ancient error, and raised characteristically modern epistemological problems.

4.25 MENTAL IMAGES

Metaphors of art and art making – and especially image making – shaped the conception of mind itself at the point at which parts of Western culture began to diverge from broader traditions. In this section, I will continue the argument that the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, the fundamental statements of the Western 'problem of knowledge', were in important respects modelled upon specific social spatial relations, the relation of a viewer to imitative painting, that is, of painting of descriptive forms in virtual space and light, and the relation of a spectator in a theatre to a drama. As we have seen and will see, these models, rather than illustrating arguments, provided the substance out of which arguments continued to be fashioned; at the same time, they were also variants of the conditions of images I have considered in this chapter. The imaginative internalization of these conditions was obviously a crucial change in the status of the conditions themselves, at the same time that their culturally specific variants shaped the ways in which operations of mind itself became objects of 'theoretical' observation, definition and speculation. The resulting understanding of mind has persisted to the present in many variations and amplifications.

The importance of presumed mental images to both the practice and criticism of Western art – and to Western assumptions about all art – can hardly be exaggerated. The question of imitation, usually discussed in terms of the imitation of appearances, which was fundamental to the Western classical tradition, has been entangled from the beginning with the question of representationalism, the assumption discussed in the Introduction that we apprehend and know the world as a more or less adequate representation. If that is the case, *which* image in the mind should be imitated? The phantasm or the idea? In the long Western discussion of artistic representation, there are always three factors: the thing represented, the image made, and a *mental* image. This third term, in being called an 'image' at all, is likened to a work of art made by the mind itself; it is a representation

that must always be interposed between anything and its actual image. A mental image is, moreover, spoken of as if providing the model or 'intention' for the actual image. But before it is a model, the mental image is in some sense or another a representation *of* something, dependent either upon external forms or the maker's power of imagination. So we say that paintings correspond not so much to things as to sensations, perceptions and conceptions, or that they are, in equally mental terms, 'fantastic' or 'ideal'. Critical judgements to the present day often consist of identification and praise or blame in terms of one or another kind of mental image. We say that art is, or should be, or should not be, 'perceptual', 'imaginative', 'conceptual', or 'ideal', always assuming that realization of these correspondences is not only possible but unproblematical.

There are many examples of such criticism. Plato criticized the 'phantastic' art of his own time, opposing it to art that was true in the sense that it could be measured. Horace and Vitruvius condemned the grotesque as fantastic and irrational, helping to establish themes that would deeply shape Western ideas of the 'primitive' many centuries later. Michelangelo ridiculed Flemish painting for its superficiality. Titian and Caravaggio were condemned for the vicinity of their painting to sense, and the whole classical tradition, as well as the Romantic and Realist reactions against it, are unthinkable outside this critical framework. 'Impressionism' promises an absolute in these terms (pure visual sensation), and the Post-impressionist reaction to it as superficial is equally predictable, and often expressly Platonic. The general category of the 'aesthetic' established the 'preconceptual' and 'prerational' as the proper domain of art. Suspicion has dogged the Western criticism of the illusions of theatre, criticism always close to that of painting, from Plato to Michael Fried's 'theatricality' and Guy Debord's 'society of the spectacle'.

As is well known, and as we have seen, the Greek language, in which the criticism I have just sketched originated, is extremely rich in differentiations of experiences of sight and the visible. The familiar word 'ideal', which has figured so prominently in the various discourses of classicism, may serve as an example. Modern usage of the term is probably a thoroughly disseminated afterglow of Platonism; but outside Plato's specialized use of the word, *idea* was a much more ambiguous term, related to the verb 'to see' (which, as in English, could mean both 'to see' and 'to know or understand'). An *idea* was a form, but with connotations of look or appearance as opposed to reality, and, as an extension of such connotations, it could be a way of appearing, a kind, style or manner.

Idea is related to *eidos*, that which is seen, but is also a plan of action (as we are inclined to associate 'ideas' with imagination: 'I have an idea'). When writing about mental images, Aristotle used *eidos* more or less interchangeably with *morphe* ('form' or 'shape'). *Eidolon* is a shape, image or spectre, also any image in the mind. Our 'idol' derives from this word, as we have seen, but a positive diminutive form of the same word is *eidyllion*, an idyll, a pleasant sight, a pastoral. On the whole, this cluster of words concentrates on appearances, even fleeting appearances. But it is crucially important that as the terms become metaphorical they also reach beyond appearances. Plato's philosopher rescued from the cave of the play of shadows in Book VII of the *Republic* is led out into the light of day, the light of the sun, which becomes the allegorical sun of the good, in

which true ideas, paradigms for their forever changing terrestrial counterparts, may be thought but never seen, as the *mind's* eye beholds the source of its own light.

The explicit coupling of images, or appearances made by art, and thinking began early. In Plato's *Philebus* (39A–B), Socrates imagines someone seen indistinctly at a distance beneath a tree. At such times, he says, it is as if we ask ourselves a question: 'What is that?' And it is as if we reply to ourselves with a statement, an opinion, that might be true or false. 'That is a man', we say, although we might also have been deceived by some contrivance made by shepherds. Our judgements are necessarily linked with feelings, which, Plato says, are like writing in the book of the soul; and at this same book a painter also works, illustrating the text. The paintings are in effect visualized opinions, grounded in inscribed feelings, integral with perception, but especially with memory, and with our hopes and expectations for the future. Even if the painter might be fooled, Plato must have considered it necessary to place a painter in the soul in order to account for the persistence of our memories, which must be retained in order for us to call them up in the way we do.

Plato's *Cratylus* is the first text on the nature of language in Western literature, and it contrasts verbal representation to pictorial (or pictographic) representation. The Greek word *graphein* means 'to mark', and may mean either to paint or to write, and perhaps this identity made it all the more necessary to distinguish carefully between them. Since words imitate and comprehend what they name, Cratylus argues, statements cannot be false, to which Socrates counters that, since words do imitate, but cannot truly imitate, and are conventional, it is very difficult *not* to speak falsely. Socrates makes extensive use of an analogy of painting to naming. Just as in the art of painting one or another colour is used as the subject demands, so 'by the art of naming, or rhetoric, or whatever it be', 'the ancients' used letters and syllables to make nouns and verbs, in turn used to make something 'great, fair and complete'.

Painting and rhetoric, especially when compared, are seldom positive examples in Platonic dialogues, since both have to do with seeming. Socrates finally brings Cratylus around to the admission that no image can correspond to its original, or may do so only to the degree that the medium of representation and the original share qualities. Both pictorial and alphabetic representation, however, *are* representation, the term for which is *delosis,* from a verb meaning 'to show', 'make plain or visible', 'to indicate or make known'. That is, both kinds of representation are analogous to the manifestness of sight, and in the foundational critical tradition of classical rhetoric, the aim was to persuade by setting the matter as if before the hearer's eyes, using 'colours' and 'brilliant' 'figures' of speech and thought. This art, as the philosophy of Plato itself shows, did not go unopposed; on the contrary, it contributed to a new scepticism and a corresponding need for criteria to distinguish true from 'sophistical' arguments. Rhetoric thus implied both logic and epistemology in order to separate truth from seeming and fantasy. In terms of the present argument, Socrates denied that either images or words are able to comprehend. This denial, however, might be taken to acknowledge a more clearly defined realm of fiction, in which both images and words are free to develop as fictions, to be forthrightly concerned with fantasy and verisimilitude, that is, with what may be made to seem to be. Space had been

opened up, in short, for poetry as speaking painting, and for painting as mute poetry, in the famous formula of Simonides of Cos.

Aristotle defined the theory of meaning in language that lasted until modern times in terms of mental images. Spoken and written words are *symbola* of the *pathemata* of the soul (what the soul suffers, or undergoes, like the impression of a seal ring). He calls these *pathemata* 'signs' (*semeia*), and these impressions, the forms without matter left by experience, are both natural and substantially common. They are conventionally named by words, which are, however, translatable owing to the common basis of language in experience.

In his *De memoria*, Aristotle defined memory as the more or less lasting affection of the soul – and the body that contains the soul – by the 'movement' of external things. He once again compared the *pathos* (what the soul undergoes, as opposed to what it initiates) of *aisthesis* ('sensation') to a seal-ring, and repeats what became the fundamental 'Aristotelian' principle that there can be no thinking without *phantasmata*, which might be defined as image-impressions made by lighted forms. He then compares thinking to drawing diagrams, by which I take him to mean, first, that *phantasia* is material, second, that *phantasmata* have shapes and sizes proportional to the forms that make them, and third, that we (and other animals) have the capacity (a common sense) to judge these relations adequately. But if we think and remember with *phantasmata*, why are memories and perceptions not confused? His answer is that the 'common sense' that judges spatial ratios also apprehends time, and when placed earlier in our awareness of time, *phantasmata* must be thought of differently. To illustrate this he turns to the example of painting, which may be regarded either as its actual subject (*zoon*) – that is Coriscus – or as a 'likeness' ('*eikon*') – that is a *painting* of Coriscus. The first corresponds to the impression of what stands before us (although the impression does not correspond to what stands before us, even if the two are in a unique, indexical relation), and the second corresponds to the image in memory. This apparently slight distinction established a metaphorical base for memory that still comes easily to mind. More portentously, and at a different historical scale, the distinction figured in the Byzantine Iconoclastic controversy, when it was argued, in defence of images, that it is not possible to distinguish Christ and an image of Christ by name, which they have in common, but by their natures. Christ is not therefore two, rather 'the honour given to the image rightly passes over to the prototype.' Image and prototype entail one another, as true memory is experience known to be past.

The painter, precisely because paintings are understood to be representations, may strive to make apparent *through* similarity of shape and colour (and no other characteristics) those qualities that cannot themselves be depicted, life, movement and character. Aristotle argued in his *Politics* that painted likenesses (*homoiomata*) may imitate character (*ethos*) to some degree, but not as completely as music. (According to Pliny the Elder, it was Aristotle's younger contemporary Aristides of Thebes who first painted 'what the Greeks call *ethe*, and the emotions'.) Paintings, Aristotle wrote, are not likenesses of *ethos*, but rather signs (*semeia*) of it, and they show the passions of the body rather than more stable character. Nonetheless, he recommends that the young be shown the works of Polygnotus, who shows people as better than they are, not Pauson, who shows

them as worse. This observation presupposes that character, which is invisible, may nonetheless be made apparent in images through the painter's skill. By analogy, actors no longer animate masks, but are rather the character and feeling of which their appearance is a sign.

The form in the mind insofar as we consider it in itself – which must be an image in memory – is what Aristotle called a *theorema*, a 'sight' or 'spectacle', but also something contemplated by the mind, something under the mind's eye. *Theoria* itself is 'looking at', 'viewing' or 'beholding', also 'the sending of an observer', in addition to its more familiar meanings of 'contemplation' and 'reflection'. He cites the 'art of memory', according to which the orator walks through an imagined space in the course of an oration, gathering topics (from *topos*, place) by association along the way. Again, Aristotle says, when we call up 'paintings' in imagination, we are like spectators (*theomenoi*) who watch the terrible or the encouraging, but are not involved in them. We need not act on feelings of fear or courage. Rather than reacting on the basis of sensation and opinion, we may survey the *theorema,* as if at a theatre, a place for seeing.

Finally, in his most famous metaphor for mind, Aristotle wrote that what is thought must be like letters on a tablet (*grammateion*) that bears no actual writing. This once again raises the issue, not just of images and writing, but of *planarity,* which is the condition for writing (and certain kinds of images). Aristotle's *tabula rasa* (as his example was translated into Latin) links mental images to the modalities of planarity, but also, through planarity, with the notional, which, as we shall see, may be fully developed only in the virtual dimension and in thought. Association of images with the notional carries abstraction by sight to a conclusion that is only thinkable. *In the mind*, form may be immaterially small. 'All internal things', Aristotle wrote, 'are smaller, and as it were proportionate to those outside' (*De memoria,* 452b13). Thought is ratio. The inner theatre that became optical was the place in which the external world was able to be 'theorized' as notional and metric. The question raised was this: how is it possible, not only correctly to think *forms*, but to think the *relations among forms* in the same terms? The eventual solution lay in reducing forms themselves to relations, a reduction involving them in a notional infinity and in inevitable relation to a viewer. The emergence of this solution was the emergence of the imaginative basis for the modern world of space and force I shall consider in Chapter 7.

4.26 ICONS AND IMAGINATION

The installation of images in the mind as indexes and forms of things, together with the craft metaphor, provided a basis for the distinction of one kind of mental image from another: the difference between sensation and memory is like the difference between a thing and its painted imitation. Furthermore, the capacity to remember implies the capacity to imagine, that is, to remake images. If we have imaginations, are we able to imagine what has not been impressed earlier in our memories? Aristotle's answer was no. But if we have not seen a real centaur, or if no one has ever seen a real centaur (except perhaps in fabulous, peripheral parts of the world), how are we to explain that we have come to think of them at all, or how are we to explain that painters and poets have come to think of them, so that we may 'have' *images* of them, or be made to imagine them? The

140 Supernatural guardian figure (*lamassu*) from the Palace of Sargon II (721–705 BC) at Khorsabad, Iraq. Stone, height 4.42m (14 ft 9 in). British Museum, London

answer was to attribute their formation to the *phantasia*, which, as a 'faculty' of the mind, not only has the power to *reproduce* the images of sensation before the mind's eye, but also has the power to *combine* parts of sensations (and therefore the prior power to take them apart, if they do not disintegrate spontaneously). The fantastic image is a combination of memory images, and thus both indissolubly linked to sensation and clearly marked off from it as a 'painting', thus to become a memory in its own right. That is, a distinction was made between images with an *external* origin and images with an *internal* origin, at the same time that it was asserted that the material of internal images was external. What then awaited explanation were the principles according to which imagination transforms memory. (The largely Platonic idea of inspiration – visionary experience – provided one explanation, that some fantastic images might come from

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a *higher* external reality.) In any case, imagination, fantasy, became the province of *poiesis* ('making') distinct from *mimesis* ('imitation'), which was the imitation of external nature, and *precisely in the context of mental images,* the imitation of *visible* nature.

The distinction between sensation and imagination, and then the inclusion of fantasy as a power of imagination, walled off the irrational, conceived as the monstrous and chaotic, at the same time that it associated the rational with the physical world from which sensation arises. Reason became what could rightly represent the physical world and its principles. We know the world, however, as *phantasmata,* which may become 'fantasies' of another kind, centaurs and hippogryphs. Within the 'theatre' of the mind itself, criteria had to be devised to separate the true in the apparent, and to separate it not just from the false but from the irrational.

The Assyrian *lamassu* (Figure 140) is a composite creature, an icon of a kind that came to be associated with ancient Near Eastern kings. This one guarded the entrance to the throne room of the palace of the Assyrian king Sargon II at Khorsabad, built at the end of the eighth century BC. It is literally 'supernatural'; the king, and only the king, is protected by creatures at once with the strength of a bull, the solar wings of an eagle, the wisdom and vision of an anthropo-morphic god. The *lamassu* not only makes extraordinary power present, but concentrates it in identification with the great building of the king's palace, where they are apotropaic, the guardians of the royal boundaries. As an icon, it is important that this creature be fully present, and it is often observed that these great guardians have been given double front legs in order to appear whole when seen from the front or either side. Nothing – no power – is 'lost to sight'.

Like other 'eastern motifs', composite 'monsters' like the *lamassu* passed into currency in the Mediterranean, where they were eventually to assume very differ-ent kinds of meaning. In the Bronze Age, ivories from the eastern Mediterranean and upper Tigris and Euphrates valleys combined motifs and styles of Mesopota-mia, Egypt, Mycenae and Crete. The crested griffin, another icon, is represen-tative of this art. Such images, whether imported by the Mycenaeans, or made by Near Eastern artisans, or copied from imported examples, indicate contact and interaction among militarily aggressive, chariot-building élites in the Near East during the Late Bronze Age, the late second millennium BC, a period of great turmoil in Mediterranean history. Ivories carved with griffins were part of royal furniture (or of luxury items close to royal courts), and griffins, like other 'monsters', far from being merely ornamental, were decorative in the fuller sense I have discussed in Chapter 1 and were appropriate both as facture and image to the distinction of royal status.

As the centuries passed, these composite creatures were used more widely on Greek artifacts of many kinds, and, if they may have continued to be used on expensive objects, and may have retained some of their apotropaic value, they also changed their meaning in ways that were vastly influential for the tradition that has descended from the Greeks to the present day. When the Greek philoso-phers associated composite monsters with fantasy and poetry, *phantasia* became the opposite of reason, which understands the natural world and may become a model of its principles. In Plato's *Phaedrus* (229B-E), Socrates treats this theme

with great irony. Asked about the truth of a myth, he replies that he has no opinion, unlike the philosophers of nature, who try to offer sensible explanations for such things. This enterprise is hopeless because 'they must go on and tell us the real truth about the appearance of centaurs and the Chimera, not to mention a whole host of such creatures, Gorgons and Pegasuses and countless other remarkable monsters of legend flocking in on them.' Fable is not explainable as nature is; but having said that, Socrates remarks that he would rather follow the Delphic oracle, to know himself, and concludes by wondering whether he is himself a mythical monster or perhaps something simpler and gentler.

The importance of the specific opposition between fantasy and reason is fundamental to Greek rationalism and to Western critical discussion through the centuries. For our present purposes it helps to explain why icons in the sense I have defined them are so hard for us to understand. We are deeply inclined to understand images as either successful or failed effigies, in some way directly caused by the appearance of what they represent. In such terms, an evident image to which nothing corresponds must be explained by what is in effect some internally generated sensation, which is in turn an action of the mind itself upon external sensation and memory, both of which are consequences of the activity of the natural world upon the mind. This explains icons in terms very different from the reasons for their making, which have to do with the assemblage of powers in personal and social spaces. This is not to say that icons, or makers of icons, are not 'imaginative'; they must in fact be highly inventive, in ways, however, involving very different considerations from those to which we are accustomed. By the same token, the opposition between fantasy and reason has deeply shaped the Western understanding of painting and poetry, as well as the understanding of the art of other traditions.

4.27 AUTOMATA

The idea of an *automaton*, a work of art that moves itself or, perhaps better, one with its own desires, a mind of its own, is as old in Greek literature as the ideal of imitation, to which it is in fact closely related. When Homer described the visit of Thetis to the forge of Hephaestus to ask him to make armour for her mortal son, Achilles, she finds him working at twenty wheeled tripods to go back and forth at his wish from his bronze house to the assembly of the gods (*Iliad* XVIII.373–7); Hephaestus's bellows also work themselves, and he is attended by golden maidens whom he has endowed with mind, sense, voice and strength (417–20).

Automata induce wonder in a way very like images that succeed in denying their materiality by seeming to live, and Homer also described illusion of a kind with no parallels in early Greek art. Hephaestus put the whole world and its surrounding Ocean on the shield of Achilles, together with many scenes and episodes, including such things as 'a vineyard heavily laden with clusters, a vineyard fair and wrought of gold; black were the grapes, and the vines were set up throughout on silver poles' (*Iliad* XVIII.561–3). Such pictorial feats, it is insisted, are achieved *in gold,* and this text, rather than recording then-contemporary Greek art, set a standard and goal for the development of skill for centuries to come. Writers competed in the same illusionistic skills. *Ekphrases,* descriptions

of real and imaginary paintings and sculptures by later writers, treated works as if living, praising marble and bronze as having been made indistinguishable from human flesh by skill. Perhaps best known is Ovid's Pygmalion (*Metamorphoses* X.238–98), who falls in love with his own marvellous work, an ivory maiden, his art having concealed his art so successfully that she seemed to be living. Pygmalion himself is taken in, brings her gifts and touches her flesh to see if it will yield. At the altar of Venus, on the day of her feast, Pygmalion asks for a girl 'like mine of ivory'. When he returns home his ivory maiden has become warm and soft, alive. The desired illusion of art is made real by the goddess of desire.

Automata take artistic cunning in another direction, promising life through art, not through divine intervention. Such animation came to be associated with Daedalus, whose self-moving statues had become proverbial by classical times, metaphors in philosophical argument and standard fixtures in comedy. When Homer wrote of automata he might merely have been extending the metaphor of 'living art' achieved through the artisan's skill; and he might also have anthropomorphized mechanisms of other kinds; he called the self-opening gates of Olympus *automata*, for example. However that may be, Hephaestus, beyond making his figures lifelike, actually gave some of them the capacity for self-movement. If images are substitutes that can be treated as what they make present, then Hephaestus – and Daedalus, and so the artist – has the power to make life more than apparent, to make it actually present, or as if actually present.

Greek mechanics continued to be coupled with Daedalic lifelikeness, and *automata* were invented not only to solve practical problems but also to create wonder, much as more practical machinery, like the pulleys and winches used on ships, were used in the theatre for the *deus ex machina*.

Aristotle wrote in his *De anima* that a comic dramatist told of Daedalus causing a wooden statue of Aphrodite to move by pouring quicksilver into it. Aristotle meant this example to belittle the theory of the philosopher Democritus, who argued that atoms, which are spherical and therefore unstable, move by nature, taking the body with them. After reducing the argument to absurdity by asking how the body could ever rest if this were so, Aristotle dismisses it. However, the idea that art could duplicate life, and that life itself therefore could be analysed and resynthesized reappeared with incomparably greater force in the context of the universal mechanism posited by early modern Western natural science. René Descartes, for example, assumed the human body to be an elaborate machine to which the soul was joined and with which it interacted. Descartes's human machine was operated from a single point, the pineal gland in the centre of the brain, the sole juncture of body and soul. Descartes was a dualist, but the scheme he devised raised the possibility of a monist materialism, in which the complex human machine was driven, as Daedalus and Democritus had imagined, by an internal natural principle, not substantially different from the mechanism to which it belonged. The Greek word *automaton* also refers to chance, the connection between the two meanings perhaps being that what is self-willed may also be what acts indifferently to our interests, hence the ambivalence of modern attitudes toward 'artificial intelligence' and robotics. 'Robot' is from the Czech word for 'work', and a robot works with perfect efficiency, but only in the right,

141 Donatello, *Bust of a Youth,* c.1440. Bronze, height 42 cm (16¾ in). Museo Nazionale del Bargello, Florence

142 Mino da Fiesole, *Bust of Piero de' Medici,* 1453. Marble, height 45 cm (18 in). Museo Nazionale del Bargello, Florence

narrowly defined circumstances; in the wrong circumstances it may also act with dispassionate 'mechanical', 'programmed' indifference. As he pressed his systematic doubts, Descartes himself entertained the possibility that the people in the street were not people at all but rather automata in coats and hats, apparent human beings who had been made to seem to live by malevolent divine artifice.

At the beginning of his *Politics* (1253b), in the midst of arguments on slavery that would reverberate so unhappily through the subsequent history of the West, Aristotle observed that if tools understood their purposes, and performed them unbidden, if there were automata of the kind Homer described, and 'if shuttles wove and quills played harps by themselves, master craftsmen would have no need of assistants and masters no need of slaves'. Such tools did not exist, however, and so, Aristotle concluded, assistants and slaves must serve as tools for others. 'Mechanics' originally meant the art of devising ingenious things, the creation of effects that could not be understood; how can that tower be so high? How was that image made to seem alive? As the art of mechanics advanced, spurred on by war and the avoidance or correction of disaster, but also by the construction of wondrous works and marvellous entertainments, what Aristotle considered impossible began to be realized. The earliest record of a water-driven mill tells of work done by nymphs as the women who usually ground grain rested at home. The later mechanization of textile manufacture had far-reaching social consequences. The analysis of production that made mechanization and automation possible also involved the division of labour, and workers who might have been 'tools' before found themselves more or less interchangeable parts in the greater mechanism of increased production. Such problems notwithstanding, automation is one of the deep themes and ongoing projects of Western technological modernity, a project that can only be indicated in this brief section. It is most important that automation is closely related to imitation, and that both are equally ancient.

The bust persists to the present day as one of the characteristic honorific forms of Western art. The word 'bust' descends from the Latin *bustum,* probably related to a form of the verb *urere,* 'to burn', in which case it might refer to the funeral pyre after burning, to that last hillock of wood and human ashes. If the word thus has funerary and memorial connotations, the sculptural form itself may be supported by other meanings. In Greek and Latin, and in other Indo-European languages as well, the major life forces, *psyche* and *thymos, anima* and *animus,* were associated with head and heart. A person might be shown as if fully living, then, by a bust, a container of the two principles of life.

From classical antiquity on, the form of the bust was adapted to many purposes. In the Middle Ages, reliquaries were shaped into busts, thus identifying inside, or inwardness, with the spiritually potent relic, which was often visible – that is, tangible to sight – through an opening in the chest. Outwardness, the appearance of the reliquary itself, could give the relic an appropriately splendid facing, in an image which, if not an effigy, had something like the value of an effigy because it contained the relic, and was thus contiguous with it.

The bust of a youth associated with the Florentine Renaissance sculptor Donatello (Figure 141) is a variant of these themes. The young man wears over his breast a large cameo depicting the human soul in allegorical form. In his *Phaedrus,* Plato described the soul as a winged charioteer, her chariot drawn by two horses. One is temperate and modest, leading the soul through the experience of beauty to true love and restoration; the other, hot-blooded and vainglorious, rushes at once to the fulfilment of physical desire. In the emblematic cameo of Donatello's bust we are thus made to 'see' the soul, as the immaterial made visible in allegory. And the face of the youth himself is equally 'soulful', mobile as the living soul within, as if poised in choice between the higher and lower alternatives depicted in the cameo.

Portraiture never entirely vanished after classical antiquity, and when it returned to Western art as a major form in the Renaissance, ancient coins provided an important model. Most ancient coin portraits were profiles, in many cases profile busts. A similar pattern was followed in late medieval painted portraits, as royal profile portraits also reappeared on coins. The humanist medal also appeared in the mid-fifteenth century. Typically these medals, which were exchanged in élite circles, had a profile portrait on one side and a personal allegorical device on the other, a body–soul opposition rather like that to be seen in Figure 141.

When the sculptor Mino da Fiesole carved the marble portrait of Piero de' Medici (Figure 142) in 1453, Piero still had sixteen years to live; his bust was thus not commemorative, but rather records a living individual and was placed together with other such images in the Medici family palace. Nonetheless, the image was certainly meant to outlast Piero himself, so that future inhabitants of the Medici palace might continue to see their forebear's polished features.

Piero's bust, like many before it, is cut off horizontally at the bottom. This implies more than a firm base for the life-containing parts of a person, and it is as if Piero were framed in the manner of contemporary painted portraits, as if the rest of the body were there, but beneath the frame, a simple example of what

I shall call a *viewer space* in Chapter 6. Piero occupies the space of metric vision in a bust that shows him neither full-face nor profile, but three-quarters, so that either his head or his body is always seen as foreshortened, as maximally particular in relation to a moving viewer. The device that gives him apparent life and movement is enhanced by our own movement.

The Italian Renaissance painter (or sculptor), in principle, made the invisible (the movements of the soul) visible in the movements of the body. Leonardo da Vinci argued that artists run the risk of making images look like themselves because the same individual soul that shaped the artist's physical appearance also judges the beauty and rightness of the figures the artist makes. Leonardo recommended that artists study proportion, which will give them the means to counteract this distorting narcissistic tendency. His argument assumes coincidence between individual appearance and individual soul, outwardness and inwardness. It also suggests the difficulty of distinguishing the perception of another from oneself.

The Mona Lisa (Figure 143), the extended bust portrait of the young wife of a Florentine merchant, is foreshortened with a complexity and fluidity that continues and develops the three-dimensional variety of Piero de' Medici's portrait. Leonardo added quiet hands and again framed the figure to imply her completeness beyond what we actually see. She is the individual mask of her own inwardness, of the mind and heart suggested to us by her famous smile. But she is also, as Leonardo was the first painter to be able to imagine, a complex anatomical mechanism, perhaps an automaton, one with the great necessary processes of time and nature by which she is surrounded.

143 Leonardo da Vinci, *Portrait of Lisa di Antonio Maria Gherardini ('Mona Lisa')*, 1503. Oil on canvas, 75.6 × 52.5 cm (30¼ × 21 in). Louvre, Paris

4.29 IMAGES ON SURFACES: EFFIGY, SURFACE AND 'FIELD OF VISION'

The paradigmatic effigy, like a substitute, is three-dimensional, again like a life mask. Several of the examples I have discussed, however, are not three-dimensional, but are instead what I shall call *images on surfaces*. An image like the face of Christ on Veronica's *Sudarium* (Figure 129) may serve to introduce the problematic relation between effigy, surface and image. If the impression of a face on a napkin is folded out flat, the swell of the features is also flattened, and includes frontal views of cheeks and temples. It might, in short, be a strong, true trace, but a distorted image. Veronica's veil is usually shown in a way that denies such distortions. The face of Christ is shown as a virtual volume 'in' the virtual space of the napkin 'in' the virtual space of the painting. By becoming virtual, by becoming surfaces apparently turning in light, the putative true trace becomes a more satisfactory image.

If effigies take their authority from the contact of surfaces, it was not possible to fix the appearances of surfaces on other surfaces until the invention of photography. This fixing, however, takes place under certain conditions. A photograph, which is immediate *via* space and light, registers *all* visible surfaces from the location of its own recording surface. Although photographs are not taken from a literal geometric 'point' of view, the location of their recording *surface* is determined by the specific position of a viewer/photographer, which also determines what visible surfaces are seen more directly than others. To that extent, a photograph is indexical, but it is like the corrected index of Veronica's veil.

144 Holly Wright, *Untitled,*
1985. Photograph,
18.8 x 18.8 cm (7½ x 7½ in).
Private collection

The position of the photographer having been chosen, the indexical relation
between film surface and facing external surfaces is not limited to the surfaces
of the subject, but is rather delimited by a *frame.* In Figure 144 the surfaces behind
and beneath the broken marble Antinous also register; they show a virtual space,
but also register *as* surfaces. In fact, this photograph is a kind of threnody of
textures – silken light, velvet shadow, divine flesh, shattered stone, blistering
plaster and peeling paint, rusting iron, ruin within ruin – and the unbroken
expanse of sumptuous, sombre and poignant surfaces may be seen to address
the surficiality of photography itself. In the endless ways in which surfaces may
be manipulated, however – by the use of different lenses, by focus, exposure,
lighting or printing – the photograph does more than create a kind of bounded
virtual place for the centred subject. *Framing is arbitrary, and the whole framed
field has the value of an effigy.*

Mirror reflections, or views of a *camera obscura,* like photography, presup-
pose the planarity of the registering surface. A mirror displays to us a seamless
array of facing surfaces, which, if reversed and mobile, are all in most direct
response to our mobility and the mobility of the mirror itself; a *camera obscura*
allows us to look at an optical model of our own vision, but inverted. A photo-
graph is fixed and righted (as we right but cannot fix our own retinal image),

but, like mirror reflections and *camera obscura* views, it shows surfaces in light on a surface, a format, that may be regarded as *analogous* to the *field of vision* of an observer/viewer. Analogy is crucial; because neither format *corresponds* (and cannot correspond) to a field of vision, rather it is analogous in being a passive, uniform surface. This being the case, it is the uniformity – that is, the planarity – and the rectilinear frame that most fully articulate point of view. Frame and field thus also assume something like the value of an effigy – this field is like that which struck someone's eye, or was selected to strike someone's eye. The format assumes culturally specific values and meanings together with the unity of its surface. These values and meanings are rooted in the assumption that the visual field is geometrically determined for an individual viewer, an assumption that began to take shape in the late Middle Ages. The plane mirror and the planar section through the 'visual pyramid' of geometric optics come to provide the model for vision.

Jan van Eyck's painting of Jan Arnolfini and his bride Giovanna Cenami (Figure 145) is transitional with respect to these assumptions. It was clearly meant to have the value of an effigy and the truth of a reflection in a plane mirror. It is a quasi-legal document of witness of a civil wedding ceremony. In his signature, over the central convex mirror, van Eyck certified in courtly, calligraphic Gothic script – perhaps 'unforgeably' autographic and skilled – that he 'was here'. He described the individual textures of things – a description depending upon uniform attention to the kinds of reflectiveness of their surfaces – with a precision suggesting that they could only have been there to be seen just as he painted them. Van Eyck, however, lingered over the features of Arnolfini's face until they became slightly large, oddly emphatic relative to his head and small, delicate hands. Similarly, the couple are large in the interior in which they stand, and if the least lighted surfaces and shadows of wood, metal, glass and fur seem to have been described with fidelity, size relations among the parts of the painting have as much to do with relative status as with the incidents and accidents that lay before the painter's eye. Taken altogether, then, the image as a whole is hierarchical in ways I will define in the next chapter, but it also has the authority of an elaborate, overall trace.

Jan Arnolfini's face is not outlined, rather the minute topography of the face 'turns into' the virtual space in an edge varied in response to the particularity of the receding surfaces, so that surface is also prior in contours, which are foreshortened surfaces. When Jan van Eyck painted Arnolfini's face (the face of his bride is more regular, perhaps more like the imagined face of a Virgin or female saint), he translated surfaces of a particularity that might have been registered in a life mask, but at the size of apparent distance, onto another surface, that of the support, the smoothed panel upon which the oil pigments were spread. The contourlessness of what is painted is general. All surfaces are in light, all come to an edge, then immediately abut another surface in light. The painting, for all its attention to hierarchy, clarity and symbol, has become mirrorlike, as in fact the couple, and more of the room than is framed, are reflected in the large convex mirror on the back wall, together with Jan van Eyck and the second witness to the ceremony.

It is in becoming like a plane mirror reflection that the painting as a whole has begun to become a characteristically modern Western version of the visual

field. The eye is 'struck' by whatever lies before it, but fundamental sense of this impression is made by the receiving surface, the planar mirror, which itself represents the painter/viewer. The 'plate' or film of a camera similarly represents the photographer/viewer. Images on surfaces, the fundamental significance of which is anticipated by planar order, have become part of the ubiquitous modern system of communication in this form. But this visual field is only one possibility, and has only one history.

When an image is placed on a surface, the surface itself is made to face an observer. Whether the image itself is planar and frontal (as I shall discuss in Chapter 5) or 'absorbed' (that is, turned to face into a virtual space), the surface – or, most usually, the format – confronts the observer, and presumes the facing of the viewer, at a level deeper than the disposition of the image itself. (This is not to say that it is insignificant when there is disjunction between the facing of format and image.)

The facing of a surface relative to an observer is prior to any image placed upon it, and is thus also prior to the differentiation of surface necessary for the presentation of an image through such means as addition, outlining or engraving. A single image painted on the 'wall' of a cave, for example, may have been meant to be substitutive in that it established that of which it is an image in a place for more or less specific purposes; but the very placing of the image raised possibilities different from the making of a substitute. The image is necessarily inseparably identified with the surface itself, and surface and image are made to face together relative to observers (or observants); furthermore, as we have seen, its being on a surface means that its contour entails comprehension and completion, which are themselves conditional alternatives to substitution. An image on a surface is seldom equal to its format; the contours of a resemblant shape seldom coincide with the shape of a format (although there are of course such cut-out figures), and the remainder of the prior facing surface *for the observer* also presents conditional possibilities. An image on a surface immediately assumes real spatial relations (size in relation to observers, manner of facing), but the inequality of image and surface also makes it possible to *represent relations as relations*, either on the surface itself (next to, above, equal to), or in virtual space (far, near, before, behind). These issues of relation amplify the issues of notionality treated in Chapter 1. Much in the way that bilateral symmetry as a relation emerged from the fashioning of symmetrical artifacts, the possibility of the representation of new relations, and of the representation of real relations *as* two-dimensional, emerged as images were placed on surfaces, where they stand in actual, if modelled, relation. All of these possibilities had the deepest implications for both image and surface.

In conditional terms, most surfaces are formats (cave walls are an exception, and images placed on them may be said to raise the problem of the limits within which relations are best definable). Formats are of some specific size, connecting them absolutely to real space; and in all cases, whether they are limited or not, surfaces are unified and continuous. Marks or shapes put on a surface are more or less 'held together' in some way with other marks and shapes on the same surface by the surface itself. Surfaces are thus the conditions for *synthesis*, which at its simplest means 'putting together'. *Formats* – formed, as opposed to

145 Jan van Eyck,
*Jan Arnolfini and his Bride
Giovanna Cenami*, 1434.
Oil on wood, 81.8 × 59.7 cm
(32¾ × 23⅞ in).
National Gallery, London

natural surfaces – further specify unity and continuity as homogeneity, so that surfaces may be the basis for other kinds of synthesis. A principal means of such specification is smoothing a definite surface toward the notional unity of planarity.

4.30 SURFICIALITY AND PLANARITY

If marks and shapes on a surface are at least potentially unified with one or another kind of continuity, and thus by implication set in some significant relation simply by having been put on a surface, it is also reciprocally true that a surface becomes evident as the basis for relations when marks and shapes are placed upon it. As we have seen, putting an image on a surface identifies it with the viewer-acknowledging facing of the surface (or format), as well as with its unity and continuity; but images are also *differentiations* of their supporting surfaces. Given a definite format and the unity of surface itself, differentiation may proceed in two ways; first, *division* of the format by means of line and distinct shape. As I shall discuss in the next chapter, *division* means treating the surface as if it actually were a plane. The second differentiation is effected by *maintaining the unity and continuity of surface itself,* through variations of texture, of value (light/dark) and colour, which I shall discuss in detail in Chapter 6. (The texture of a real surface in changing light continually varies light and dark, and a varied paint surface, in addition to describing a continuum of light through contrast of value and colour – as in an Impressionist painting – is also various in texture.) Any format may be treated as a plane or as a surface, but the alternatives are very different. Planarity might be called *anoptical,* while *surficiality* (as I shall call it) is inherently optical, and so is related to the virtual. Light, dark and colour are optical elements, and the unity and continuity of surface are analogous to the interdependence of figure and space in the field of vision. The unity and continuity may be material (the canvas texture and impasto of an Impressionist painting, for example) or near-notional (but not planar), treated as a set of near-points (as in a high resolution photograph).

   Surficial is a little-used but straightforward word meaning of or pertaining to surfaces, things we perhaps have few occasions to talk about in themselves. The distinction made by the term is useful, however, because so much of what we call art is on surfaces (which are always in social spaces), because surfaces may be articulated as such in various ways, and because *the surficial, as analogous to the optical, underlies all virtuality.* As we have just seen, surficiality is based in retention of the unity and continuity of surface itself as overall texture, colour and value. Surficiality is also implicit in any order not also possible by division. In general, surficiality is the condition for the representation of anything that might be seen, or shown as if seen. In themselves, surfaces are particular, and their order in any instance is thus *random.* No two surfaces are alike (whereas, in principle at least, all planes *are* alike). This random order is analogous to the incessant optical incident of visual sensation, and is thus prior to the representation of actual particular relations (or for the presentation of relations as if described).

   Landscape is the best example of the union of format as facing surface with the depiction of facing surfaces framed for an observer. There are countless summarized and suggested surfaces in a landscape, and, as this example also

suggests, surficiality demands its own kind of completion, of random marks as consistent and unified description of optical incident. Perhaps the basic skill of the landscape painter is the exploitation of particularity of surface as implicit optical description.

If there are two bison on the same surface, then we may say, '*there* is a place (and time) with two bison.' But we may also say 'two bison', in which case relation on the surface means 'one of the same kind *and* one of the same kind'. In the second case, the images tend to be symbolic and may be regarded as a *tabulation*. Again, these alternatives are quite different. The tabulated bison might finally be signified by two similar digits – 1 and 1 – in which case the more perfectly abstract equality of the digits would demand a regular, implicitly planar and notional surface, upon which tabulation is as clear as possible. If the surface is seen as a virtual space, then its virtuality is maintained *as an alternative to tabulation*, by exploiting or seeking specific rather than general relations; the incident of the natural wall is analogous to the incident of the surfaces of the animals depicted and their surroundings, whether or not these are specified; at a next level of specificity, one bison might overlap the form of another, which implies that one bison stands *between* a viewer and the other bison. This may describe a real state of affairs, but may also just seem to have done so. Ultimately, and in the most general terms, the possibility of such virtual specificity is maintained by maintaining surficiality, that is, by making the particularity of the surface analogous to the particularity of all that might have been seen.

The argument to this point brings us back to Chapter 1, and to the importance of facture as the concurrent establishment of abilities to make relations in turn implying notional relations. Surfaces are the places where these relations, in all their notional dimensions, were to be further developed as planar, metric and virtual. Surfaces became the places where images might be put in relations analogous to the visual, in virtual spatial relations, to fashion representations of events, real, imagined, dreamed or simply arising from the sheer play of the virtual, bringing times and places not necessarily subject to the exigencies of real space and time into social space and time.

4.31 SUR-FACE

I wish now to examine more closely the 'facing' of surfaces and the 'facing' of images, which, as we have seen, cannot be assumed simply to coincide. The word 'face' itself has a fundamental ambiguity. We have faces, we face things, and things face us. We must also 'face' or confront things and situations. The projection of cardinality expressed in these simple English usages may point us in the direction of a set of conditional relations. Surfaces are what face us, or may face us, *in vision*. The prefix 'sur-' is from the Latin *super*, 'above' or 'over', and surface is closely related to *superficies*, *super* plus *facies*, the face of something. *Superficies* could translate the Greek *chroma*, which we translate as 'colour', but which first meant 'skin', the surface of the body, then the *colour* of the skin. (Latin *colour* referred to complexion, but also to beauty and lustre.) The movement of the metaphor is from what touches and can be touched toward contact *by sight*.

If some 'faces' of objects are 'up' or 'above' relative to others, this is so *in our seeing them*, and the prefix *super* is at least partly hierarchical; it refers not simply

to the externality of surfaces but to the salience of what is actually seen. The 'higher', and therefore the more important, is the actually visible, as if that aspect were the means by which something seen is actually made present. In a sense, the 'upper' faces of things *are* their present actuality, and occluded surfaces are secondary in being merely potentially there to be seen should our attention or relative position change.

Any image on a surface must be consistent with the conditions set by the facing surface (or format) itself; by the same token, only surfaces (or formats) may represent what we face, and what faces us in vision. Insofar as this is so, surfaces may represent the visible for an observer who is more specifically a viewer. The hierarchy of the visible, however, has another level; because some surfaces of things are more telling than others, and in the presentation of images on surfaces these 'superior' surfaces may be brought into full accommodation with the prior facing of surfaces (formats) themselves, as we shall see when I treat planar images in the next chapter. In the most general terms, *surfaces provide occasions to present what we desire to face in what we do face, or are able to make in order to face.*

4.32 DOUBLE DISTANCE

Even if images on surfaces are meant to be substitutive, they do not, and cannot, substitute in the way real metaphors do. An image on a surface, like a real metaphor, may make a place significant as the location of what it represents, but, as quasi-visual, that is, in its abstraction from size, its demand for completion, and its facing, it may also specify the observer *as a viewer* and itself as something seen in a virtual space. Like real metaphors, images on surfaces are undergirded by their own conditions, and have their own relations to social spaces. It is to this last issue I will now turn.

Images on surfaces entail a *double distance*; they necessarily place what is shown in the context of relations (planar or virtual) only possible by means of surface itself, at the same time that they inevitably present image and relations in the real, social space of the observer/viewer. It is important to insist upon this point; because it shields the conditional substance of images on surfaces from reduction to one or another version of the relation of image and observer.

If in general the sizes of images are determined by the uses to which they are put, then according to the principle of double distance the sizes of images on surfaces are determined, first, by relations internal to the format; and, second, by the practicability of the format in its space of use.

As given surfaces (or formats) are turned to some purpose by the addition of images, their treatment as surfaces not only develops potentials for planarity or virtuality, it just as surely entails some appropriate behaviour in their correlative social spaces. The vast majority of images have not been made on natural surfaces, and, correspondingly, their correlative spaces are fully articulated within generally similar bounds. A surface is always a real surface in relation to other real surfaces – a wall in relation to other walls, for example – which are social spatial. An image placed on a wall takes its place within an institution, thus setting any observer within a range of appropriate behaviour. This is really no more than to say that the principle of double distance is compatible with the princi-

ple stated in the Introduction, that real space is the fundamental principle. But it adds to that principle the corollary argument that constructions of social space and images on surfaces are mutually implicative in any number of ways.

4.33 SURFACES, RECOGNITION AND RELATION

When we make an image on a surface, we transfer something sufficiently similar in appearance to the visible surfaces of things we have seen – people and animals, for example – onto a particular surface waiting at hand. This surface already has its own conditional and cultural values, its own placement and dimensions, all of which are in their turn modified by the making of the image. An image on a surface is usually made up of characteristic and recognizable shapes of surfaces. But, as we have seen in Section 5 of this chapter, the recognizable is not just generally resemblant, but more properly consists of some kind of sufficiently similar *relations,* an order, or schema; moreover, *surfaces are conditional for the development of recognizability specifically as a relation on a surface. Surfaces thus also promote the representation of relations as evident and distinct relations.* To see an image either as 'in' a virtual space or 'on' a planar surface is to see it as also involved in one or another set of embracing relations, which may be more or less explicitly developed, and which may be endlessly varied.

4.34 VIRTUALITY, COMPLETION AND DOUBLE METAPHOR

It is obvious but important that an image on a surface assumes the two-dimensionality of the surface itself. Pigments may bond closely with a surface, as they do in fresco or watercolour, or they may be more bodily, like encaustic, oil, or, to change the medium entirely, relief sculpture. But, however corpulent the body of an image on a surface may be, it cannot simply duplicate a volume, and must raise issues related to those raised by comprehension and contour in earlier sections.

The simple ease with which we recognize images on surfaces of all sizes, despite their manifest differences from what they represent, tends to conceal both the process of recognition and its significance. What happens when, looking at pigments on a stretched and prepared piece of canvas, we say 'that is a lion', or 'that is a ferocious lion', or 'that is a ferocious lion in the desert at night examining a sleeping man in a striped robe'? This reaction is very different from what occurs when we see that the letters L, I, O and N spell 'lion', and the difference lies in the conditions of the presentation of images on surfaces, and more specifically of *virtual* images on surfaces. Our seeing images *as* virtual involves not just recognition (as we recognize the meaning of a word, and even associate it with memories) but *completion* of them, our seeing them as if their presence under the actual conditions of their presentation as image were somehow analogous to the presence of what is recognized. Whatever other basis this capacity to complete may have, it is essentially important that it is also based on the condition of presentation on surfaces.

Completion obviously bears a certain relation to what E. H. Gombrich called 'the beholder's share', but it is more simply rooted in the conditionality of images on surfaces. It is also related to real metaphor in that, given a format (and a format in a certain location) an image may be completed as actual, but only *in*

its virtual space. Completion is therefore dependent on the context of surface as the possibility of virtual space.

As we have seen, planar relations, as opposed to virtual spatial relations, are general, in the sense that they are relations that might be shared by any number of things – similarity, identity, symmetry. A noun or a planar image (which I will define in the next chapter) may refer to any number of particulars, although not in the same ways. Both are specified additively, by adjectives, or attributes, as we have seen in icons. Virtual – and ultimately *surficial* – relations, however, are particular in the sense that the particularity of their presentation in itself has the value of being analogous to unique relations, and of seeming to be descriptive of such relations. Even if they only suggest what they represent, or their subjects are imaginary (centaurs), virtual images *seem always to be describing*. The marks making up virtual images are thus seen as *of or from the surfaces* of what they represent, and therefore tend to have something like the value of effigies, but in the overall visual field of what presents itself to sight.

The completion of images on surfaces raises the issue of *double metaphor*. Completion, in affirming the actual presence of something 'in' virtual space, brings images on surfaces into conjunction with values of real metaphor, which, however, can never be realized. I have nonetheless retained the term 'metaphor' because, in making an image on a surface, as in making a real metaphor, something already at hand must be transposed and transformed in order to be something else. Pigment and vehicle, for example, must be obtained, combined and brought to the surface of a painting before being placed upon it. The image made from these materials, insofar as it is the result of these activities, is thus in a simple sense metaphorical and comparable to a real metaphor. The materials do not, however, just 'take the place of', or 'make a place for' what they represent, as a real metaphor does. Rather they take their place on a surface, where by their shape and extent they indicate, or apparently indicate, the visible surfaces of a form in relation. They make evident, in other words, only the *implicit* substance of what they represent, substance which may have many values. Earth colours are brought to the making of a painting of a person and made to represent the physical presence of that person. These materials are made to approximate the *appearance* of a person and that person's *implicit* physical presence in that appearance. When we recognize the pigments on a surface as a person in a space we are made to *complete* that implicit presence. For virtual images, completion is insepa-rable from recognition; it involves inference in the sense of an in-ference, a carrying into. Virtuality, completion and double metaphor thus all entail one another. Images are virtual when they have the force or effect, but not the physical substance, of what they show, and in our experience of their apparently having this force or effect virtual images are completed.

The paint spread on a supporting surface to make an image represents the facing surfaces bounding real forms, and these forms are replaced, but also abbreviated and compressed, by the 'body' of the paint. The paint *stands for* these forms, and characterizes their surfaces in one way or another, but the *virtual volume* of the forms also implies continuity with the virtual space 'in' which the forms are seen to be. This gives another dimension to abstraction from size. Even though the image may be of any size, it implies that its original had an actual

size, and therefore some material substance. As we have seen, and will see in
detail in the next chapter, surfaces are what can be measured, and there is thus
an immediate, at least potential relation between the surfaces of virtual forms,
measure, ratio and metric naturalism. By the same token, there is also an implicit
relation between surface and apparent three-dimensional volume as measurable.

Two (or more) shapes on a surface – such as figures in a painting – are usually
made with the same materials, if not with the same pigment, then with the same
vehicle (oil or water, for example); they therefore have a certain similarity, or
even identity, complementing the unity and continuity of the surface itself. When
these shapes are completed as three-dimensional forms, that is, when they are
seen as two bison, or two trees, this similarity is greatly enhanced; it becomes
the virtual substance of two things recognized as being the same, which are now
similar not just in terms of the material of which they are made, but in terms of
the virtual substance of which they consist. The completion of shape as virtual
substance is comparable to – but is obviously not the same as – the certainty with
which we can walk to and around what we see, or with which we know that
surfaces of objects turn behind any aspect they might present to us. The implicit
uniformity of two painted figures thus implies – and even more or less explicitly
articulates – *the continuity of the virtual space between them.*

Virtuality presupposes the presentation of the world as a (usually upright)
format, and the transposition of the surfaces of things seen onto that surface.
Leaving aside images of single figures, or groups of figures, landscapes involve
the summarization of countless surfaces as they might strike the eye – obliquely,
obscured by distance or atmosphere – in a few strokes of brush or pen on a single
surface. In most images, things seen display themselves to us, and are turned
toward the surface, in order to be recognizable and to acknowledge the presence
and position of a viewer, for whose presence the surface/format itself may be
said to stand. If we couple this presence and point of view with completion, and
with the consequent correlative imaginable movement around virtual forms,
virtuality is always more or less explicitly optical, in that forms shown from one
point of view might in principle be shown from any other point of view, and the
choice of one rather than another determines their actual appearance.

4.35 SUCCESSION, NARRATIVE AND FICTION

I have argued that all resemblant images are implicitly *after* their originals. They
may be taken to imply a prior corresponding existence, and may thus be seen to
be inherently temporal, or, more precisely, spatiotemporal, much as an effigy
must have been taken in a particular time and place. Resemblant images thus
have the value of reference *even if there is nothing to which they might refer.* Just
as effigies may be treated as icons or parts of icons because of their understood
power and their real metaphorical basis, icons may also be treated as effigies, as
if they were after something somewhere else in space and time, as in fact we are
in the habit of understanding them. I have argued that an image as expressly real
spatial as that of *Coatlicue* (Figures 4 and 5) should be regarded as a combina-
tion of potencies; but its recognizable elements also imply that there were and
are snakes and eagles. Beyond that, the general anthropomorphic form of the
new iconic synthesis of the image, primarily meant to make the powers stated 341

and concentrated in the image both addressable and active, might provide a basis for the construction of a narrative. 'There was and is a great woman, the earth, covered with serpents and with the bones of the dead, who gave birth and gives birth to the sun, moon and stars . . .' Icons, then, might also be the opportunity for the elaboration of myths rather than being mere illustrations of them.

In the space of use of an image on a surface, at the double distance of its social spatial meaning, the recognizable forms of images on surfaces, no matter how planar, may seem to make things, places and events contiguous by sight, by 'visual contact'. In this way the social space of which the image is part may itself be conditionally modified; it becomes not just the place of the effective reality of a presence (which a real metaphor might make it, or a planar image), it becomes the place in which *what was or will be*, or what *is elsewhere*, is there to be seen. In any case, the social space adjunct to a virtual space becomes a place at once for the suspension or denial of present circumstances and for the suspension or denial of spatial and temporal distance from desire, not in the modern reductive and consumeristic sense of sexual desire (although it may be that), but in the older, much more general etymological sense of scanning the heavens in vain, grief, loss, longing. The social space and the virtual space are joined as a place for narrative.

At a conditional level, then, all images may entail spatiotemporal reference, thus to imply two further categories. The first, as we have seen, is *narrative*. Effigies, as traces, indicate an earlier actual state; they seem more or less explicitly to show us, or tell us, what *was* or *is* elsewhere. The crucial word here is 'seem'. All images on surfaces are necessarily involved in the virtual, which is an open-ended realm of possible invention. This points in the direction not only of narrative, but of characteristic kinds of fiction. Insofar as they are narrative, all images on surfaces entail the specification of places, specifications that may refer to specific places, but that are invented in the first instance and create the possibility of further inventions. Narrative always fuses space and time, and always raises the possibility of the specification of both, and the specification of their relation one to another, with consequent implications for the observer/viewer. A narrative might show a momentary action, all the participants in an action, all the actions in an event, all of which articulate time as well as space differently. Or it might show two events by the same person or persons in a single space, as in a continuous narrative. In all cases, resemblance, precisely because of its inseparability from the abstraction of sight and the conditional virtuality of surfaces, must show us things that never were as we see them.

Notes

Citations to author and short title 'as above' refer to earlier full citations in the same chapter section. Complete references to books and articles cited in other chapters and their sections will be indicated (for example) 'as at 5. 3', that is, as first cited in the notes to Chapter 5, Section 3. References to ancient Western texts are to Loeb Classical Library editions.

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For 'il difetto della lontananza' see G. Paleotti, *Discorso intorno alle imagini sacre e profane*, Bologna, 1582; in P. Barocchi, ed., *Trattati d'arte del cinquecento fra manierismo e controriforma*, Bari, 1960, II, p. 141.

M. Fried, *Art and Objecthood*, Chicago, 1998.

I. Lavin, 'The Art of Art History. A Professional Allegory', *ARTNews*, v. 82, no. 8, pp. 96–101; see also *World Art: Themes of Unity in Diversity*, ed. I. Lavin, University Park, 1989, 3 vols. (Acts of the XXVth International Congress of the History of Art).

W. Davis, *Replications: Archaeology, Art History, Psychoanalysis*, University Park, 1996.

INTRODUCTION

Intro 1
H. Belting, *The End of the History of Art?*, tr. C. S. Wood, Chicago and London, 1987, p. 94.

G. Kubler, *The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things*, New Haven, 1962.

E. Panofsky, *Meaning in the Visual Arts: Papers in and on the History of Art*, Garden City, 1982; E. H. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation*, 6th edn., London, 2002, pp. 8–12. Gombrich argues that naturalistic styles approach appearance as a limit, beginning from some existing representation (schema); as skill advances, painters become able to suggest optical experience by indications triggering completion on the part of the viewer, as in French Impressionism. E. H. Gombrich, 'In Search of Cultural History', in *Ideals and Idols: Essays on Values in History and in Art,* London, 1979, pp. 24–59. On purposes, E. H. Gombrich, 'Introduction: Aims and Limits of Iconology', in *Symbolic Images: Studies in the art of the Renaissance II*, Oxford, 1985, pp. 1–25; and *The Uses of Images: Studies in the Social Function of Art and Visual Communication*, London, 1999, introduction.

M. Heidegger, 'The Origin of the Work of Art', *Basic Writings from Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964)*, ed. D. F. Krell, New York, 1977, pp. 149–87.

See for example P. Ben-Amos and A. Rubin, *The Art of Power: The Power of Art: Studies in Benin Iconography*, Los Angeles, 1983. When Panofsky published his essay on iconography and iconology (*Meaning in the Visual Arts*, as above, pp. 26–54) he realized, as we may surmise from its subtitle, 'An Introduction to the Study of Renaissance Art', that his remarks were historically limited. This does not mean that only Renaissance art has iconography, but rather that the recovery of 'conventional subject-matter' could be adjusted to other historical circumstances.

See D. Summers, 'The "Visual Arts" and the Problem of Art Historical Description', *Art Journal*, 42, 1982, pp. 301–10; and '"Form", Nineteenth-century Metaphysics and the Problem of Art Historical Description', *Critical Inquiry*, 15, 1989, pp. 372–406.

G. Kubler, 'The Iconography of the Art of Teotihuacan', in *Studies in Ancient American and European Art: The Collected Essays of George Kubler*, ed. T. F. Reese, New Haven and London, pp. 263–74.

For a good introduction to the long discussion of imitation to the present, see G. Gebauer and C. Wulf, 'Mimesis' in *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics*, ed. M. Kelly, New York–Oxford, 1998, v. 3, pp. 232–8; on rhetoric, G. A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times*, 2nd edition, Chapel Hill, 1999; and D. Summers, *Michelangelo and the Language of Art*, Princeton, 1981; on theatre, J. Barrish, *The Antitheatrical Prejudice*, Berkeley–Los Angeles–London, 1981.

E. H. Gombrich, 'Meditations on a Hobby Horse or the Roots of Artistic Form', in *Meditations on a Hobby Horse and other essays on the Theory of Art*, London, 1963, pp. 1–11.

E. H. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion*, as above, pp. 93–115.

D. Summers, 'Real Metaphor: Towards a Redefinition of the "Conceptual" Image', in *Visual Theory: Painting and Interpretation*, ed. N. Bryson, M. A. Holly and K. Moxey, Hanover–London, 1991, pp. 231–59.

E. Panofsky, *Perspective as Symbolic Form*, New York, 1991, pp. 29–30, n. 7. Panofsky quotes at length from E. Cassirer, *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, v. 2, *Mythical Thought*, tr. R. Mannheim, New Haven, 1955, pp. 83–4. As I read Panofsky's essay, he wishes to place ancient *skenographia* closer to 'mythic thought' both because it is based (unlike Renaissance perspective) on the physiological fact of the curvature of the surfaces of the eye and because it is not generalizable and totalizable. Cassirer writes that 'perception does not know the concept of infinity... it is confined within certain spatial limits imposed by our faculty of perception... The ultimate basis of the homogeneity of geometric space is that all its elements, the "points" which are joined in it, are mere determinations of position... it is a purely functional and not a substantial reality... Homogeneous space is never given space, but space produced by construction; and indeed the geometrical concept of homogeneity can be expressed by the postulate that from every point in space it must be possible to draw similar figures in all directions and magnitudes. Nowhere in the space of immediate perception can this postulate be fulfilled... there is no strict homogeneity... each place has its own mode and its own value.' In comparison to Euclidean metric space, space as given in vision and touch is 'anisotropic and unhomogeneous'. Cassirer cites Ernst Mach to say that the 'main directions of organization – before–behind, above–below, right–left – are dissimilar with regard to the Euclidean postulate'. Panofsky explains this to mean that perspective is an abstraction from psychophysiological structure. This mathematical space 'negates the differences between front and back, between right and left, between bodies and intervening space ("empty" space), so that the sum of all parts of space and all its contents are absorbed into a single "quantum continuum".' This is not to mention, according to Panofsky, that the identification of such space with vision ignores that we see with two eyes, and the perceptual modifications made by the accommodation in experience of vision and touch. Finally, vision takes place on a curved surface (as he argues ancient *skenographia* acknowledged) rather than a planar

surface, as perspective implies, and as the camera in fact does.

See M. Jay, *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought*, Berkeley–Los Angeles–London, 1993; for an excellent introduction to art-historical problems of visuality, see *Visuality Before and Beyond the Renaissance*, ed. R. S. Nelson, Cambridge, 2000.

F. Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters*, ed. E.M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby, Oxford, 1967, pp. 32–43.

M. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, tr. T. Parsons, London – New York, 1992.

M. Heidegger, 'The Age of the World Picture', in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, tr. W. Lovitt, New York, 1977, pp. 115–54.

M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno, 'The Concept of Enlightenment', in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, tr. J. Cumming, New York, 1972, pp. 3–42; for a discussion of the metaphorical application of perspective and a review of its recent critical fortunes, see J. Elkins, *The Poetics of Perspective*, Ithaca–London, 1994, chapter 1.

On Georg Lukács I have followed M. Jay, *Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukacs to Habermas*, Berkeley–Los Angeles, 1984, pp. 83, 109. O. Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, tr. C. F. Atkinson, Oxford–New York, 1991, p. 97: The 'prime symbol' of the Faustian soul is 'pure and limitless space; its body is the Western Culture that blossomed forth with the birth of the Romanesque style in the tenth century.' Modern Western 'Faustian' is opposed to ancient Mediterranean 'Apollonian', following Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy*. Space figures importantly in W. Worringer's *Abstraction and Empathy* (tr. M. Bullock, Cleveland–New York, 1967), written in 1906 and published two years later. Here the awareness of space is called 'agoraphobic', a kind of undistanced sublimity, fear in the face of the overwhelming processes of nature. Space is a principle of connection and non-differentiation, hostile to the self-contained forms of the classical tradition (empathy), but also to the alternative Worringer offers (abstraction). Dread of space is the fundamental impulse to art, and resultant abstraction is a kind of regression to 'the deepest roots of somato-psychic constitution', to the morphological law of 'crystalline-inorganic matter' of which spirit is something like a memory. The

arguments precede and suggest those of Freud I shall consider in Chapter 7. The more evolved an organism, the greater the pain of its birth, the stronger the impulse to the 'crystalline-inorganic'. Primitives and moderns are alike in finding space the condition for the presentation of the 'thing-in-itself'. As Nietzsche had said, art is the illusion that makes life bearable, although in Worringer the illusion of abstraction has an absolute regressive basis. (On the importance of art as the illusion of order and purpose in Nietzsche, see J. Young, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art*, Cambridge, 1992, p. 135.)

H. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, tr. D. Nicholson-Smith, Oxford–Cambridge, Mass., 1991; E. Soja, *The Political Organization of Space*, Washington, DC, 1971; and *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory*, London, 1989; also X. Tang, *Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao*, Stanford, 1996; for essays on space in major 20th-century thinkers in the context of 'critical geography', see M. Crang and N. Thrift, *Thinking Space*, London and New York, 2000.

See for example M. Eliade, 'Sacred Architecture and Symbolism', in *Symbolism, the Sacred, and the Arts*, ed. D. Apostolos-Cappadona, New York, 1985, pp. 105–29. Eliade contrasts the sacred to the 'profane', the 'chaos' outside the circumscribed and consecrated; significantly, he follows the usual pattern by conflating the profane and the modern secular. 'Western scholars' have concluded that 'sacred space… has nothing to do with the profane space of geometry [that is, Western metaoptical space]; it has another structure and corresponds to another experience.' For a feminist treatment of space in both traditional and modern examples, see D. Spain, *Gendered Spaces*, Chapel Hill–London, 1992. For a review of recent critical issues of space see D. Wiles, *Tragedy in Athens: Performance Space and Theatrical Meaning*, Cambridge, 1977, a discussion brought to my attention by T. J. Smith.

E. Panofsky, *Perspective as Symbolic Form* (as above), argued, I think correctly, for one-point perspective as a forerunner of absolute (infinite) space. (See to the contrary, Elkins, *Poetics*, p. 35, n. 95 and passim.) As pointed out by H. Damisch, *The Origin of Perspective*, tr. J. Goodman, Cambridge, Mass.–London, 1994, pp. 386–7, Alberti himself stated that his orthogonals extend 'almost as if to infinity', and he would certainly have understood optics as both physical and geometric

(or notional). In the terms of the arguments I shall develop, perspective construction must entail infinity if its terms are considered notionally rather than presumed only to be optical and physical. See J. V. Field, *The Invention of Infinity: Mathematics and Art in the Renaissance*, Oxford–New York–Tokyo, 1997; and K. Harries, *Infinity and Perspective*, Cambridge, Mass.–London, 2001.

On the history of the idea of place from antiquity to the late 20th century, see E. S. Casey, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History*, Berkeley–Los Angeles–London, 1997.

G. Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle,* tr. D. Nicholson-Smith, New York, 1994. See for example p. 17: 'the spectacle's job is to cause a world that is no longer directly perceptible to be *seen* via different specialized mediations, it is inevitable that it should elevate the human sense of sight… the most abstract of the senses, and the most easily deceived, sight is naturally the most readily adaptable to present-day society's generalized abstraction'. And M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, tr. A. Sheridan, New York, pp. 195–228, here p. 217: 'Our society is not one of spectacle, but of surveillance… We are neither in the amphitheatre, nor on the stage, but in the panoptic machine, invested by its effects of power, which we bring to ourselves since we are part of the mechanism.' For a projection of these influential ideas into the beginnings of European modernity, M. Trachtenberg, *Dominion of the Eye: Urbanism, Art, and Power in Early Modern Florence*, Cambridge–New York, 1997. 'Social space' in P. Bourdieu (for example, *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action*, Stanford, 1998) might more properly be called sociological space; it is a metaphorical system of class relations, within which 'habitus' more or less corresponds to consumeristic 'lifestyle'. This is also too reductive for my purposes.

'Cardinality' echoes M. Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, tr. C. Smith, London, 1962. The emergence of space as an issue in German art-historical theory, from Adolf Hildebrandt's union of two-dimensional and cubic 'kinaesthetic' space to August Schmarsow's more proto-phenomenological space based on the 'system of natural coordinates' of the human body, is traced by H. F. Mallgrave and E. Ikonomou in the Introduction to *Empathy, Form and Space. Problems in German Aesthetics, 1873–1893*, Santa Monica, 1994. Schmarsow (p. 291), writing in 1893, distinguished the 'science of space', according to which the same (Newtonian) laws govern both cosmic and terrestrial events, from the 'art of space',

grounded in the body's 'coordinates' and movements, is compatible with the distinction of Cassirer and Panofsky above, and with the distinctions I shall draw between the values of 'place' and metaoptical, metric space.

M. Schapiro, 'On Some Problems in the Semiotics of Visual Art: Field and Vehicle in Image-Signs', in *Theory and Philosophy of Art. Selected Papers*, New York, 1994, pp. 1–32. When, for example, Schapiro writes (p. 12) that 'the qualities of upper and lower are probably connected with our posture and relation to gravity and perhaps reinforced by our visual experience of earth and sky' he is raising more than semiotic issues. The distinction between real and virtual space is made to critical purposes other than those I shall pursue by S. Nodelman, *Marden, Novros, Rothko: Painting in the Age of Actuality*, Seattle, 1978; and *The Rothko Chapel Paintings. Origins, Structure, Meaning*, Austin, 1997.

See R. M. Rorty, ed., *The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method: With Two Retrospective Essays*, Chicago–London, 1992.

See D. Summers, *The Judgment of Sense: Renaissance Naturalism and the Rise of Aesthetics*, Cambridge, 1987, p. 77 and passim. Plato (*Theaetetus* 184) writes of the individual senses as organs of a power, which might be called *psyche*. He is most interested in the capacity of this power to distinguish contradictions in perception, but also remarks that it must unite the various kinds of sensation. This is a predecessor to Aristotle's *koine aisthesis*, which among other things sees that we see. In a long tradition, the common unifying sense was closely identified with an aspect of imagination, the 'internal sense' posited to explain how the various data of sense are correlated in perception. The 'seeing' of this post-sensational faculty may be surmised to imply a hierarchy of the senses, in which sight is most mind-like, and imagination sight-like. The first act of the mind is one of representation (or imitation), and the question of the adequacy or inadequacy of such representations, and their further representation in language (or art) began the millennial dispute about such issues to the present.

W. J. T. Mitchell, *Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology*, Chicago–London, 1986.
L. Steinberg, 'Picasso: Drawing as if to Possess', *Artforum*, 1971, pp. 44–53.

D. Summers, 'Figure come fratelli: A Transformation of Symmetry in Renaissance Painting', *Art Quarterly*, no. 1, 1977, pp. 59–88.
For my interpretation of Eco's essay on Peirces's 'final interpretant', see D. Summers, 'This is not a Sign: Some Remarks on Art and Semiotics', *Art Criticism*, 3, 1986, pp. 30–45; and 'On the Histories of Artifacts', in the series 'A Range of Critical Perspectives: The Subject in/of Art History', *The Art Bulletin*, 77, 1994, pp. 590–2.

M. Bal and N. Bryson, 'Semiotics and Art History', *Art Bulletin*, 74, 1991, pp. 173–209.

D. Summers, 'Conditions and Conventions: On the Disanalogy of Art and Language', *The Language of Art History*. ed. I. Gaskell and S. Kemal, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 181–212.

C. S. Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sander Peirce*, ed. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss, Cambridge, Mass., 1974, 6 vols., 2 vols. in 1, II, pp. 156–73; C. Ginzburg, 'Clues: Roots of an Evidential Paradigm', in *Clues, Myths and the Historical Method*, tr. J. and A. Tedeschi, Baltimore, 1989, pp. 96–125, refers to indexical inference as 'venatic'.

M. Baxandall, 'The Language of Art History', *New Literary History*, 10, 1979, pp. 453–65, shortened and reprinted as 'The Language of Art Criticism' in *The Language of Art History* (as above), pp. 67–75. See also Baxandall's important development of the categories of material and facture in *The Limewood Sculptors of Renaissance Germany*, New Haven, 1980.

D. Freedberg, *The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Response*, Chicago–London, 1989; and W. J. T. Mitchell, *Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation*, Chicago–London, 1994; B. M. Stafford, *Body Criticism: Imaging the Unseen in Enlightenment Art and Medicine*, Cambridge, Mass.–London, 1993.

E. Panofsky, *Perspective as Symbolic Form*; and 'The History of the Theory of Human Proportions as a Reflection of the History of Styles', in *Meaning in the Visual Arts* (as above), pp. 55–107. In the two opening paragraphs of this essay Panofsky succinctly explains his departure from Riegl.

E. H. Gombrich, 'Icones symbolicae: Philosophies of Symbolism and their Bearing on Art', in *Symbolic Images* (as above), pp. 123–95.

E. H. Gombrich, 'The Heritage of Apelles', and 'Light, Form, and Texture in Fifteenth-Century Painting North and South of the Alps', in *The Heritage of Apelles: Studies in the Art of the Renaissance*, Oxford, 1976, pp. 3–55.
A. K. Coomaraswamy, 'Ornament', *Art Bulletin*, 21, 1939, pp. 375–82; I have used A. K. Coomaraswamy, *Traditional Art and Symbolism*, ed. R. Lipsey, Princeton, 1977, pp. 241–53.

Intro 2
Going over much the same ground as this section, B. Smith, *Modernism's History: A Study in Twentieth-Century Art and Ideas*, New Haven–London, 1999, p. 36, writes that Kant's emphasis on form 'helped to prepare the transformation of the cultural particulars of indigenous artefacts into the universalizing aesthetic formalism of marketable commodities'. In the West itself, 'formalesque' art, originally the art of the 'avant-garde', was one of the 'modernisms' reacting to 'modernity'. By appropriating non-European, more two-dimensional art, what Smith calls 'formalesque' art (and art history) parallels European cultural imperialism and colonialism, becoming a global, 'modern' art.

On the early history of imagination, see D. Summers, *Michelangelo*, and *Judgment of Sense*, as at Intro 1; for Kant on imagination,*Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. and ed. P. Guyer and A. W. Wood, Cambridge, 1997, p. 211. For the emergence of the 'fine arts', see P.O. Kristeller, 'The Modern System of the Arts', *Renaissance Thought II: Papers on Humanism and the Arts*, New York–Evanston–London, 1965, pp. 163–227. For the marginality of the fantastic, M. Camille, *Image on the Edge: The Margins in Medieval Art*, Cambridge, Mass., 1992.

Intro 6
E. Pasztory, *Aztec Art*, New York, 1983; R. F. Townsend, *State and Cosmos in the Art of Tenochtitlan*, Washington, DC, 1979; On the later history of *Coatlicue*, see B. Keen, *The Aztec Image in Western Thought*, New Brunswick, 1971.

Intro 8
On humans as most imitative, Aristotle, *Poetics* 1448b. In these terms, imitation has indispensable survival and adaptive value prior to any process of socialization.

CHAPTER I FACTURE

1.1
res 36, autumn 1999, is devoted to the subject of 'factura'. In his editorial introduction to these essays (pp. 5–19), J. L. Koerner notes

that in normal use 'facture' refers to what I shall call the 'autographic facture' of modern European painting, and connects 'factura' with what I shall call 'arbitrariness'. Facture is not defined with anything like the generality I will give it.

1.3
For similar arguments, D. Summers, 'Conventions in the History of Art', *New Literary History*, 13, 1981, pp. 103–26.

It has been argued on the basis of formal and technical similarities that the Solutrean and Clovis industries are related, thus opening the way for theories of European diffusion both westward and eastward to North America. For a review of such arguments, A. T. Boldurian and J. L. Cotter, *Clovis Revisited: New Perspectives on Paleoindian Adaptations from Blackwater Draw, New Mexico*, Philadelphia, 1999, pp. 113–23.

1.6
P. O. Kristeller, 'The Modern System of the Arts', as at Intro 2.

C. Goldstein, *Teaching Art: Academies and Schools from Vasari to Albers*, Cambridge, 1996.

For a review of the extensive literature on style, see B. Lang, 'Style', in *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics*, ed. M. Kelly, New York–Oxford, 1998, IV, pp. 318–22.

1.7
On synchronic and diachronic, see e. g. R. E. Krauss, 'Sculpture in the Expanded Field', in *The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths*, Cambridge, Mass.–London, 1985, pp. 276–90. In contrast to 'historicist criticism's construction of elaborate genealogical trees' (diachronic), the 'history of form' may be thought of in terms of 'definitive ruptures and the possibility of looking at historical process from the point of view of logical structure'. T. S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago, 1970, popularized the structuralist idea of 'paradigm'.

The arguments of Immanuel Kant (*The Critique of Judgement*, tr. J. C. Meredith, Oxford, 1952, pp. 32–3 and passim) hinge on the ideas of form and the formless, the beautiful and the sublime, both of which point in different ways to the supersensible and free. The judgement of form as such (that is, of the beautiful), a kind of pleasure arising from the fit between certain sensations and our faculties of apprehension themselves, makes us aware of our constitutive freedom in opposition to

the necessity of nature. We also apprehend form as purposeful, hence Kant's concern with 'teleological judgement'; we apprehend form as such, however, as 'purposefulness without purpose'. The formless sublime makes us aware of the capacity of reason to comprehend what sense and understanding cannot.

E. H. Gombrich, 'Raphael's Madonna della Sedia', *Norm and Form: Studies in the Art of the Renaissance*, London, 1966, pp. 76–80, argues against formal analysis and the presumption of organic unity in favour of a greater concern with 'complex' or 'polycentric' orders. In these terms we may consider conscious and unconscious motivations as parallel and interactive. His recommendation is entirely compatible with Kubler's argument that any work of art is a resolution of a number of coexistent series. See also Summers, 'Form, Nineteenth-century Metaphysics', as at Intro 1.

1.9
On Olduvai Gorge, see notes at 2.1. On form and matter, see D. Summers, 'Form and Gender', *New Literary History*, 24, 1995, pp. 234–71; Gombrich, 'Visual Metaphors of Value in Art', in *Meditations*, as at Intro 1, pp. 12–29. G. Clark, *Symbols of Excellence: Precious Materials as Expressions of Status*, Cambridge, 1986; M. Baxandall, *Painting and Experience in Fifteenth-Century Italy: A Primer in the Social History of Pictorial Style*, Oxford, 1972, Chapter 1; on the history of ultramarine (and many other pigments), P. Ball, *Bright Earth: Art and the Invention of Color*, New York, 2001.

For an introduction to plastic, *The Plastics Age: from Bakelite to Beanbags and Beyond*, ed. P. Sparke, London, 1992.

On jade in China, see Y. Yang, 'The Chinese Jade Culture', in *Mysteries of Ancient China: New Discoveries from the Early Dynasties*, ed. J. Rawson, New York, 1996, pp. 225–31; for the hierarchy of materials in Indian architecture, G. Michell, *The Hindu Temple: An Introduction to its Meaning and Forms*, Chicago–London, 1988, p. 79; S. B. Butters, *The Triumph of Vulcan: Sculptors' Tools, Porphyry, and the Prince in Ducal Florence*, Florence, 1996, 2 vols.; on bronze, D. Summers, 'Pandora's Crown: On Wonder, Imitation and Mechanism in Western Art', in P. Platt, ed., *Wonders, Marvels and Monsters in Early Modern Culture*, Newark–London, 1999, pp. 45–75; E. W. Herbert, *Iron, Gender, and Power: Rituals of Transformations in African Societies*, Bloomington–Indianapolis, 1993; *Africa's Ogun: Old World and New*, ed. S. T. Barnes, Bloomington–Indianapolis, 1989; E. W.

Herbert, *Red Gold of Africa: Copper in Precolonial History and Culture*, Madison, 1984; see the interesting sceptical discussion of J. H. Vaughan, Jr. 'Ankyagu as Artists in Marghi Society', in *The Traditional Artist in African Societies*, ed. W. L. d'Avezedo, Bloomington–Indianapolis, 1973, pp. 162–93. Metalworking is elaborated in myth in many parts of the world, no doubt partly because it involves fire and change of state in addition to simple transformation, as in carving. It also involves secret knowledge and skills and is associated with weapons and with the power of rule.

1.10
J. P. Mallory, *In Search of the Indo-Europeans: Language, Archaeology and Myth*, London–New York, 1989; and R. Drews, *The Coming of the Greeks: Indo-European Conquests in the Aegean and the Near East*, Princeton, 1988, pp. 117–18. Wheeled vehicles from present Armenia made around the middle of the second millennium BC used several woods, and might have as many as 12,000 mortices. It has been suggested that the prestige of chariots and chariot-making accounts for comparison of this art to poetry (ibid., p. 86), and may even account for the name 'Homer' itself, for the metaphorical base of 'harmony', and for such personifications of skill as Homer's Harmonides. See S. Morris, *Daidalos and the Origins of Greek Art*, Princeton, 1992, p. 85.

E. Panofsky, *Abbot Suger on the Abbey Church and St-Denis and its Art Treasures*, Princeton, 1979. Suger cites Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, II.1ff., where the palace of the sun is made of 'gleaming gold and bronze', with ivory gables and doors of burnished silver. In these 'the work was more beautiful than the material'. The artist is Mulciber, that is, Vulcan, the Greek Hephaestus, and Ovid tips his hat to Homer's description of the shield of Achilles; in the silver doors the world is bounded by Ocean, with creatures of the sea, the world of men and beasts, the sky above with signs of the zodiac.

L. B. Alberti, *On Painting and On Sculpture: The Latin Texts of* De Pictura *and* De Statua, ed. and tr. C. Grayson, London, 1972, pp. 60–1 (*On Painting*, 25): 'Gold too, when embellished by the art of painting, is equal in value to a far larger quantity of gold. Even lead, the basest of metals, if it were formed into some image by the hand of Phidias or Praxiteles, would probably be regarded as more precious than rough unworked silver'.

1.12
Book X of Plato's *Republic* is devoted to the

rejection of illusionism; for the comparison to sophistry, see 596C–D; and 602C–D, where *skiagraphia*, shadow-painting, is compared to witchcraft, addressing only our lowest mental faculties. See also Plato, *Sophist*, 235B–C ff.; and D. Summers, *Michelangelo* (as at Intro 1), pp. 41–55 and passim.

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Quintilian, *Instituto oratoria*, VIII, pr. 17; orators of the 'corrupt' Asiatic school are competent in other respects, but lack judgement and moderation in style, *elocutio*. The idea of form was separated from the beautiful as imagination came to be historicized. E. H. Gombrich (*Norm and Form*, as at Intro 6, pp. 81–106) has argued that the sequence of art-historical periods (and the fields of art-historical concentration) has grown off the stalk of the opposition classical/anti-classical best exemplified among ancient authors by Vitruvius's *De architectura*. Thus Gothic, Romanesque, Baroque, Rococo and Mannerism all began as negative critical concepts relative to the classical. As these periods joined a more nearly neutral art-historical sequence, they suggested a principle of similarity and continuity, which was provided by idealist imaginative 'form' cast at a level of generality Gombrich rejected. The negative, unclassical categories all involve decline or decadence, either loss of skill (Romanesque) or, more commonly, excessive artifice, to be associated with fantasy rather than nature. (Quintilian's 'Asiatic' must also be related to the exoticism of the 'oriental'.) If the 'primitive' is a variant of the same process, it is also ambivalent; it could connote lack of skill, but because of that very artlessness, had the positive value of sincerity and primordiality, and, in a deep sense of the word, of originality. In these terms, modernism, which might have been added to the list, instead turned the tables on classicism.

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On these vessels, see J. E. Kidder, *Prehistoric Japanese Arts: Jomon Pottery*, Tokyo–Palo Alto, 1968; and D. M. Kenrick, *Jomon of Japan: The World's Oldest Pottery*, London and New York, 1995.

On the Western tradition of difficulty and its significance, see D. Summers, *Michelangelo*, as at Intro 1, pp. 177–85.

See W. Cahn, *Masterpieces: Chapters on the History of an Idea*, Princeton, 1979.

Pliny, *Natural History*, XXXIV. xviii. 38–9, on colossal sculptures as *audaciae*.

1.15
For the *demiourgos*, Plato, *Timaeus*, 28A.

H. von Winning and O. Hammer, *Anecdotal Sculpture of Ancient West Mexico*, Los Angeles, 1972. 'Anecdotal' models have been made in several parts of the world – Middle Kingdom Egypt and Ecuador, for example – and the authors consider the possibility that West Mexican groups are related to contemporaneous groups in Han dynasty China.

CHAPTER 2 PLACES

2.1
M. D. Leakey, *Olduvai Gorge, vol. 3: Excavations in Beds I and II, 1960–1963*, Cambridge, 1971, pp. 258–62. Everything about this topic is controversial, see further R. Potts, *Early Hominid Activities at Olduvai*, New York, 1988. As we shall see in many examples, culturally specific definitions of time are indispensable for the definition of places; see A. F. Aveni, *Empires of Time: Calendars, Clocks, and Cultures*, New York, 1989; see the useful E. C. Krupp, *Echoes of the Ancient Skies: The Astronomy of Lost Civilizations*, New York, 1983.

J. Hemming and E. Ranney, *Monuments of the Incas*, Albuquerque, 1982; and M. E. Moseley, *The Incas and their Ancestors*, London, 1992; on Inca ritual, B. S. Bauer and C. Stanish, *Ritual and Pilgrimage in the Ancient Andes. The Islands of the Sun and the Moon*, Austin, 2001.

J. M. Hurwit, *The Athenian Acropolis: History, Mythology, and Archaeology from the Neolithic Era to the Present*, Cambridge, 1999; on centre and periphery in the formation of the Greek city-state, F. de Polignac, *Cults, Territory, and the Origins of the Greek City-State*, tr. J. Lloyd, Chicago–London, 1995.

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On the siting, alignment and foundation of Egyptian temples, see R. H. Wilkinson, *The Complete Temples of Ancient Egypt*, New York, 2000, pp. 36–9.

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P. Nabokov and R. Easton. *Native American Architecture*, New York–Oxford, 1989, pp. 322–37; and P. T. Furst and J. L. Furst, *North American Indian Art*, New York, pp. 58–62, where the image discussed here is illustrated. See also O. Grøn, 'General Spatial Behaviour in Small Dwellings: a Preliminary Study in Ethnoarchaeology and Social Psychology', in *The Mesolithic in Europe: Papers Presented at the Third International Symposium, Edinburgh 1985*, Edinburgh, 1990, pp. 99–105.

2.4
On the variants of the root *hrm* see B. Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam*, Chicago–London, 1988, p. 71, nn.1–2

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F. Willett, *Ife in the History of West African Sculpture*, New York, 1967; H. J. Drewal, J. Pemberton III and R. Abiodun, *Yoruba: Nine Centuries of Art and Thought*, New York, 1989, p. 45.

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Islamic Art, New Haven–London, 1987, chap. 3, 'The Symbolic Appropriation of the Land'.

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On the beginnings of the *sikhara* in early Buddhist architecture, see J. C. Harle, *The Art and Architecture of the Indian Subcontinent*, London, 1986, p. 43; G. Michell, *Hindu Temple* (as at 1.9), pp. 69–71; and M. W. Meister, 'On the Development of a Morphology for a Symbolic Architecture', *res*, 12, 1986, pp. 33–50.

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CHAPTER 3 THE APPROPRIATION OF THE CENTRE

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CHAPTER 4 IMAGES

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See D. Freedberg, *The Power of Images* (as at Intro 1); H. Belting, *Likeness and Presence: A History of the Image before the Era of Art*, tr. E. Jephcott, Chicago–London, 1994. C. A. Faraone, *Talismans and Trojan Horses: Guardian Statues in Ancient Greek Myth and Ritual*, New York–Oxford, 1992; D. Steiner, *Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought*, Princeton, 2001; R. Trexler, 'Florentine Religious Experiences: the Sacred Image', in *Church and Community 1200–1600*, Rome, 1987, pp. 37–74,

4.2
C. Paternoster, *The Stone and the Thread: Andean Roots of Abstract Art*, tr. E. Allen, Austin, 1996.

On the fetish, W. Pietz, 'The Problem of the Fetish, II: The Origin of the Fetish', *res 13*, spring 1987, pp. 23–45. The use of this term at crucial points in their arguments by Karl Marx (commodity fetish) and Sigmund Freud (castration anxiety) has made this one of the central terms in contemporary criticism.

4.3
N. Munn, *Walbiri Iconography: Graphic Representations and Cultural Symbolism in a Central Australian Society*, Ithaca, 1973; see also H. Morphy, *Aboriginal Art*, London, 1998.

On abstraction, see J. Weinberg, 'Abstraction in the Formation of Concepts', *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* (as at 3.12), I, pp. 1–9. In very general terms, abstraction is Aristotelian, based on the separation of form from matter, and opposed in a long tradition to Platonic *anamnesis*, according to which we 'unforget' ideas in our mind with experience. Again in very general terms, abstraction began to assume its modern connotations with Kant, who argued, as we have seen, that the mind itself is the principle of form.

4.4
See D. Summers 'Real Metaphor', as at Intro 1.

4.6.
On conception, D. Summers, 'Form and Gender', as at 1.9. On 'X-ray' bark painting, L. Taylor, *Seeing the Inside: Bark Painting in Western Arnhem Land*, Oxford, 1996; and, by the same author, 'Flesh, Bone, and Spirit: Western Arnhem Land Bark Painting', in *Art from the Land: Dialogues with the Kluge-Ruhe Collection of Australian Aboriginal Art*, ed. H. Morphy and M. S. Boles, Charlottesville, 1999, pp. 27–56.

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For Lepinski Vir, M. Gimbutas, *The Civilization of the Goddess* (as at 2.16), pp. 284–6 and passim.

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On the 'Staff or Oranmiyan', H. J. Drewal, et al., *Yoruba*, as at 2.4, pp. 48–51.

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S. P. Huyler, 'Clay, Sacred and Sublime:
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1965. On ceramics, *The Emergence of
Pottery: Technology and Innovation
in Ancient Societies,* ed. W. K. Barnett
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London, 1995.

4.12
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Statuary, Gilgamesh's Axe, and Cathected
Viewing in the Ancient Near East', in
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H. Colvin, *Architecture and the After-Life*,
New Haven–London, 1991.

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S. Y. Edgerton, Jr., *Pictures and Punishment:
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Florentine Renaissance*, Ithaca–London,
1985, on *pitture infamanti*.

4.13
See W. McGaffey, 'The Eyes of Under-
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Museum of African Art, 1993,
pp. 21–103.

4.15
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and Presence* (as at 4.1), pp. 208–24; M.
Baxandall, *Painting and Experience*
(as at 1.9), pp. 56–7.

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Faces from Ancient Egypt*, New York, 1995.

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Florentine Bourgeoisie: Domenico
Ghirlandaio in Santa Trinita, The Portraits
of Lorenzo de' Medici and his Household',
in *Renewal of Pagan Antiquity*, as at 3.6, pp.
185–221.

H. Schwarz, 'The Mirror of the Artist and the
Mirror of the Devout', *Studies in the History
of Art Dedicated to William E. Suida*, London,
1959, pp. 90–105, A. Hyatt Mayor, *Prints
and People: A Social History of Printed
Pictures*, Princeton, 1971, fig. 533; on the
visual character of worship in the late Western

Middle Ages, see M. Rubin, *Corpus Christi:
The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture*,
Cambridge, 1991.

4.17
K. Weitzmann, *The Icon: Holy Images – Sixth
to Fourteenth Century*, New York, 1978,
p. 80; on Mary as *Theotokos*, J. Pelikan, *Mary
through the Centuries: Her Place in the
History of Culture,* New Haven–London,
1986, pp. 55–66; on Mary in the Koran,
pp. 67–79.

4.18
E. Bevan, *Holy Images: An Inquiry into
Idolatry and Image-Worship in Ancient
Paganism and in Christianity*, London,
1940.

J.-J. Goux, *Les Iconoclastes*, Paris, 1978;
C. Eire, *War Against the Idols: The
Reformation of Worship from Erasmus to
Calvin*, Cambridge, 1986; D. Freedberg,
*Iconoclasm and Painting in the Revolt of the
Netherlands, 1566–1609*, New York, 1988;
M. Halberstal and M. Avishai, *Idolatry*, tr.
N. Goldblum, Cambridge, Mass., 1992;
S. Michalski, *The Reformation and the Visual
Arts: The Protestant Image Question in
Western and Eastern Europe*, London–New
York, 1993; E. Kantorowicz, *The King's
Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political
Theology*, Princeton, 1957.

J. Philips, *The Reformation of Images:
Destruction of Art in England, 1535–1600*,
Berkeley, 1973.

A. Grabar, *L'Iconoclasme byzantin: le dossier
archeologique*, Paris, 1984; J. Pelikan, *Imago
Dei: The Byzantine Apologia for Icons*,
Princeton, 1990; M. Barasch, *Icon: Studies in
the History of an Idea*, New York–London,
1992; A. Besancon, *The Forbidden Image: An
Intellectual History of Iconoclasm*, tr.
J. M. Todd, Chicago–London, 2000.

Saint Theodore the Studite, *On the Holy
Icons*, tr. C. P. Roth, Crestwood, NY, 1981.

The Koran, tr. N. J. Dawood, London, 1993,
pp. 205–18 (Sura 18, The Cave); O. Grabar,
Formation of Islamic Art, as at 2.7, pp. 72–98,
'Islamic Attitudes toward the Arts'.

B. Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier*, tr.
C. S. Singleton, Garden City, 1959, p. 216.

E. Panofsky, *Idea: A Concept in Art Theory*,
tr. J. J. S. Peake, Columbia, SC, 1968.

F. Bacon, *Novum Organum*, in *The English
Philosophers from Bacon to Mill*, ed. E. A.

Burtt, New York, 1939, p. 31 (xxii) distin-
guishes between the 'idols' of the human mind
and the 'Ideas' of the divine as empty and true
respectively. There must be a radical refounda-
tion of thinking (xxxi) unless we would
'revolve forever in a circle with mean and
contemptible progress' (that is, there must
be a revolution from new beginnings). His
four famous 'idols' of Tribe (human under-
standing is a 'false mirror'); of 'the Cave' (our
subjective interests); of the Marketplace (the
accommodations we make with others); and
of the Theatre (false dogmas, 'so many stage-
plays, representing worlds of their own
creation after an unreal and scenic fashion')
are clearly set out in iconoclastic terms, both
as rhetoric and as substance.

4.19
This etymology of 'mask' is provided by
J. W. Nunley and C. McCarty, *Masks: Faces
of Culture*, New York, 1999, p. 15.

On masks in Aztec ritual, R. F. Townsend,
State and Cosmos, as at Intro 2, p. 28.

Drewal, et al., *Yoruba*, as at 2.4.

B. Lawal, *The Gelede Spectacle: Art, Gender,
and Social Harmony in an African Culture*,
Seattle–London, 1996; R. F. Thompson,
African Art in Motion: Icon and Act, Los
Angeles–Berkeley–London, 1979.

J. Barrish, *Anti-theatrical Prejudice*, as at Intro
1, pp. 5–37 for 'the Platonic foundation' of his
book's subject. Something like this ancient
distinction is still to be found in M. Fried,
*Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and
Beholder in the Age of Diderot*, Berkeley–Los
Angeles–London, 1981.

Cicero, *De Officiis*, I.xxx.107–9. It may be
noted that condemnation of the indecorous
public display of calls of nature also conceals a
theatrical metaphor, *obscenitas*, what is
properly 'offstage' (ibid. I.xxxv). On Cicero's
source in the ethical theory of the Middle Stoic
philosopher Panaetius of Rhodes, A. R. Dyck,
A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis, Ann
Arbor, 1996, pp. 269–272.

On ancient theatrical masks in the later
Western tradition, M. Barasch, *Imago
Hominis: Studies in the Language of Art*, New
York, 1994, pp. 47–118.

P. T. and J. Furst, *North American Indian Art*,
as at 2.2, pp. 136–48; and C. Levi-Strauss,
'Split Representation in the Art of Asia and
America', in *Structural Anthropology*, tr.
C. Jacobson and B. G. Schoepf, Garden City,
1967, pp. 239–63.

Chiefly Feasts: The Enduring Kwakiutl Potlatch, ed. A. Jonaitis, Seattle–London, 1991, p. 238.

4.20
J. W. Graham, *The Palaces of Crete*, Princeton, 1987, p. 27. The designation owes to Sir Arthur Evans, the excavator of Knossos. Graham agrees that the space was evidently for some kind of spectacle or performance, which cannot, however, have been for drama, and cites Homer's 'dancing-place that in wide Knossos Daedalus wrought for Ariadne of the lovely tresses' (*Iliad* xviii). Such a function of course does not eliminate the possibility that certain rituals and designated spaces are alike part of the pre-history of drama.

4.21
Plutarch, 'Demetrius and Antony', in *Lives*, IX. Theatricality is a theme to which Plutarch returns over and over in the biography of Demetrius.

4.22
Theophrastus, *Characters*.

See E. H. Gombrich and E. Kris, *Caricature*, Harmondsworth, 1940, pp. 11–12. For the text, D. Posner, *Annibale Carracci: A Study in the Reform of Italian Painting around 1590*, London, 1971, I, p. 164, n. 88, with further references.

4.23
M. Detienne and J-P. Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society*, tr. J. Lloyd, Chicago, 1991.

On Kleobis and Biton, Herodotus, *Histories*, I.xxxi.

4.24
W. J. T. Mitchell, *Iconology* (as at Intro 1) on the metaphors used to characterize thinking itself in Western philosophy (and usage).

On the Corinthian maiden see Pliny, *Natural History*, XXXV.xliii.151

Augustine considered *idea, forma, species* and *ratio* more or less interchangeable; see *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg, Cambridge, 1982, p. 442, n.7. Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, devotes much attention to *simulacra* or *imagines;* these are very small and subtle, and are compared (for example, IV.51–3) to a film or bark constantly given off from the very exterior surface of things. Each is an image (*imago*) which bears the appearance (*species*) and a form (*forma*) similar to its origin. These speedy *simulacra* once launched into the world account not only for vision but for dreams and imagination.

E. Panofsky, *Idea*, as at 4.11.

For the distinction between *phantastic* and *eikastic* imitation, see Plato, *Sophist*, 235B–236A

On *skiagraphia*, Plato, *Republic*, 523B and 602C–D.

On Simonides, still see R. W. Lee, 'Ut Pictura Poesis: The Humanistic Theory of Painting', *Art Bulletin*, 22, 1940, pp. 197–269; published separately, New York, 1967.

On images, language and memory, Aristotle, *De interpretatione* 16a4–9; Aristotle, *De memoria* 449b32–450a1; and *De anima* 431a17–18.

On the imitation of ethos, Aristotle, *Politics* 1340b8–19, Aristotle, *Poetics* 1448a2, and Pliny the Elder, *Natural History*, XXXV. xxxvi. 98.

On memory and theatre, Aristotle, *De memoria* 450b24–6. The phrase is *'theorema* or *phantasma'*

F. A. Yates, *The Art of Memory*, Chicago, 1966.

For the *grammateion*, Aristotle, *De anima* 429b32–430a2.

4.26
F. S. Connelly, *The Sleep of Reason*, as at 2.17.

J. S. Romm, *The Edges of the Earth*, as at 2.17; R. Wittkower, 'Marvels of the East: A Study in the History of Monsters' and 'Marco Polo and the Pictorial Tradition of the Marvels of the East', in *Allegory and the Migration of Symbols*, New York, pp. 45–92; and 'Distant Worlds' in *Circa 1492: Art in the Age of Exploration*, ed. J. A. Levenson, New Haven, 1991, pp. 120–33. Many of the illustrations discussed by Wittkower are from the *Romance of Alexander*, see Chapter 3, note 6 above. P. Mitter, *Much Maligned Monsters: History of European Reaction to Indian Art*, Oxford, 1977.

On the tradition of imagination as vision, see M. W. Bundy, *The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought*, Urbana, 1927; R. Klein, 'Spirito peregrino', in *Form and Meaning: Writings on the Renaissance and Modern Art*, Princeton, 1979, pp. 62–85.

4.27
On *automata*, Aristotle, *De anima* 406b17–26; S. P. Morris, as at 1.10; and D. Summers, 'Pandora's Crown', as at 1.9.

Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 983a12ff., where *automata* are described under the category of marvellous phenomena the causes of which cannot be understood, and hence provoke the desire to understand (how did you do that?). *Automaton* has been variously translated as 'puppet', 'marionette' and 'self-moving marionette', none of which seems just right. In *Physics* 195b30ff. Aristotle treats *automaton* together with *tyche*. *Automata* happen spontaneously and by chance, and *tyche* is fortune. The *automaton* is thus shaped to human purpose, but may also work contrary to this purpose.

E. Kris and O. Kurz, *Legend, Myth, and Magic in the Image of the Artist: A Historical Experiment*, New Haven–London, 1979. Although I entirely disagree with premises and conclusions of this outdated study (see for example p. 77), the authors have gathered many useful examples.

4.28
R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time and Fate*, Cambridge, 1951, pp. 123–73; I. Lavin, 'On the Sources and Meanings of the Renaissance Portrait Bust', *Art Quarterly*, 33, 1970, pp. 207–26; and 'On Illusion and Allusion in Italian sixteenth-century Portrait Busts', *Proceedings of the American Philsophophical Society*, 119.5, 1975, pp. 353–62.

E. H. Gombrich, 'Icones symbolicae. Philo-sophies of Symbolism and their Bearing on Art', in *Symbolic Images* (as at Intro 1), pp. 31–81.

L. B. Alberti, *On Painting* (as at 1.10): 'Nature provides… that we mourn with the mourners, laugh with those who laugh, and grieve with the grief-stricken. Yet these feelings are known from the movements of the body… The painter therefore must know all about the movements of the body, which I believe he must take from Nature with great skill. It is extremely difficult to vary the movements of the body in accordance with the almost infinite movements of the heart'.

M. Kemp, '"Ogni dipintore dipinge se", a Neoplatonic Echo in Leonardo's Art Theory?'

in *Cultural Aspects of the Italian Renaissance: Essays in Honour of Paul Oskar Kristeller*, Manchester, 1976, pp. 311–323.

4.29
On 'absorption', M. Fried, *Absorption and Theatricality*, as at 4.14.

CHAPTER 5 PLANARITY

5.1
On blood, M. Detienne, J.-P. Vernant et al., *The Cuisine of Sacrifice among the Greeks*, tr. P. Wissing, Chicago–London, 1989, p. 147. I have also used R. Turcan, *The Cults of the Roman Empire*, tr. A. Nevill, Oxford–Cambridge, Mass., 1996.

On 'spaghetti drawings', W. Davis, *Replications: Archaeology, Art History, Psychoanalysis*, University Park, 1996, pp. 67–94; on calendrical marking in the Palaeolithic, A. Marschack, *The Roots of Civilization: The Cognitive Beginnings of Man's First Art, Symbol and Notation*, Mount Kisco, 1991.

5.7
On wholeness, Gombrich, *Art and Illusion*, as at Intro 1, pp. 138–9.

5.8
On the importance of the head in African kingship, H. J. Drewal, in *Yoruba* (as at 2.2), pp. 65–9.

African Seats, ed. S. Bocola, Munich–New York, 1995.

5.12
H. Weyl, *Symmetry*, Princeton, 1952.

5.13
G. Kubler, 'The Iconography of the Art of Teotihuacan', *Papers*, as at Intro 1, pp. 263–74.

5.14
On Fang village alignment, note at 2.1. This essay is based on *African Masterworks in the Detroit Institute of Arts*, Washington–London, 1995, pp. 112–13.

On frontal faces made with confronted profiles, C. Levi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*, as at 4.14.

On left and right in the world at large, see D. Summers, *Michelangelo*, as at Intro 1, pp. 424–5.

See B. Barnes, *Michelangelo's Last Judgment: The Renaissance Response*, Berkeley–Los Angeles–London, 1998.

J. L. Koerner, *The Moment of Self-Portraiture in German Renaissance Art*, Chicago–London, 1993, pp. 384–406, treats a number of images like Holbein's allegory, in which the Law and the Gospel are opposed as our left and right and as death and life respectively. In the examples of *Hercules at the Crossroads* Koerner compares to these images, however, virtue is placed on the proper right, vice to the left, following the more usual pattern. In the Lutheran images the significance of movement from left to right supplements the opposition made possible by symmetrical division.

5.15
On Sesostris III I have followed R. H. Wilkinson, *Reading Egyptian Art: A Hieroglyphic Guide to Ancient Egyptian Painting and Sculpture*, London, 1992, p. 135.

5.16
S. M. Paley, *King of the World: Ashur-nasir-pal II of Assyria 883–859 BC*, Brooklyn, 1976.

I. J. Winter, 'Royal Rhetoric and the Development of Historical Narrative in Neo-Assyrian Reliefs', *Studies in Visual Communication*, 7, no. 2, Spring, 1981, pp. 2–38.

5.17
P. Ben-Amos and A. Rubin, *Art of Power*, as at Intro 1; K. Ezra, *Royal Art of Benin: The Perls Collection in the Metropolitan Museum of Art*, New York, 1992, pp. 78–85, 117–53; S. P. Blier, *The Royal Arts of Africa: The Majesty of Form*, New York, 1998.

5.18
See Wen C. Fong, 'Imperial Portraiture in the Song, Yuan, and Ming Periods', *Ars Orientalis*, 25, 1995, pp. 47–60; see also J. Hay, 'The Human Body as a Microcosmic source of Macrocosmic Values in Calligraphy', *Theories of the Arts in China*, ed. S. Bush and C. Murck, pp. 74–102. I have also used *Circa 1492*, as at 4.21, pp. 428–9.

5.19
On Enguarrand Charronton I have followed J. Snyder, *Northern Renaissance Art: Painting, Sculpture, the Graphic Arts from 1350–1575*, New York, 1985, p. 262.

5.20
On frontal figures as negative in Egyptian art, Gombrich, *Art and Illusion* (as at Intro 1), p. 112: 'Foreign prisoners, dead enemies on the battlefield, and slave girls were sometimes rendered *en face*, as if certain taboos did not apply to such low creatures.' See also M. Schapiro, 'Frontal and Profile as Symbolic

Forms', in *Words, Script, and Pictures: Semiotics of Visual Language*, New York, 1996, pp. 69–112. Other essays in this volume are also relevant.

5.21
On Quintilian's *flexus*, figuration exemplified by Myron's *Discobolos* (*Institutio oratoria*, II. xiii. 8–11), see. J. Shearman, *Mannerism*, Baltimore, 1967, p. 84; M. Baxandall, *Giotto and the Orators: Humanist Observers of Painting in Italy and the Discovery of Pictorial Composition*, Oxford, 1971, pp. 18–19; and D. Summers, 'Contrapposto: Style and Meaning in Renaissance Art', *Art Bulletin*, 59, 1977, pp. 336–61.

Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, IX.iv.13–17, also uses the metaphor *textum* in the context of the discussion of *compositio* and artifice in language.

On the early history of textiles, E. J. W. Barber, *Prehistoric Textiles: The Development of Cloth in the Neolithic and Bronze Ages, with Special Reference to the Aegean*, Princeton, 1991.

In the *Divine Comedy*, Dante (*Purgatorio*, XI.81) refers to 'that art that in Paris is called *alluminar*', corresponding to the French *enluminer*, a term that began to be used for paintings in books in the late Middle Ages. Cicero (*De oratore*, III.xliii.170) wrote that metaphor best distinguishes and 'illuminates' the oration rather like stars. In these terms, an 'illumination' might be thought of as making the text more vivid, more appealing to inner sight, and more persuasive.

5.22
J. D. Dodds, 'The Great Mosque at Cordoba', *Al-Andalus: The Art of Islamic Spain*, New York, 1992, pp. 11–25. The Great Mosque was built on the site of a Christian church; in 1523, some three centuries after the Cordoba was reconquered in 1236, the Catedral de Santa Maria was begun in the middle of the mosque, its minaret becoming a bell tower.

See as an introduction, *Images of Paradise in Islamic Art*, ed. S. S. Blair and J. M. Bloom, Hood Museum of Art, Dartmouth College, 1991; and J. Brookes, *Gardens of Paradise: The History and Design of the Great Islamic Gardens*, New York, 1987.

See R. Ettinghausen, in *Prayer Rugs*, Textile Museum, Washington, DC, 1974.

On calligraphy and geometry, R. Irwin, *Islamic Art in Context: Art, Architecture, and the Literary World*, New York, 1997, p. 180.

On Al-Farabi, D. Summers, *Judgment of Sense* (as at Intro 1), p. 254, n. 53.

5.23
G. Robins, *Proportion and Style in Ancient Egyptian Art*, Austin, 1994.

E. Panofsky, 'The History of the Theory of Human Proportions as a Reflection of the History of Styles', in *Meaning in the Visual Arts* (as at Intro 1), pp. 69–72.

J. J. Coulton, *Ancient Greek Architects at Work: Problems of Structure and Design*, Ithaca, 1977, p. 65.

On Pythagoras, D. Summers, *Judgment of Sense* (as at Intro 1), pp. 52–3. On macrocosm/microcosm, L. Barkan, *Nature's Work of Art: the Human Body as Image of the World*, New Haven, 1975.

5.25
See the suggestive remarks of H. Damisch, 'L'Echiquier et la forme "Tableau"', in *World Art: Themes of Unity in Diversity, Acts of the XXVIth International Congress of the History of Art*, ed. I. Lavin, University Park–London, 1989, I, pp. 187–91. R. E. Krauss, 'Grids', in *Originality of the Avant-Garde* (as at 1.7), pp. 9–22, offers a structural analysis of the grid, an 'emblem' of 20th-century art, as a myth of modernism, preserving in tension the contradiction between science and spirituality. In the terms of the present argument, the grid is a fundamental characteristic of a much longer modernity, of which the twentieth century gained a new consciousness. Early modern grids were modular and metric, most of the grids Krauss illustrates are not (Mondrian, Agnes Martin and Jasper Johns, for example), and the adoption and exploration of the grid might be considered a departure from its earlier relatively unconscious dominance, a departure that yielded art objects of a new kind in a transformation within a specifically pictorial and optical format. An arbitrary grid (as opposed to a true, modular grid) implies identity with format (since it as specific as format) and implies anamorphosis with respect to representation.

5.28
For the plan of Polyanitsa, *The Oxford Illustrated Prehistory of Europe*, ed. B. Cunliffe, Oxford–New York, 1994, p. 173; for Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa, M. Wheeler, *Civilizations of the Indus Valley and Beyond*, New York, 1972. A sympathetic and nuanced consideration of the grid is provided by S. Kostof, *City Shaped* (as at 2.18), Chapter 2.

On the Salt Lake City, S. Kostof, *City Shaped*, as above, pp. 99–103.

5.29
For *sekhet*, Wilkinson, *Reading Egyptian Art* (as at 5.14), p. 125.

5.30
On Greek colonies, E. J. Owens, *The City in the Greek and Roman World*, London–New York, 1991; on Greek and Roman colonies and their later traditions in Europe and the New World, S. Kostof, *City Shaped* (as above), passim; and the excellent study by D. Friedman, *Florentine New Towns, Urban Designs in the Late Middle Ages*, Cambridge, Mass.–London, 1988.

5.31
On Tuleilat Ghassul, *Archaeological Encyclopedia of the Holy Land* (as at 2.7), 1986, pp. 386–7.

Aristotle, *Politics* 1330a–b.

S. Y. Edgerton, Jr., *Renaissance Rediscovery of Linear Perspective*, New York, 1975, pp. 91–122. On the world maps of Nicolaus Germanus, Mercator and Martin Waldseemüller, R. W. Karrow, Jr., *Mapmakers of the Sixteenth Century and Their Maps*, Chicago, 1993, 263, 389 and 571.
The Periplus of the Erythrean Sea: Travel and Trade in the Indian Ocean by a Merchant of the First Century, tr. W. H. Schoff, New Delhi, 1974; and, more recently, *The Periplus Maris Erythraei*, tr. L. Casson, Princeton, 1989.

CHAPTER 6 VIRTUALITY

6.1
Virtuality raises the sorts of issues discussed by R. Wollheim, (*Art and its Objects*, Cambridge, 1980). What Wollheim calls 'representational seeing' is our readiness to see a painting (his primary concern) *as* what it represents. Wollheim took up his problem from L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe, New York, 1953, pp. 193–230 (which is also basic for E. H. Gombrich's *Art and Illusion*). Wollheim abandoned the category of 'seeing as', embracing what he calls 'seeing in' (pp. 205–26). Instead of seeing a painting as what it represents, we see what is represented *in* the painting; he argues that in general experiences are of two kinds, of a particular or of a state of affairs, and seems to associate seeing-in with the latter. Wollheim, however, writes of 'cultivated experience' as requiring 'two-fold attention', so that what is experienced in painting is essentially indifferent to medium and location. According to the argument I am making, virtual space is, as Wollheim says, about events (rather than isolated images), but his arguments for the self-containedness of representations are contrary to what I have called double distance. And, although address to images on surfaces is culturally specific, there is a broad range of possible articulations of it, and the conditions for virtuality are practically universal.

6.3.
On Mesolithic painting, I have used L. Dams, *Les Peintures rupestres du Levant Espagnol*, Paris, 1984.

6.5
For the term 'stage space', M. Bunim, *Space in Medieval Painting and the Forerunners of Perspective*, New York, 1940.

Although I cannot follow her to all of her conclusions, and would not want to accept her Rieglesque regional and national characterizations, the distinction between *stage space* and *viewer space* was suggested to me by S. Alpers, *The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century*, Chicago, 1983, pp. 53–9.

6.6
For discussion of Hesire's proportions, see G. Robins, *Proportion* (as at 5.22), p. 237.

6.7
On planarity, see H. Wölfflin, *Principles of Art History: The Problem of the Development of Style in Later Art*, tr. M. D. Hottinger, New York, 1950. By 'planarity' Wölfflin meant something like what I will call relief space in the next section, not the 'flatness' that so fascinated American painters and critics in the 1960s. On Wölfflin and Adolf Hildebrandt see M. Podro, *The Critical Historians of Art*, New Haven–London, 1982 p. 66.

'Surficiality' began as A. Riegl's 'optical' plane (*Late Roman Art Industry*, tr. R. Winkes, Rome, 1985, chap. II; see Podro, *Critical Historians*, as above, pp. 73–6). For Riegl, this plane is the end of the evolution from haptic to optic, in which sculptural forms, articulated in terms of light and dark, form a new unified optical surface as it were over the actual surface. In my argument surficiality is the conditional possibilty for the incident of any surface to be seen as potentially optical, as a field of light, dark and colour. For an ingenious but tersely argued variant of Riegl's idea, see Panofsky,

Perspective as Symbolic Form (as at Intro 1), pp. 47–55. In the 'great recoil' of the 'Romanesque', figure and surface were united in a manner crucial for the subsequent development of late medieval and Renaissance illusionism. In the present argument, the presence of surfaces as potentially optical is conditional, not only in the sense that they are more or less universally available, but in the sense that their characteristics as surface provide opportunities for association and completion. Illusionistic skills are partly the ability to exploit these conditions in any instance.

6.11
On the numinosity of mountains in China, K. Munakata, *Sacred Mountains* (as at 2.4), and in the West, M. H. Nicholson, *Mountain Gloom, Mountain Glory: The Development of the Aesthetics of the Infinite*, Ithaca, 1959.

S. Little, et al., *Taoism and the Arts of China*, Berkeley, 2000; on pneumatology in the West, R. Klein, 'Spirito peregrino', as at 4.21.

For the introduction of perspective to China, see S. Y. Edgerton, Jr., *The Heritage of Giotto's Geometry: Art and Science on the Eve of the Scientific Revolution*, Ithaca –London, 1991, pp. 254–87.

6.12
On modern light, W. Schivelbusch, *Disenchanted Light: the Industrialization of Light in the Nineteenth Century*, tr. A. Davies, Berkeley, 1988.

For an excellent introduction to the mostly Platonic tradition of light metaphysics, see D. C. Lindberg, *Roger Bacon's Philosophy of Nature: a Critical Edition, with English translation, and notes, of De multiplicatione specierum and De Speculis comburentibus*, Oxford–New York, 1983.

On the history of the halo, *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, as at 2.14, p. 132.

On Jan van Eyck's *Virgin in the Cathedral*, see E. Panofsky, *Early Netherlandish Painting, Its Origin and Character*, New York, 1971, I, pp. 144–8; and J. Snyder, *Northern Renaissance Art* (as at 5.18), pp. 100–1; and see M. Meiss, 'Light as Form and Symbol in Some Fifteenth-Century Paintings', in *The Painter's Choice. Problems in the Interpretation of Renaissance Art*, New York–Hagerstown–San Francisco–London, 1976, pp. 3–18.

J. Okazaki, *Pure Land Buddhist Painting*, tr. E. ten Grotenhuis, Tokyo–New York–San

Francisco, 1977; and D. Wong, 'Four Sichuan Buddhist Steles and the Beginnings of Pure Land Imagery in China', *Archives of Asian Art*, 51, 1998–9, pp. 56–79.

On mirrors in China and Japan, see B. Goldberg, *Mirror* (as at 3.11), pp. 37–78.

On the idea of the Enlightenment (and the twin Counter-Enlightenment), see the essays by H. O. Pappe and I. Berlin, in *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* (as at 3.12), II, pp. 89–112.

6.13
For an introduction to the art of Akhenaten, see D. Arnold, *The Royal Women of Amarna: Images of Beauty from Ancient Egypt*, New York, 1996. Carved stelae seem to have been placed in domestic shrines, in which one worshipped the royal family involved in exclusive worship, they alone having direct access to the divine power of the sun.

E. H. Gombrich, 'The Heritage of Apelles' (as at Intro 1), pp. 3–18.

For Descartes's literalization of the rays of the visual angle, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, tr. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, Cambridge, 1985, I, pp. 153–5, 169.

Aristotle discusses 'those sciences which are rather physical than mathematical, though combining both disciplines, such as optics, harmonics and astronomy' at *Physics* 194a.

On the judicious incorporation of illusionistic modelling in Chinese painting, which came together with Buddhism and its iconography in the early 6th century, and is associated with the painter Chang Seng-yu, see J. Cahill, *Chinese Painting*, New York, 1977, p. 15.

On the origin of the word *canon* (measuring stick) see W. Burkert, *The Orientalizing Revolution: Near Eastern Influence on Greek Culture in the Early Archaic Age*, tr. M. E. Pinder and W. Burkert, Cambridge, Mass., 1992, pp. 34–9.

On reflections, E. H. Gombrich, 'Light, Form and Texture in Fifteenth-Century Painting North and South of the Alps', in *Heritage of Apelles* (as at Intro 1), pp. 19–35; on the reflections in the eyes of Albrecht Dürer's figures, J. Bialostocki, 'Man and Mirror in Painting: Reality and Transcendence', in *Studies in Late Medieval and Renaissance Painting in Honor of Millard Meiss*, ed. I. Lavin and J. Plummer, New York, 1977, pp. 61–72. See also M. Pardo, 'The Subject of

Savoldo's Magdalene', *Art Bulletin*, 71, 1989, pp. 67–91.

6.14
On intromission and extromission, see D. C. Lindberg, *Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler*, Chicago-London, 1976. Vitruvius (VI. ii. 3) in Roman times and L. B. Alberti (as at 1.10, p. 41; *On Painting*, 5), in the Renaissance declared it did not matter whether the rays went in or out of the eye, the geometry being the same in either case.

For a translation of the Euclid's *Optics*, see H. E. Burton, 'The Optics of Euclid', *Journal of the Optical Society of America*, 35, no. 5, 1945, pp. 357–72.

6.15
For Vitruvius's rejection of fantastic scene painting, *De architectura*, VII. v. 3–7. The text was often coupled with the ridicule of fantastic painting at the beginning of the *Ars poetica* of Horace. There were of course those who advocated rather than condemned such audacity. See D. Summers, *Michelangelo* (as at Intro 1), pp. 134–63. See G. Carettoni, *Das Haus des Augustus auf dem Palatin*, Mainz am Rhein, 1983, pp. 23–7 on the Room of the Masks.

6.16
For Seneca, see *Naturales quaestiones*, I.iii.9; and D. Summers, *Judgment of Sense* (as at Intro 1), p. 45.

On the Mount Sinai *Madonna and Child* in the context of the formation of the Christian icon, see H. Belting, *Likeness* (as at 4.1), pp. 129–32 and passim.

6.19
For this meander pattern, see E. H. Gombrich, 'Heritage of Apelles' (as at Intro 1), pp. 12–14. Gombrich compares it to a convention for the representation of mountains and landscapes with innumerable replications to the 15th century (see for example Figures 299–300). For Gombrich the meander respects and transmits what he calls the 'rule of Philoponus', that light colours advance in comparison to dark ones, a quasi-optical principle for practice that persisted through the Renaissance.

C. Nordenfalk, 'Outdoors–Indoors: a 2000-year Space Problem in Western Art', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 117, 4, 1973, pp. 233–58. Nordenfalk is most interested in the next phase, the view of landscape through the back wall of the optical cube, which begins as a theme in early Northern Renaissance painting.

The idea of perspective as a model may be regarded as an adaptation of the arguments of M. Kubovy, *The Psychology of Perspective and Renaissance Art*, Cambridge, 1986, who considers in quite different terms why we see a perspective painting without difficulty even if we are not in the constructed position for seeing it.

I have followed the analysis of Giotto's painting in M. Kemp, *The Science of Art: Optical Themes in Western Art from Brunelleschi to Seurat*, New Haven–London, 1990, pp. 8–10.

On the altarpiece, F. Hartt, *Italian Renaissance Art: Painting, Sculpture, Architecture*, 4th edn., New York, 1994, pp. 32–3. Hartt attributes the change to the rise of new patronage and the proliferation of altars in private chapels, on which see H. Colvin, *Architecture and the Afterlife*, (as at 4.8), pp. 152–216. See E. H. Gombrich, 'Paintings for Altars: Their Evolution, Ancestry and Progeny', in *Uses of Images* (as at Intro 1), pp. 48–79; and J. Gardner, 'Altars, Altarpieces and Art History: Legislation and Usage', in *Italian Altarpieces 1250–1550: Function and Design*, ed. E. Borsook and F. Superbi Gioffredi, Oxford, 1994, pp. 5–39. The sack of Constantinople in the Fourth Crusade of 1204 brought relics and icons to Western Europe in great numbers, and the rise of the use of images in both worship and devotion is a complex historical issue. See also B. G. Lane, *The Altar and the Altarpiece: Sacramental Themes in Early Netherlandish Painting*, New York, 1984; *The Altarpiece in the Renaissance*, ed. P. Humfrey and M. Kemp, Cambridge, 1990; and A. Nagel, in *The Dictionary of Art*, s. v. 'Altarpiece'.

Thomas Aquinas, rather than continuing the iconoclasm controversy, seems to have considered it settled; see his *Summa Theologiae*, III.25.3. Reverence is to be shown to images insofar as they are images of their prototypes, not insofar as they are 'carved or painted wood'.

6.21
On Alhazen, see D. C. Lindberg, *Theories of Vision* (as at 6.13); Lindberg has also provided a facsimile edition of the Latin Alhazen in *Opticae thesaurus: Alhazeni Arabis libri septem*, ed. F. Risner, New York, 1972. For a translation and critical edition of the Arabic text, see A. I. Sabra, *The Optics of Ibn al-Haytham: Books I–III On Direct Vision*, 2 vols., London, 1989; S. Y. Edgerton, Jr., *Renaissance Rediscovery* (as at 5.29), pp. 64–78, places Alhazen among 'the fathers

of optics'; and see my *Judgment of Sense*, pp. 153–70.

C. J. Farago, *Leonardo da Vinci's 'Paragone': A Critical Interpretation with a New Edition of the Text in the Codex Urbinas*, Leiden, 1992, pp. 181–3. And Alhazen, ed. Sabra, as above, p. 66.

6.22
For the description of Brunelleschi's panel, see A. Manetti, *The Life of Brunelleschi*, ed. H. Saalman, University Park, 1970, pp. 43–7. Every part of this account has been contested, although there is little disagreement that Brunelleschi must have done something very like what Manetti described. For a review and tabular account of various readings, see S. Boraso, *Brunelleschi 1420: Il paradigma prospettico di Filippo di Ser Brunellesco: il 'caso' delle tavole sperimentali ottico-prospettiche*, Padua, 1999.

G. Tanturli ('Rapporti del Brunelleschi con gli ambienti letterarie fiorentini', in *Filippo Brunelleschi: la sua opera e il suo tempo*, Florence, 1980, pp. 125–44) has shown that by 1413 Brunelleschi was doing diverting optical demonstrations. S. Y. Edgerton, Jr., *Renaissance Rediscovery* (as at 5.29), pp. 91–123, has stressed the importance of cartography for Italian Renaissance perspective. Optics, surveying and cartography, as kinds of practical geometry, were closely related, however, and it must have been easy for a person practised in one to understand another.

For Alhazen and 15th-century Italian artists, see J. M. Greenstein, 'On Alberti's "Sign": Vision and Composition in Quattrocento Painting', *Art Bulletin*, 79, 1997, pp. 669–98; and D. Summers, *Judgment of Sense* (as at Intro 1), pp. 164–76.

C. Guillen, 'On the Concept and Metaphor of Perspective', in *Literature as System: Essays toward the Theory of Literary History*, Princeton, 1971, pp. 283–378.

On the flattening of the crystalline humour see Ibn al-Haytham, ed. Sabra (as at 6.21), p. 56. There is 'a slight flattening similar to that of a lentil's exterior. Thus the surface of its front is a portion of a spherical surface which is larger than the spherical surface surrounding the rest of it.' See also ibid., p. 116. Alhazen is at pains to show that the order of points on the anterior crystalline humour is exactly the same as the order of points in the object seen, and a plane reflection is truest. Some writers simply pronounced the crystalline humour flat, like a plane mirror.

6.25
On perspective and *perspicuitas*, which may mean clarity but also brilliance of treatment, see Pomponius Gauricus, *De Sculptura (1504)*, ed. A. Chastel and R. Klein, Geneva, 1969, pp. 177–8.

On the unnoticed halving of the universe see L. B. Alberti, *On Painting* (as at 1.10), I.18; Alberti describes his construction at I.19–24; on the broader intellectual historical significance of Alberti's arguments and the revival of Protagoras in the Renaissance, K. Harries, *Infinity and Perspective*, Cambridge, Mass., 2001, pp. 184–99.

M. Baxandall, *Giotto and the Orators*, as at 5.20.

For Narcissus as the paradigm of painting, Alberti, *On Painting* (as at 1.10), II.26.

See D. Summers, 'Contrapposto', as at 5.20.

On poetry as allegory, D. Summers, *Michelangelo* (as at Intro 1). pp. 35–6 and passim. L. Barkan, *The Gods Made Flesh: Metamorphosis and the Pursuit of Paganism*, New Haven, 1986.

Prudentius, 'Psychomachia', in *Prudentius, Volume 1*, tr. H. J. Thomson, Cambridge, Mass.–London, 1993, pp. 275–343. On the tradition of allegory in Western art, E. H. Gombrich, '*Icones symbolicae*: Philosophies of Symbolism and their Bearing on Art', in *Symbolic Images* (as at Intro 1), pp. 123–95.

On the long Western tradition of 'difficulty', in effect the limitation of access to meaning, see D. Summers, *Michelangelo* (as at I. 1), pp. 177–85.

On the metaphor of the book, including the 'Book of Nature', E. R. Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, tr. W. R. Trask, New York–Evanston, 1953.

See E. Auerbach, 'Figura', in *Scenes from the Drama of European Literature*, Minneapolis, 1984, pp. 11–76.

C. Ripa, *Iconologia: overo descrittione di diverse imagini cavati dal'antichità, e di proprio inventione*, Hildesheim–New York, 1970, first published in 1593.

C. Owens, 'The Allegorical Impulse: Toward a Theory of Postmodernism'; and 'The Allegorical Impulse... Part 2', in *Beyond Recognition: Representation, Power, and Culture*, ed. S. Bryson, B. Kruger, L. Tillman, J. Weinstock, Berkeley, 1992, pp. 70–87.

6.26
On Andrea Pozzo, M. Kemp, *Science of Painting* (as at 6.18), pp. 127–39.

6.27
E. H. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion* (as at Intro 1), Chapter I, 'From Light into Paint'.

F. Ames-Lewis, *Drawing in Early Renaissance Italy*, New Haven, 2000.

H. Wölfflin, *Principles of Art History*, as at 6.7.

CHAPTER 7 THE CONDITIONS OF MODERNISM

7.1
M. Warnke, *The Court Artist: On the Ancestry of the Modern Artist*, Cambridge, 1993.

H. Belting, *Likeness and Presence* (as at 4.1) means by the phrase 'age of art' in his subtitle something like what Hegel meant by the 'death of art'; we make beautiful images, but 'do not bend the knee' (G. W. F. Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, tr. T. M. Knox, Oxford, 1975, I, p. 103). Art is aesthetic, about expression and experience, not about presence.

For an introduction to the substantial recent discussion of museums, see D. Preziosi, ed., *The Art of Art History: A Critical Anthology*, Oxford–New York, 1998, pp. 451–506.

See T. E. Crow, *Painting and Public Life in Eighteenth-Century Paris*, New Haven, 1985.

On the mirror in early consumer culture, W. Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, tr. H. Eiland and K. McLaughlin, Cambridge, Mass.–London, 1999, pp. 537–42.

In the *Mechanical Problems* attributed to Aristotle (*Minor Works*, tr. W. S. Hett, Cambridge, Mass.–London, 1980, pp. 330–1) we read that some remarkable things happen in accordance with nature, others contrary to nature; the second are done by human skill for human benefit; see D. Summers, 'Pandora's Crown', as at 1.9.

On modern illumination, W. Schivelbusch, *Disenchanted Light* (as at 6.12); W. Benjamin, *Arcades Project* (as above) pp. 562–71; D. E. Nye, *Electrifying America. Social Meanings of a New Technology*, Cambridge, Mass.–London, 1991.

Einstein's joke is quoted by R. Rhodes, *The Making of the Atomic Bomb*, New York –London, 1986, p. 181. For a clear and interesting discussion of modern art as the illustration of the new science, see L. Gamwell, *Exploring the Invisible: Art, Science and the Spiritual*, Princeton, 2002.

7.2
For Brunelleschi's clocks, see A. Manetti, *Life of Brunelleschi* (as at 6.21), pp. 50–1; and F. D. Prager, 'Brunelleschi's Clock?', *Physis*, 10, 1963, pp. 203–16, on his likely connection with the Cathedral clock, painted by Paolo Uccello in 1443, see F. and S. Borsi, *Paolo Uccello*, Milan, 1992, pp. 116–19. On the measurement of time in general, see A. Aveni, *Empires of Time* (as at 2.1); and D. S. Landes, *Revolution in Time. Clocks and the Making of the Modern World*, Cambridge, Mass. –London, 1983; A. W. Crosby, *The Measure of Reality: Quantification and Western Society, 1250–1600*, Cambridge–New York, 1997; S. Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space 1880–1918*, Cambridge, Mass., 1983. R. S. Wieck, *Time Sanctified: The Book of Hours in Medieval Art and Life*, New York–Baltimore, 1988; L. White, Jr., 'The Iconography of *Temperantia* and the Virtuousness of Technology', *Medieval Religion and Technology: Collected Essays*, Berkeley–Los Angeles–London, 1978, pp. 181–204.

Vitruvius (X. i. 4) writes that the mechanism of Nature, by which we know the turning of the seasons, is the source of all human mechanics. See the late 15th-century Flemish tapestry (*Circa 1492*, as at 4.21, p. 214, n. 111), where an angel, immediately below a radiant God the Father (with the inscription 'power of the prime mover') turns a crank to animate the universe, conceived as an astrolabe revolving around the Pole Star. On the 'unmoved mover' as the origin of all motion, see Aristotle, *Physics*, 241b24–243a2; 254b7–256b29 and *De Caelo*, passim. These arguments had a long, authoritative tradition.

For Cusanus, see K. Harries (as at 6.25), pp. 32–6; for Leonardo, J. P. Richter, *The Notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci*, New York, 1970, II, pp. 137–47.

For Viator on the 'subject', see H. Damisch, *The Origin of Perspective*, tr. J. Goodman, Cambridge–London, 1994; and W. Ivins, *On the Rationalization of Sight: Viator, De Artificiali Perspectiva*, New York 1973, cap. ii. Viator emphatically embraces intromission, comparing the eye as a focus of rays to a burning mirror.

See S. Y. Edgerton, Jr., 'Geometrization of Astronomical Space: Galileo, Florentine *Disegno*, and the "Strange Spottednesse" of the Moon', *Heritage of Giotto's Geometry* (as at 6.10), pp. 223–53; on the microscope, I have used C. Wilson, *The Invisible World: Early Modern Philosophy and the Invention of the Microscope*, Princeton, 1995.

On Descartes's retention of the idea of form as a definition of the human soul, see R. Ariew, *Descartes and the Last Scholastics*, Ithaca–London, 1999, pp. 77–96 (with M. Grene).

Philosophical Writings of Descartes (as at 6.12), I, p. 202: 'Our reason for using the term "indefinite" rather than "infinite" [for the extension of the world, the division of the parts of nature, the number of stars] is, in the first place, so as to reserve the term "infinite" for God alone.' For space and time as the 'sensorium of God', I. Newton, *Opticks, or A Treatise of the Reflections, Refractions, Inflections and Colours of Light*, New York, 1952, p. 370 (first published 1704); on the broad dispute surrounding the confusion of infinite space and the ontological proof of God's existence, see E. A. Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science*, Garden City, 1954; and A. Koyre, *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe*, Baltimore, 1957. 'Ether' might be described as the body of absolute space, but its existence could not be demonstrated; see L. Gamwell, as at 7.1, p. 195.

7.3
Max Jammer, *Concepts of Force: A Study in the Foundations of Dynamics*, Mineola, 1999; *Concepts of Mass in Classical and Modern Physics,* New York–Evanston–London, 1961; and *Concepts of Space: The History of Theories of Space in Physics*, 2nd edn., Cambridge, Mass, 1969.

For Kant on Rousseau I have used E. Cassirer, *Kant's Life and Thought*, tr. J. Haden, New Haven–London, 1981, p. 89; on the association of ideas, see R. M. Young, *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* (as at 3.12), I, pp. 111–18. D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd edn., Oxford, 1978, I, part 1, section IV.

For S. Freud, *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex*, tr. E. E. Brill, New York, 1962, p. 74 (and passim): the *libido* is 'a force of variable quantity which has the capacity of measuring processes and transformations in the spheres of sexual excitement'. C. Darwin, *On The Origin of Species: A Facsimile of the First Edition*, Cambridge, Mass.-London, 1964, p. 490. Life 'with its several powers, having been originally breathed in a few forms

or into one... whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity'; 'from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved'. K. Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, tr. S. Moore and E. Aveling, New York, 1906, Preface to the First Edition, p. 14. 'It is the ultimate aim of this work, to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society'; and A. Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, ed. E. Cannan, Chicago, 1976, p. 340.

L. A. Feuerbach called Copernicus the 'first revolutionary of modern times'; he 'deprived mankind of its heaven' and 'gave full license to all the Earth's subsequent and differently located revolutions'. See H. Blumenberg, *The Genesis of the Copernican World*, tr. R. M. Wallace, Cambridge, Mass.–London, 1987, p. 84.

7.4
See D. Summers, '*Cogito* Embodied: Force and Counterforce in René Descartes's *Les passions de l'âme*', *Representing the Passions: Histories, Bodies, Visions*, ed. R. Meyer, Los Angeles, 2003, pp. 13–36.

T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. R. Tuck, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 13–16; on discourse, pp. 20–1.

Plato, *Theaetetus*, 184D: 'It would be strange if the different senses... do not strive to join into one *idea*, whether we should call it *psyche* or something else.' However this text is read (and I am grateful to Jenny Strauss Clay for helping me read it) the *psyche* is a principle of unity; it is the immediate ancestor of Aristotle's *koine aisthesis* and of the long tradition of the faculty of common sense. See D. Summers, *Judgment of Sense* (as at Intro 1), pp. 75–89. This seems to be the beginning of representationalism (as discussed in the Introduction); a faculty of the soul, later identified with both imagination and common sense, makes an *idea*, something seen, out of the disparate data of the senses. This not only implies representationalism, it also stresses the priority and near-mental character of sight, much as *phantasia* first meant something seen, then something seen in the light of the mind, before the 'mind's eye'.

J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. P. H. Nidditch, Oxford, pp. 249–51. See also the Section on 'Force and Understanding – The World of Appearance and the Supersensible World' in G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, tr. J. B. Baillie, London, 1949, pp. 181–213. Hegel is explaining (among other things) how force, which is in itself and self-differentiating, can also be for the understanding.
R. Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*, in *Philosophical Writings* (as at 6.13), I, pp. 325–404.

For Spinoza on the passions, H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processes of his Thinking*, Cambridge, Mass.–London, 1934, pp. 185–220.

F. Bacon, *Novum Organum*, xlviii (*English Philosophers*, as at 4.11, p. 37).

J. Todd, *Sensibility: An Introduction*, London–New York, 1986; A. Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie, Indianapolis, 1984 (first published in 1759). D. Hume, 'Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion', *Selected Essays*, ed. S. Copley and A. Edgar, Oxford–New York, 1993, pp. 10–13.

A. Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Idea* was first published in 1818; it enjoyed European popularity, including Nietzsche, whose famous and overused Dionysian /Apollonian duality formed around Schopenhauer's irrational will/idea opposition (F. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals*, tr. F. Golffing, Garden City, 1956). Freud often cites Schopenhauer when discussion reaches the metaphysical level; S. Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, tr. J. Strachey, New York, 1959, p. 88: 'We have unwittingly steered our course into the harbour of Schopenhauer's philosophy. For him death is the "true result and to that extent the purpose of life", while the sexual instinct is the embodiment of the will to live.' Freud's speculative discussion of the 'vesicle' is at IV, pp. 50–63. See *Schopenhauer Selections*, ed. D. H. Parker, New York, 1956, pp. 374–5: 'The inner being in itself of things is nothing that knows, no intellect, but an unconscious; knowledge is only added as an accident...' Or the 'Metaphysics of the Love of the Sexes' (ibid. p. 370): 'But it is just this inner nature [will] which lies at the foundation of our own consciousness as its kernel, and hence indeed is more immediate than this itself as thing in itself, and, as thing in itself, free from the principle of individuation, is really the same and identical in all individuals, whether they exist together or after each other. Now this is the will to live, thus just that which desires life and continuance so vehemently.' Schopenhauer appealed to the example of the early theory of evolution of Larmarck.

7.5
K. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250–1345*, Leiden, 1988. Hobbes, *Leviathan* (as at 7.4), p. 15.

On Descartes and grottoes, S. Gaukroger, *Descartes: An Intellectual Biography*, Oxford, 1995, p. 63 and passim.

Descartes, *Philosophical Writings* (as at 6.13), I, p. 81: 'there may be a difference between the sensation we have of light (that is, the idea of light which is formed in our imagination by the mediation of our eyes) and what is in the objects that produces this sensation within us.'

For the relevant sections from the *Optics*, see *Philosophical Writings* (as above), I, pp. 152–75.

M. Kemp, *The Science of Art* (as at 6.19), pp. 165–6.

See D. Summers, 'Why did Kant call Taste a Common Sense?', *Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics and the Reconstruction of Art*, ed. P. Mattick, Jr., Cambridge, 1993, pp. 120–51. D. Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, as at 7.3, pp. 252–3.

J. Crary, *Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge, Mass.–London, 1991, pp. 67–96. This very interesting chapter is skewed by its reliance on the periodization of Michel Foucault.

G. Berkeley, *Philosophical Works, including the Works on Vision*, ed. M. R. Ayers, London, 1975, pp. 7–70. E. H. Gombrich discusses the importance of Berkeley's 'new theory of vision' in *Art and Illusion* (as at Intro 1), pp. 15–20.

M. Fried, *Art and Objecthood: Essays and Reviews*, Chicago and London, 1998, pp. 224–9.

On anamorphosis, K. Veltman, *Linear Perspective and the Visual Dimensions of Science and Art*, Munich, 1986, pp. 143–69.

7.6
Aristotle, *Physics*, 199a8: 'Thus, if a house were a natural product, the process would pass through the same stages that it in fact passes through when it is produced by art; and if natural products could also be produced by art, they would move along the line that the natural process actually takes.'

Both nature and art work to ends. See my
'Pandora's Crown'(as at 1.9), passim.
Part II of Immanuel Kant's *Critique of
Judgement*, the 'Critique of Teleological
Judgement', is in large part given over to
the dismissal of this analogy. Just because
natural forms seem to have been made
toward an end in the manner of works of
human art, we cannot assume that
ends and forms are in fact final causes.

7.7
Guillen, 'Perspective', as at 6.21 above.

G. W. Leibniz, *The Monadology and
other Philosophical Writings*, tr.
R. Latta, New York, 1985, p. 248;
this text is cited by J. Elkins, as at
Intro 1, p. 24.

7.8
S. H. Monk, *The Sublime: A Study of Critical
Theories in Eighteenth-Century England*, Ann
Arbor, 1960; M. H. Nicholson, *Mountain
Gloom*, as at 6.10.

Quoted in A. Broadie, *The Scottish
Enlightenment: The Historical Age of the
Historical Nation*, Edinburgh, 2001, p. 215;
S. Toulmin and J. Goodfield, *The Discovery
of Time*, New York, 1965.
As far as I know, the term 'technological
sublime' was coined by L. Marx, *The Machine
in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral
Ideal in America*, New York, 1967. See
Marx's student, D. E. Nye, *American
Technological Sublime*, Cambridge,
Mass.–London, 1994, who adds the
'electrical sublime' (see 7.1) and the
'consumer's sublime' (Las Vegas, etc.).

E. Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry into the
Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and
Beautiful*, ed. J. T. Boulton, London–New
York, 1958, p. 31.

P. Spacks, *Boredom: The Literary History of
a State of Mind*, Chicago, 1995.

On sense as a mean, Summers, *Judgment of
Sense*, as at Intro 1, passim.

E. Burke, *Philosophical Enquiry*, as above,
pp. 57–87; on the 'commonness' of dimension,
p. 72.

I. Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, as at
1.6, p. 90.

7.9
I have used J. L. Koerner, *Caspar David
Friedrich and the Subject of Landscape*,
New Haven–London, 1990.

7.10
See J. H. Rubin, *Impressionism*,
London, 1999.
On the artifice of Monet's instantaneity, R.
Herbert, 'Method and Meaning in Monet',
Art in America, 67, no. 5, 1979, pp. 90–108.

S. Z. Levine, *Monet, Narcissus and Self-
Reflection: The Modern Myth of the Self*,
Chicago and London, 1994, pp. 61–73. Levine
notes (p. 19) that Theodore Duret explained
Impressionist painting by referring to
Schopenhauer, who had taught us that
everything is a manifestation of a single cause,
a 'universal motor which science now calls
force'. We never apprehend this in itself, but
we know everything through it; it remains
inexplicable and incomprehensible.

G. Berkeley, *Of the Principles of Human
Knowledge*, in *Philosophical Works*
(as at 7.5), pp. 89–153.

On the 'conceptual image' see D. Summers,
'Real Metaphor', as at Intro 1.

7.11
Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1448a–1449a12.

Hobbes, *Leviathan* (as at 7.4), p. 43. Laughter
is a passion, excited by 'sudden glory', either
pleasure in one's own actions, 'or by the
apprehension of some deformed thing in
another'. Too much laughing at others,
Hobbes says, betrays 'pusillanimity', which
we might call insecurity. We should be
comparing ourselves to the better, not to
the worse.

E. Kris, *Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art*,
New York, 1952, Part 3: 'The Comic'; the
section entitled 'The Principles of Caricature'
was written with E. H. Gombrich; see also
Gombrich, 'The Cartoonist's Armoury',
Meditations on a Hobby Horse, as at Intro 1,
pp. 127–42; and 'Magic, Myth and Metaphor:
Reflections on Pictorial Satire', in *The
Essential Gombrich*, London, 1996,
pp. 331–53. And J. Wechsler, *A Human
Comedy: Physiognomy and Caricature in
Nineteenth Century Paris*, Chicago–
London, 1982.

E. M. Kenney and J. M. Merriman, *The Pear:
French Graphic Arts in the Golden Age of
Caricature*, South Hadley, 1991; and J. Cuno,
'Charles Philipon, La Maison Aubert and the
Business of Caricature in Paris, 1829–41', *Art
Journal*, 43, 1983, pp. 347–54.

I. and P. Opie, *The Oxford Dictionary of
Nursery Rhymes*, London, 1975, p. 185.
'Georgie' has been variously identified as

George I or Charles II (among kings), but the
rhyme was first published in 1842 with
another name altogether (which is not to say
that it might not have been much older, or
may not have existed in variants before it
was recorded.)

On the history of public relations, I have used
S. Ewen, *PR! A Social History of Spin*, New
York, 1996.

7.12
For Courbet's alleged remark to his drinking
partners, see G. Mack, *Gustave Courbet*, New
York, 1951, pp. 101–2; cited by V. Goldberg,
*The Power of Photography: How
Photographs Changed our Lives,* New
York–London–Paris, 1991, p. 19.

On fingerprints, C. Ginzburg, 'Clues',
as at Intro 1.

R. Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on
Photography*, tr. R. Howard, New York,
1981.

K. Varnedoe, *A Fine Disregard: What Makes
Modern Art Modern*, New York, 1990,
Chapter 5, 'Overview: the Flight of the Mind',
pp. 217–77.
On the enthusiasm for Taylorism in revolu-
tionary Russia, see T. J. Clark, *Farewell to an
Idea: Episodes from a History of Modernism*,
New Haven–London, 1999, pp. 228–9. El
Lissitsky's 'photogram' self-portrait as
'Constructor', made in 1924, shows superim-
posed hand and eye disciplined by a grid, the
general significance of which cannot be much
different from that of Taylor and Gilbreth's.

On C. T. R. Wilson's cloud chamber and the
British tradition of cloud study beginning with
Luke Wilson's classification of clouds at the
turn of the nineteenth century, see P. Galison,
*Image and Logic: A Material Culture of
Microphysics*, Chicago, 1997, pp. 65–141.
Wilson was a skilled photographer and
adapted the technique of nanosecond illumina-
tion by spark used by A. M. Worthington in
A Study of Splashes, published in 1908.

7.13
I have used H. Foster, *Compulsive Beauty*,
Cambridge, Mass., 1993.

F. Novotny, *Cézanne*, 2nd edn., Vienna–New
York, 1938. Novotny's brief introductory
essay is an outline of his *Cézanne und das
Ende der wissenschaftlichen Perspektive*,
Vienna, 1938.

For 'interminable disclosures' see F. Cachin,
I. Cahn, W. Feilchenfeldt, H. Loyrette, J. J.

Rishel, *Cézanne*, Philadelphia Museum of Art, 1996, p. 428. Matisse wrote that, although there are 'architectural laws' useful for young painters in Cezanne's paintings, he had also accomplished painting's 'highest mission, to make his colors *forces* in a picture'.

M. Gough, 'Faktura. The Making of the Russian Avant-garde', *res*, 36, 1999, pp. 32–60, argues that *faktura*, which first meant something like texture, associated with 'touch' in painted surfaces, and thus with individuality and subjectivity, came to refer to the determination of the work of art by material itself, an idea taken up by Tatlin. When it was pointed out that composition as well a *faktura* expressed subjectivity, it became necessary to find other 'constructive' principles of organization. To my mind, this meant submission of effort to rationalized space and time and allied the avant-garde with a de-Romanticized futurism.

E. H. Gombrich, '"The Father of Art History": A Reading of the *Lectures on Aesthetics* of G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831)', in *Tributes: Interpreters of our Cultural Tradition*, Oxford, 1984, pp. 51–69. A. Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: a Philosophy of Art*, Cambridge, Mass., 1981; and *Beyond the Brillo Box: the Visual Arts in Post-historical Perspective*, New York, 1992.

7.14
S. J. Barnes, *The Rothko Chapel: An Act of Faith*, Austin, 1989, provides a straightforward monograph. Rothko's remarks concerning ecumenism are provided by D. Ashton, *About Rothko*, New York, 1983; see pp. 168–70; A. Chave, *Mark Rothko: Subjects in Abstraction*, New Haven–London, 1989, argues that Rothko worked in a kind of

minimalized code of traditional pictorial conventions; for example, his favoured format was a 'microcosmic' fusion of landscape and portrait formats, he opposed lights and darks (*chiaroscuro*) and his facture was autographic but non-referential. The most exhaustive treatment is S. Nodelman, *Rothko Chapel*, as at Intro 1. The structural analysis fundamental to this study is supplanted here by actual alignment and circumambulation. Nodelman treats the transformation from virtual to real space, a distinction he finally dissolves; see D. Anfam, 'Dark Illumination: the Context of the Rothko Chapel' in *Mark Rothko: the Chapel Commission*, exh. cat., Menil Collection, Houston, 1996, pp. 6–15; and Anfam's monumental *Mark Rothko/The Works on Canvas/Catalogue Raisonné*, New Haven, 1998; Anfam connects the Chapel with Greek tragedy, with Nietzsche's remarks on the numinosity of the Greek temple and the Christian and Judaic *Deus absconditus*. The terms of this discussion were set by R. Rosenblum in 1961, 'The Abstract Sublime', in *On Modern American Art: Selected Essays*, New York, 1999, pp. 72–9; see then *Modern Painting and the Northern Romantic Tradition: Friedrich to Rothko*, New York, 1975; and 'Rothko and Tradition' (1987), in *Essays*, pp. 109–121.

J. Weiss, *Mark Rothko*, exh. cat. Washington, National Gallery of Art–New Haven, 1998; J. Gage, 'Rothko: Color as Subject', pp. 246–63; B. Novak and B. O'Doherty, 'Tragedy and Void', pp. 264–81; J. Weiss, 'Rothko's Unknown Space', pp. 303–29, for a review of interpretations.

For William Bennett, see the review of R. Smith, 'Center for Land Use and Interpretation, 'Formations of Erasure: Earthworks and Entropy', *The New York Times*, 25 May 2001. Against the grain of

current institutional criticism of the museum see A. McLellan, 'From Boulée to Bilbao: The Museum as Utopian Space', in *Art History and Its Institutions: Foundations of a Discipline*, ed. E. Mansfield, London–New York, 2002, pp. 46–64.

See *Theories and Documents of Contemporary Art: A Sourcebook of Artists' Writings*, ed. K. Stiles and P. Selz, Berkeley–London, 1996; and K. Stiles, *Out of Actions: Between Performance and the Object*, Los Angeles, 1998.

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F. A. Yates, *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition*, Chicago–London, 1964, pp. 245–9.

A. K. Gillespie, *The Life of New York City's World Trade Center*, New Brunswick–London, 1999.

A. Warburg, 'Images from the Region of the Pueblo Indians of North America', in D. Preziosi, *The Art of Art History*, as at 7.1, pp. 177–206.

For the making of *Karrku*, F. Dussart, 'What an Acrylic can Mean: On the Meta-Ritualistic Resonances of a Central Desert Painting', in *Art from the Land*, as at 4.6, pp. 193–218; see also H. Morphy, *Aboriginal Art*, as at 4.3, pp. 299–303.

For Panofsky's essay, 'Style and Medium in the Motion Picture', see M. Weitz, *Problems in Aesthetics: An Introductory Book of Readings*, New York, 1959, pp. 526–43.

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in this book.*

In this bold, brilliant, original and important book, David Summers argues that current formalist, contextual and post-structural approaches to art cannot provide the basis for a truly global and intercultural art history. He believes that assumptions right at the heart of Western thinking about art must therefore be re-examined, and the new framework he offers is an attempt to resolve some of the problems that arise from doing so. At the core of the argument is a proposal to replace the modern Western notion of the 'visual arts' with that of the 'spatial arts', comprising two fundamental categories: 'real space' and 'virtual space'. Real space is the space we share with other people and things, and the fundamental arts of real space are sculpture, the art of personal space, and architecture, the art of social space. Virtual space, space represented in two dimensions, as in paintings, drawings and prints, always entails a format in real space, thus making real space the primary category.

Adopting a wide definition of art that in principle embraces anything that is made, and underpinning his arguments with detailed examination of artifacts and architecture from all over the world, the author develops his thesis in a series of chapters that broadly trace the progress of human skill in many different traditions from the simple facture of hominid tools to the sophisticated universal three-dimensional grid of modern technology, which he describes as 'metaoptical' space. In wide-ranging and revealing discussions of facture, places, centres, two- and three-dimensional and planar images, virtuality and perspective, and the essentially centreless world of Western modernism, he creates a conceptual framework that, by always relating art to use, enables us to treat all traditions on an equal footing. At the same time this framework can help to accommodate and understand opposition and conflict both within and between cultures. In this wider framework, formalism and other theories of art can be seen and evaluated within the Western tradition whence they originated, without universal validity being claimed for them.

Within this broad plan there is great richness of detail and vividness of description, based on a constant engagement with actual works of art, and the author's analysis of the concrete metaphors that lie behind our critical vocabulary is revealing and thought-provoking. New terms are carefully defined and explained in such a way that any reader can appreciate why such terminology is necessary and useful. The author insists that all art is made to fit human uses, and can never be separated from the primary spatial conditions of those uses. With its universal scope and its sympathetic understanding of the innumerable forms art takes, this book will stimulate people to think in new and fruitful ways about the human purposes of art, and also to think more deeply and critically about the relations between art, political order and technology.